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ABSTRACT
Jobs, Schools and Roads:
The Long Run Economic Development of India
by
Gaurav Khanna
Chair: John Bound and Dean Yang
My dissertation uses novel empirical methods to explore large, national-level issues that affect
developing economies across several dimensions. I study a variety of issues such as unequal
educational access and attainment, labor market consequences of educational investments, af-
firmative action programs, nationwide infrastructure programs and regional development. One
aspect of my dissertation focusses on measuring the causal effects of large-scale government
initiatives, which, unlike smaller researcher-led interventions, come with a unique set of chal-
lenges like addressing significant general equilibrium effects, imperfect implementation, and
sporadic or poor-quality data. I consolidate conventional data from household surveys and
census data, with data from more innovative sources like satellite imagery, geospatial data,
state-level legislation and news reports. I also employ innovative econometric techniques and
various instrumental variable strategies in order to overcome data and identification difficulties
and comprehensively explore the efficacy of large-scale policies in developing countries.
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CHAPTER 1
Large-scale Education Reform in General
Equilibrium: Regression Discontinuity
Evidence from India
The economic consequences of large-scale government investments in education depend on the general
equilibrium (GE) effects in both the labor market and the education sector. I develop a novel general
equilibrium model and derive sufficient statistics that capture the economic consequences of a massive
countrywide schooling initiative implemented by the Indian government. I provide unbiased estimates of
the sufficient statistics using a Regression Discontinuity design. The earnings returns to a year of educa-
tion are 13.4%. The general equilibrium labor market effects are substantial: they depress the returns to
skill and dampen the increase in economic benefits. These GE effects have distributional consequences
across cohorts and skill groups, where as a result of the policy unskilled workers are better off and skilled
workers are worse off. In the education sector, more private schools enter these markets negating con-
cerns of crowd-out. These results indicate that researchers and policymakers need to consider the GE
effects when scaling up micro-interventions.
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1.1 Introduction
Large-scale educational expansions represent substantial investments of public resources and benefit
households by increasing productivity in the local economy. However, since they impact both individual
behavior and labor market outcomes, convincing causal estimates of their overall economic benefits are
hard to generate. While small-scale, carefully controlled, researcher-led experiments provide promis-
ing evidence about which educational investments are effective, for a variety of reasons these estimates
may not be valid for large scale policies. Importantly, large-scale education programs may have sizable
general equilibrium (GE) effects in the education sector and the labor market that may undermine the
effectiveness of the intervention. In the labor market, an expansion in schooling makes skilled workers
more abundant and lowers their equilibrium earnings. At the same time, an increase in the size of the
skilled workforce may attract capital and technology, benefiting skilled workers. In the education sector,
additional public schools may simply crowd-out private schools, diminishing the benefits from school-
ing expansions. I causally estimate and take into account these GE effects in determining the overall
economic consequences and benefits of a nationwide education program.
I build a new framework to analyze the consequences of a large-scale educational expansion program
in India with an explicit focus on issues inherent to nationwide government policies: the persistence
of effects and the consequences of lost funding, and GE effects in the markets for both education and
labor. I model the labor market and education sector and decompose wage changes into the individual
returns to education and the GE effects. I then estimate the sufficient statistics generated by the model
using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach. Further, I exploit variation in cohort exposure to the
program and skill levels to identify the GE effects, by estimating how the earnings skill-premium changes
across local economies. I use the estimated parameters to comprehensively measure the overall benefits
of the policy and its distributional consequences across skill levels and age cohorts. Not only do I find
substantial GE effects in the labor market, but I am also able to precisely estimate their size—in my
context these effects depress the returns to skill by 32% and dampen the increase in labor market benefits
by 23%. By increasing the size of the skilled workforce, the policy makes skilled workers worse off and
unskilled workers better off. At the same time, the GE effects in the education sector suggest a crowd-in
of private schools, negating concerns of crowd-out.
From a novel model of households, public schools, private schools, and firms, I derive sufficient statistics
that measure the effect of the program on welfare. In the education sector, I model the entry and exit
decisions of private schools, the spending decisions of public schools, and household decisions to attend
school. On the labor market side, I combine two sets of canonical models. The first is an education choice
model that determines one individual’s optimal level of education for a given set of wages (Becker, 1967;
Mincer, 1958; Willis, 1986). The second is a labor supply and demand framework that determines the set
of wages for a given distribution of education, where changes in the skill-distribution of the workforce
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affect the skill-premium in wages (Card and Lemieux, 2001).1 Combining these models allows me
to study how the distribution of earnings affects education choices, and consequently how changes in
education choices affect the distribution of earnings.
The returns to education and the change in the returns due to the GE effects are among the model’s
important sufficient statistics. While a well implemented policy can effectively increase the supply of
schooling, equilibrium schooling may not change much if the returns to education are low (Jensen, 2010,
2012).2 If overall education levels do rise because of the interventions, we expect earnings and therefore
the returns to be affected in a few ways. First, a more educated worker is more productive and will earn
a higher wage. Second, a more educated worker may reside in a region where there are fewer educated
workers, making her relatively more valuable in the labor market. But, if large numbers of people receive
additional education, there is also a GE effect in the labor market: an increase in the abundance of high-
skill labor puts downward pressure on their wages. At the same time, as more skilled workers join the
labor force, skill-biased capital may flow into these regions, raising their earnings. Last, as workers
switch to more productive skill groups, overall output may increase to the benefit of all workers. I,
therefore, estimate all components of the GE effects to better quantify the distributional impacts and the
overall increase in labor market benefits.
The policy I study is the District Primary Education Program (DPEP), which expanded public schooling
in half the country by targeting low-literacy regions. It was the India’s flagship scheme in the 1990s
and early 2000s. At that time it was the largest program for primary education in the world, in terms
of geography, population and funding, suggesting that its effects would be similarly broad (Jalan and
Glinskaya, 2013). The policy primarily built schools, hired teachers and upgraded infrastructure in low-
literacy districts. Such schooling expansions reduce the marginal cost of attaining education by improving
access to schools (Behrman et al., 1996; Birdsall, 1985). This will induce some students who have
potentially high returns to schooling but could not previously afford it to get more education. Duflo
(2001) shows that a similar program in Indonesia increased education levels and earnings for eligible
cohorts. Similarly, I examine not only the educational outcomes, but also earnings for different cohorts
and skill groups long after their exposure to the policy. Additionally, I measure how educational inputs
such as teachers and classrooms respond to decreases in funding in the long run.3
The allocation rule under which districts receive the funding allows me to estimate the parameters of the
model using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach. Since districts that had a female literacy rate
below the national average were more likely to receive the program, I can compare regions on either side
1There is a long literature that shows how the changes in the skill distribution affect returns in the labor market (Bound
and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992).
2Changes in returns will induce changes in education - Khanna (2014) finds that, in India, an increase in the probability of
getting a government job because of affirmative action policies incentivizes low caste students to not drop out of school. At
higher education levels, Khanna and Morales (2015) studies how an increase in returns to IT sector jobs in the US and India
affects graduation from engineering schools in the 1990s.
3In an accompanying paper, I complement these results by studying whether more decentralized decision making in such
policies is more effective (Khanna, 2015).
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of the literacy-rate cutoff to determine the causal impact of the policy. The RD design allows me to tackle
biases that may arise when estimating the individual returns to education, and when comparing earnings
in two different local economies. At the individual level these biases may arise if more competent workers
are also more competent at school. The RD allows me to compare students who were induced into getting
more education to similarly competent students that were not. Furthermore, some regions may have a
large number of skilled workers or industries that require skilled work, and are therefore not comparable
to other regions. At the regional level, therefore, the RD tackles biases that arise due to differences in the
local economy and labor market.
To support each piece of the general equilibrium model, I create a comprehensive dataset by combining
three waves of a household survey, a census of firms, school-level data, and the Indian Census. I use
the data to estimate the returns to education and the GE effects, exploiting not just the RD, but also the
variation in cohort exposure and skill levels. Younger cohorts can change their educational attainment in
response to the policy, whereas older cohorts cannot. Both the young and the old are, however, affected
by changes in the labor market skill distribution. Furthermore, since the young and the old are not perfect
substitutes in the labor market, the GE effects on the two cohorts must be estimated separately. Using the
estimated parameters, I measure the GE effects and the overall impact of the policy on household welfare
for the different types of workers and cohorts.4
Given evidence from other contexts, it is crucial for researchers to address these labor market GE effects.
In the US, Abbott et al. (2013); Heckman et al. (1998a,b); Lee (2005) show how changes in taxes or
tuition and financial aid may have large general equilibrium effects. In developing countries as well, an
increase in the size of the skilled workforce have been found to depress wages for high-skill workers
(Angrist, 1995; Duflo, 2004).5 I both flexibly model and causally estimate the GE effects on different
cohorts and on different skill groups, allowing me to determine distributional consequences across both
dimensions. I estimate the earnings skill-premium by age group separately on either side of the RD cutoff.
The difference in the earnings skill-premium for older workers allows me to measure the GE effects that
affect all cohorts. At the same time, there is an often ignored, additional impact on younger workers
which I estimate by looking at the additional change in the skill-premium for young workers.
There are already a substantial number of micro-interventions in India that can help guide policy-makers
in supply-side interventions.6 These micro-interventions are, however, inherently different from large
4I corroborate my results with a Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis similar to Duflo (2001), where I compare treated
to untreated districts and the young to older cohorts. Using a DID design, however, it is hard to recover the entire extent of the
labor market GE effects as the portion of the GE effects that affect all cohorts are differenced out by the DID estimator. The
advantage of the RD is that it allows me to estimate the entire extent of the GE effects, and disentangle them into the portion
that affects all cohorts and any additional impact on treated cohorts.
5There are other types of labor market GE effects in other contexts: Crepon et al. (2013) highlight the possibilities of
negative externalities in job assistance programs, Albrecht et al. (2009) calibrate a macro model of the change in the labor
market equilibrium due to the Swedish Knowledge Lift program, and more recently Bianchi (2016) shows how college major
choice in Italy can affect returns.
6These studies cover a wide gamut of programs like library programs (Borkum et al., 2010), teacher training (Kingdon and
Teal, 2010), teacher incentives (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010), computer-aided programs (Linden, 2008), remedial
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school expansion programs since they do not have GE effects. While the evidence on smaller changes
of inputs within schools is mixed (Muralidharan, 2013), large-scale investments in schooling expansions
like the one studied here, have been found to be relatively more successful across the world.7
A concern with an expansion in public schooling is that it may crowd out private supply. On the other
hand, a crowd-in could also have occurred if the program increased the overall size and the demand for
a skilled workforce. Understanding how private schools respond is, therefore, essential to identifying the
overall benefits, as a large amount of crowd-out implies that the funds are essentially wasted and could
have been spent on other programs. In my context, I model and estimate this change in private supply. In
line with other work (Andrabi et al., 2013), I find an influx of private schools when public schooling is
expanded.
To track long-run outcomes, I assemble a 10 year long panel of districts that allows me to follow local
labor and education markets over time. While studies have found that policies that lower the costs of
schooling have positive impacts in the short run, the existing evidence on the persistence of impacts is
mixed (Angrist et al., 2006; Das et al., 2013a). I find that while there was a net increase in the number
of new schools built over this period, only a few of these schooling inputs last in the long run. Once the
funding is phased out, the physical infrastructure upgrades remain but the differential effects on more
qualified teachers dissipates.8
I find that the program increased both education and earnings for students in targeted regions. There are
large overall economic benefits to households that are driven by reductions in the costs of education and
an increase in the overall output of the region. However, general equilibrium effects substantially mitigate
the rise in labor market earnings for those who acquire more skill. Increases in the supply of educated
workers dampened earnings for skilled workers and put upward pressure on the earnings of unskilled
workers. The returns to skill are 13.4%, but the estimated labor market GE effects are substantial – for
a 17 percentage point increase in the fraction of skilled workers, the GE effects depress the returns by
6.5% points and dampen the increase in benefits to students by 23%. These GE effects have distributional
consequences, with a transfer of labor-market benefits from skilled to unskilled workers, particularly
among the younger cohorts. High-skill workers who did not change their educational levels under the
policy are adversely affected in the labor market, whereas low-skill workers benefit. Importantly, mobility
education (Banerjee et al., 2010, 2007) and class sizes (Banerjee et al., 2007; Jacob et al., 2008; Muralidharan, 2013). Some
often cited reasons for low educational outcomes are teacher quality and high levels of teacher absence (Das et al., 2013c;
Duflo et al., 2012; Muralidharan, 2013).
7Some examples are in Indonesia (Duflo, 2001), Burkina Faso (Kazianga et al., 2013), Zimbabwe (Aguero and Bharadwaj,
2014), Nigeria (Osili and Long, 2008), Sierra Leone (Cannonier and Mocan, 2012), Uganda (Deininger, 2003), Zambia
(Ashraf et al., 2015), Kenya (Bold et al., 2013b), Tanzania (Sifuna, 2007), West Bank & Gaza (Angrist, 1995), and India
(Afridi, 2010; Chin, 2005).
8There is also a large literature in the US that studies whether spending on education affects educational outcomes (Card
and Payne, 2002; Hanushek, 1997, 2003, 2006; Hoxby, 2001; Krueger, 2003). One crucial result from the US literature is
that not all schooling inputs have similar impacts, and so it is necessary to understand which inputs matter (Grogger, 1996;
Hanushek, 1986, 2008; Krueger, 1999; Loeb and Bound, 1996). This is why I extensively study the changes in a whole host
of schooling inputs, from teachers to physical infrastructure.
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of skill-biased capital does play a role, however small, in mitigating the GE effects. But consistent
with the other literature in this context (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2015), I find no evidence of labor
mobility.9
The methodology developed in this paper accounts for the general equilibrium effects of large-scale gov-
ernment spending and finds them to be substantial. In doing so, it improves upon the literature estimating
the private returns to education that exploits changes to tuition reductions, compulsory schooling laws,
schooling expansions or other large-scale policy reforms, but largely ignores the broader adjustments in
the labor market and education sector. Consistent with the theory I build in this paper, I find in the Indian
context, that labor market GE effects dampen private benefits to students that attain more education and
have substantial distributional consequences. The results in this paper indicate that these wage responses
may undermine some of the effectiveness of micro-interventions when they are scaled up (Acemoglu,
2010; Deaton, 2010).10 On the other hand, the crowd-in of private schools indicate that large-scale public
schooling expansions may have other unintended benefits in the education sector. I also show that once
the funding was phased out certain crucial inputs, such as well qualified teachers, no longer remain. These
empirically important consequences are vital considerations for both researchers and policy-makers who
examine or implement large-scale interventions.
1.2 The District Primary Education Project (DPEP)
I use exogenous variation generated by a large schooling expansion policy (the District Primary Education
Project (DPEP)) implemented by the Indian government. The government selected districts based on
the prevailing female literacy rate, which allows for a RD design. I compare districts that should have
received the policy to those that should not have, on either side of the RD cutoff, to causally estimate the
parameters of the model. This was also a time of rapid growth and development in the Indian economy,
which is why the RD is necessary to isolate the impact of the policy from other changes.
In 1992, the Indian Parliament updated their National Policy on Education with a renewed focus on
primary and upper primary education. Based on recommendations from the Central Advisory Board of
Education, the Parliament amended the constitution and transferred education-related decisions to local
bodies, and stressed the decentralization of decision making by helping districts plan and manage both
primary and upper primary education.11
9In an accompanying paper (Khanna, 2015), I compare this policy to more decentralized policies implemented in the
following decade. The decentralized policies targeted sub-districts in a way that allows me to use a Multi-Dimensional
Regression Discontinuity (MRD) framework. Since MRD is new to the literature, I provide Monte Carlo evidence about the
best possible estimators in such contexts. I find that the decentralized policies were relatively more effective in raising literacy
rates, suggesting that there are benefits to using local administrative bodies that may have better information.
10This point has often been made outside the realm of Development Economics as well (Heckman et al., 1999).
11Primary is usually grades 1 through 4 or 5, and upper primary is grades 5 or 6 through 8.
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In 1994, the District Primary Education Project (DPEP) was introduced in seven states and 42 districts,
and was over time expanded to 271 of approximately 600 districts in the country. The project spanned
four phases, the last of which were implemented in the mid-2000s. While a portion of the funds were
released under DPEP through the mid-2000s, the bulk of the funding ended in 2005 when other policies
under the newer Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) were growing in strength.12 In 2006, only 2 states received
any money, and after 2007 none did.13
DPEP grew to consist of seven projects, with funding from the World Bank, the European Commission
(EC), the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) and Official Development Assistance
(ODA), the Royal Government of the Netherlands, and UNICEF, making it one of the largest donor
assisted programs in the world (Jalan and Glinskaya, 2013). The Central government contributed 85%
of the amount using these donor funds.14 The remaining 15% came from states, which had to maintain
the level of expenditure that existed before the program was implemented in an attempt to ensure that
there was no crowd-out of state funds.15 However, states did have the ability to re-allocate funds across
districts.
Figure 1.1 shows foreign aid earmarked for primary and upper primary education only, and also the
amount spent specifically on DPEP. Both amounts rose steadily in the 1990s till they peak in 2002-3.
When foreign aid was cut in 2003, so was DPEP expenditure, which fell steadily over the next few
years. Foreign aid spiked up again in 2005-6 as the next policy – the SSA – was ramped up. Figure 1.2
shows how much the Central government transferred to the states for social sector spending (health and
education). This amount, and the share of total transfers, rose steadily during this period. The figures
make it clear that this was a period of a large increase in externally-financed expenditure on education,
most of which was concentrated in less than half the districts of the country, allowing for a valuable
policy experiment.
The broader program claims to have covered about 271 low literacy districts, and served approximately
51.3 million children and 1.1 million teachers in about 375,000 schools (Jalan and Glinskaya, 2013).
12SSA was similar to the DPEP, but covered the entire country. There were, however, certain programs under SSA that
targeted certain sub-districts.
13The phase-out was fairly rapid. In the 2002-3 financial year, the government spent approximately $345 mn on DPEP,
whereas in the 2006-7 financial year, they spent only $24 mn on it. Even though taxes were not raised to fund the DPEP, when
the shift to the newer SSA program happened, the government levied a 2% education tax to fund an expansion to all districts.
14India has received aid on various social and infrastructure programs, and in 2005-6 alone it received $4 bn (Colclough and
De, 2010). By 2002 the World Bank alone had committed about $1.62 bn on DPEP, whereas the other donors concentrated
on certain states. For example, in the first few years of the program, the EC spent ECU 150mn in Madhya Pradesh, the
Netherlands spent $25.8 mn in Gujarat, DFID spend 80 mn pounds in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, whereas UNICEF
spent $ 153 mn in Bihar (GOI, 2000). WorldBank (1997) claims that in 1993, the EC provided a grant of ECU 150 mn,
whereas the World Bank approved credits of $265 mn in 1994 and $425 mn in 1996. At the time of the transfer to the wider
SSA program in 2004, the World Bank’s contribution consisted of less than half of the external aid funds, with DFID and the
EC being the other major donors. Between 2004 and 2007 alone, about $7.8 bn was spent on the expanded SSA program,
including the Government’s contributions (Ayyar, 2008).
15Varghese (1994) claims that states had to maintain their educational expenditures at at least their 1992 values, and World-
Bank (1997) guidelines claim states had to maintain the same growth rate in educational expenditure.
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These districts were geographically dispersed all over the country as can be seen in the map in Appendix
Figure 1.12. It created 63,000 new schools, including more than 50,000 ‘alternative’ or ‘community
schools’, and trained about 1 million teachers and 3 million community members.16 Within the state,
there was major inter-district variation in planning and management as the districts had the flexibility
to allocate funds. In the project states, it increased the average allocation of funds for primary school
education by between 17-20% (Jalan and Glinskaya, 2013).17
The objectives of the project were two-fold. The first was to improve student access to and retention
in primary and upper primary education by building schools, supporting school and community orga-
nizations, constructing new classrooms and improving existing school facilities. The guidelines of the
program stipulated that the “project would be a reconstruction of primary education as a whole in se-
lected districts instead of piecemeal implementation of schemes” (GOI, 1994). While most of the funds
were directed towards the government schools, some were used towards a training drive for teachers of
private and government-aided schools.18
The second objective was to improve the access to primary and upper primary education by establishing
district institutions to decentralize planning.19 The programs were developed by each participating district
and appraised by the Bureau that also provided implementation support. The programs were evaluated
and the poorly performing subprojects are dropped.
There are numerous World Bank and Government of India briefs and media reports that refer to the pro-
gram’s success.20 The most in-depth investigation, however, is a working paper by Jalan and Glinskaya
(2013) that uses a difference-in-differences methodology to compare the enrollment rates for students in
the 42 districts in the first of the four phases to other districts. They find that five years after the program
started, enrollment and grade progression of minority groups only in some specific states improved. Fur-
thermore, grade progression for boys in certain states was higher, but there were little to no impacts on
girls. Over the entire period, districts were not allowed to receive more than $8 million, which came to
approximately $9.1 per student. Jalan and Glinskaya (2013) estimate that this intervention lowered the
16Alternative or community schools are part of the non-formal schooling system. They provide the basic schooling infras-
tructure to remote areas and disadvantaged groups with the help of the local community.
17In this period, DPEP was the flagship education program, despite being restricted to less than half the country. For
example, in 2001 alone, the Ministry of Human Resource Development, estimates spending $275 mn on DPEP for the limited
number of districts. The second and third largest expenditures were on schemes that covered all districts like the Mid-day
Meal Scheme ($232 mn), and Operation Blackboard ($130 mn).
18The guidelines of the policy also discussed the local community initiatives in promoting enrollment and retention. For
example, Village Education Committees and local bodies like the Mother-Teacher Associations were tasked with creating
local awareness campaigns and getting more children into schools and preventing them from dropping out of schools.
19Specifically, this was to be done by managing the delivery of education, including teacher support and materials develop-
ment through Block Resource Centers (BRC) and Cluster Resource Centers (CRC), and strengthening the District Institutes of
Education and Training (DIET). This also included targeted interventions for girls and minority groups, and the expansion of
Early Childhood Education (ECE). The program established a DPEP Bureau in the Ministry of Human Resource Development
that served as a financial and technical intermediary. They appraised, monitored and supervised the district programs.
20See World Bank Report (2003), “World Bank praises India for DPEP” Economic Times, (Sep 2005) and Government of
India (2011).
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private household costs of schooling by between 20 to 40%. Their paper uses two repeated cross sections
of enrollment to look at the short-run impacts on the few districts in the first phase of the program. In
contrast, I use the RD design and look at the longer run effects fifteen years after the program started,
and after all the phases were implemented. Other descriptive studies examine the outcomes for DPEP
districts without comparing them to other districts (Aggarwal, 2000; Menon, 2001; Pandey, 2000), and
hence cannot distinguish between the changes in overall education taking place all across the country
driven by a robust economic growth, and the changes specifically attributable to the program.
1.3 The Model, Comparative Statics and Economic Benefits
I set up a model that captures the salient features of the local economy and the market for education,
including the general equilibrium effects. The model will identify sufficient statistics that determine the
effect of schooling expansion policies on economic benefits. On the labor market side, I combine two sets
of canonical models. The first is a returns-to-education model (Becker, 1967; Card, 1999; Mincer, 1958),
which determines one individual’s optimal level of education for a given distribution of wages. The
second is a labor market model (Card and Lemieux, 2001) that determines the equilibrium distribution of
wages for a given distribution of educational skill levels. By combining them, I can study how changes
in the education distribution affect the distribution of wages, and vice versa, allowing me to identify the
general equilibrium effects in the labor market.21
The demand for education is determined by students’ optimization decisions, whereas the supply depends
on the choices made by both public and private schools. Furthermore, how students react to changes in
the education sector depends on the labor market returns and the general equilibrium effects on earn-
ings. Building new schools and increasing access to schools will reduce the marginal cost of schooling
(Behrman et al., 1996; Birdsall, 1985); directly affecting household welfare, and increased schooling will
lead to payoffs in the labor market.22
1.3.1 Economic Production and the Labor Market
A final good is produced in the local economy using capital and labor as inputs, where the labor input
varies by cohort and skill level. Capital is perfectly elastically supplied across districts at rental rate R∗.23
Effective labor supply in district d is Ld, and depends on the labor aggregate at each skill level. The
production function is a modification of the nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function
21Here and elsewhere, I will be using the terms education and skill interchangeably.
22New schools reduce transportation costs, and lower the market price by expanding supply, whereas improvements in
quality make it easier for students to complete the grade.
23The perfectly elastic capital assumption is not essential. The results are unaffected by assuming a fixed capital stock (see
Section 1.12.2).
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proposed by Card and Lemieux (2001). Labor aggregates at each skill level Lsd are represented by their
skill level s. This production function helps me disentangle the various components that contribute to the
returns to a higher level of skill. Aggregate output Yd in district d depends on Ld (effective labor) and Kd
(capital):24
Yd = L
%
dK
(1−%)
d (1.1)
Ld =
(∑
s
θsdL
σE−1
σE
sd
) σE
σE−1
, (1.2)
where 0 < % < 1 is the share of output accruing to labor, θsd > 0 is the productivity of workers with
education or skill level s, and σE > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across education or skill groups. The
productivity parameter θsd captures the productivity of each skill level, and increases with an increase in
skill-biased capital in the district ksd, such that θ′sd(ksd) > 0.
25 The value of θsd therefore varies across
districts only because of the variation in skill-biased capital ksd. The aggregate supply of workers at skill
level s depends on the aggregate effective supply of workers in each skill level `asd in a given age cohort
a:
Lsd =
(∑
a
ψa`
σA−1
σA
asd
) σA
σA−1
(1.3)
Here, σA is the elasticity of substitution across age cohorts, and ψa is the productivity of a specific cohort.
The effective supply `asd may depend on the ability of workers i.26 A worker gets paid their marginal
product. The average log earnings are therefore:27
logwasd = log
(
∂Yd
∂`asd
)
= log %˜+ log θsd + logψa +
1
σE
log Yd +
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
logLsd − 1
σA
log `asd ,
(1.4)
where log %˜ ≡
[(
1− 1
σE
)(
1−%
%
)
log
(
1−%
R∗
)]
is common across all districts and workers.28
24As explained in Section 1.4.1.1 the estimation procedure and measured GE effects do not depend on the functional form
of the production function. Furthermore, adding non-tradables like land into the aggregate production function Equation (1.1)
does not directly affect the estimation strategy. The policy will theoretically change the value of non-tradables; however, I
will be concentrating on the earnings of workers, and not be examining the returns to owners of capital and land.
25For completeness, in Appendix 1.12.3 I explicitly model skill-biased capital within the nested CES framework and show
how flexible ways of incorporating it do not affect the estimation or results.
26For instance, the effective supply `asd =
∑
i i`asdi.
27This is at the optimal value of K∗d , so that Yd =
(
1−%
R∗
) 1−%
% Ld.
28For convenience, I have ignored the role played by changes in prices. It is easy to include a logPd that will be clubbed
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There are a few components that drive the differences in average earnings when comparing two different
types of people in two different labor markets represented in Equation (1.5):
log
(
wasd
wa′s′d′
)
= log
(
θsd
θs′d′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity
+ log
(
ψa
ψa′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cohort
+
1
σE
log
(
Yd
Yd′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
output
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
log
Lsd
Ls′d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
skill distribution
− 1
σA
log
`asd
`a′s′d′︸ ︷︷ ︸
skill-cohort distribution
(1.5)
This equation is crucial in that it captures why earnings are systematically different across people and
across labor markets. The first component – ‘productivity’ – θsd is the higher productivity associated
with more education. Not only are skilled workers more productive, but variation in the supply of skill-
biased capital across districts will affect earnings as well. The second component – ‘cohort’ – captures
the age-specific productivities and returns to experience ψa. The third – ‘output’ – is the difference across
labor markets related to different overall output Yd. The fourth – ‘skill-distribution’ – is the difference in
earnings due to differences in the supply of more educated workers Lsd. This influences the labor market
general equilibrium effects that affect all cohorts. Last – ‘skill-cohort distribution’ – affects the earnings
due to differences in the supply of skilled workers within each cohort `asd, and drives an additional GE
effect on cohort a. Changes in the skill cohort distribution by age cohort will therefore have important
GE effects on the earnings of workers.
Furthermore, how much the skill distribution affects the difference in earnings also depends on the elas-
ticities of substitution σE and σA. For example, if the young and the old are perfect substitutes, then the
skill-cohort distribution should not affect earnings.
The increase in earnings for a person who goes from being unskilled u to skilled s will be defined as the
returns to education βasd:
log
wasd
waud
= log
θsd
θud
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
log
Lsd
Lud
− 1
σA
log
`asd
`aud
≡ βasd (1.6)
These returns depend on the difference in the productivity parameters θsd and θud, the skill distribution
Lsd and Lud, and the cohort specific skill distribution `asd and `aud. For instance, in regions that have
relatively more skilled workers, the returns to acquiring skill will be relatively lower. Whereas for regions
with more skill-biased capital, the returns to skill are higher.
with the 1σE log Yd term, and not affect the returns to skill.
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1.3.2 Students’ Decisions
Students, in my model, choose the optimal level of education given their marginal costs of going to
school and the returns to education (Becker, 1967; Mincer, 1958; Willis, 1986). Given how earnings are
determined in section 1.3.1, these choices will also eventually affect earnings.
Individuals i in district d and age a choose their optimal consumption stream, Cit, and years of schooling,
sid, to maximize utility u(Cit), where u′(Cit) > 0 and u′′(Cit) < 0. For a given subjective discount rate
δ, an internal rate of interest rid and a constant stream of earnings waid(sid), the optimization problem
can be set up as:
max
Cit,sid
∫ ∞
0
u(Cit)e
−δtdt (1.7)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
waid(sid)e
−rid(κ(sid)+t)dt ≥
∫ ∞
0
Cite
−ridtdt , (1.8)
where κ(sid) captures the costs of schooling. For example, if κ(sid) = sid, then it only captures the
opportunity cost of foregone earnings for each additional year of schooling.29
In the absence of incomplete markets and uncertainty, this problem is separable into individuals first
choosing sid to maximize their stream of earnings, and then choosing Cit to maximize utility. Student
i chooses their optimal years of education sid to maximize the present discounted value of their lifetime
earnings waid(sid) given the costs of going to school κi(sid). Since the linear form of κ(sid) only captures
the opportunity costs, Card (1999) suggests a more general formulation of the cost function, which may
also help capture credit and other monetary constraints (Becker, 1967):30
max
sid
log waid(sid)−
(
log rid + ridsid +
1
2
Γs2id
)
, (1.10)
where Γ is the quadratic cost parameter. Equations (1.5) and (1.6) determine the form of the individual
earnings function. The benefits from education for individual i can be represented by the following
function, where βasd captures the returns to schooling that may differ across districts, cohorts and skill-
groups:
29This specific opportunity-cost only formulation leads to the familiar form (Mincer, 1958; Willis, 1986):
log
(∫ ∞
0
waid(sid)e
−rid(sid+t)dt
)
= log waid(sid)− (log rid + ridsid) (1.9)
30Becker (1967) justifies the quadratic costs from the observation that each subsequent year of education is even more
expensive than before, because (a) fees are higher for higher levels (and in many cases early education is subsidized), and (b)
students first exhaust easy sources of funds (parents, relatives) before using more expensive sources (loans).
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log waid(sid) = γd + νa + βasdsid + log i , (1.11)
where i is the ability of the worker that is not observable to researchers. This ability will be correlated
with the marginal costs of schooling rid and lead to biases in standard OLS regressions (corr(i, rid) 6= 0).
For example, high-ability workers earn high wages but also have lower costs of performing in school.
Also crucial to notice is that the returns to education βasd differ across districts and skill-groups due
to differences in relative skills in the local labor force, and across cohorts due to the cohort-specific
differences in the skill distribution.
In Equation (1.11), average earnings also differ across districts γd due to differences in the overall output
and capital across regions, and differ across age cohorts νa due to the returns to experience or other
cohort-specific productivities discussed in Equation (1.5).
Given this setup, from the first order conditions one can obtain the optimal years of education for person
i:
s∗id =
βasd − rid
Γ
(1.12)
The variation in s∗id within a district d is driven entirely by the variation in the marginal cost parameter rid.
Notice, however, that the distribution of earnings in district d are driven both by the costs of education
rid, and by i abilities.31
The marginal cost parameter for person i in district d is a function of the district-level costs of going to
school, and an individual component ηi that captures individual heterogeneity in the costs of schooling.
The district-level costs depend on the access to schooling Ad (like distance to the nearest school) and the
monetary price of going to school pd (like school fees).32
rid ≡ −ΨAd + pd + ηi , (1.13)
where Ψ represents how aggregate access to education affects each i individual.33 An increase in the
number of schools in regions that did not initially have many will directly lower the transportation costs
of going to school, but may also lower the competitive equilibrium fees, even for private schools.34 These
31Smith (1775) highlights the importance of educational capabilities rid when arguing that “The difference between the
most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so from nature,
as from habit, custom and education.” On the other hand, early formal models of variation in earnings (Roy, 1950) discuss the
importance of ‘abilities’ i, like “health, strength, skill, and so on.”
32Restricting the cost parameter to simply depend on either only the monetary costs of going to school (pd) or only the
non-monetary costs (Ad) will not change the qualitative predictions of the model. This is because an expansion in public
schooling will lower both types of costs in equilibrium.
33For example, one simple form is Ψ = 1Nd where Nd is the number of potential students in the district.
34Here, students choose the lowest cost school regardless of whether they are privately or publicly owned.
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education decisions are a nested portion of the problem where individuals maximize their lifetime utility
based on their consumption stream.35
1.3.3 Schools
In this section I model the decisions made by private and public schools. The major modeling difference
between public and private schools is that for public schools a district planner makes the decisions for all
schools, whereas in the private sector each school decides separately. Furthermore, while public schools
are meant to increase the access to schooling to citizens, private schools care about profits. Both types
of schools can have heterogeneous costs or efficiency, but they provide the same output. Hence, students
merely chose the school that is less costly for them, where the costs not only depend on the school fees
pd, but also transportation costs and non-monetary costs Ad.
1.3.3.1 District Level Public School Administrator’s Decisions
District administrators for public schools maximize the access to schooling for students by investing in
inputs. The total supply of public schooling depends on inputs such as newer schools, more teachers
or better infrastructure. As access to schooling is increased, this reduces the marginal costs of going to
school for students. For example, one crucial aspect of access to schooling could be the distance to the
nearest school. By building more schools, public officials may reduce this distance and increase access
to schools.
I model this in the following way: district administrators want to maximize the overall access to education
Ad for the students in the entire district d. Greater access to schooling will lower the marginal costs for
households. Public schools are not directly concerned with revenues from fees, and many are meant to
be free (Kremer and Muralidharan, 2007). They do, however, have a budget constraint that restricts their
spending.36 The district d receives Rd from the government, and spends pm for each input xm into the
schooling production function. Any funds received under government-backed schemes will increase the
value of Rd. The vector of inputs at the district level xm can consist of new schools, better qualified
teachers, better infrastructure, more resource centers, etc. This setup, therefore, reduces the district’s
maximization problem to the following:37
max
xm
Ad(xm) (1.14)
35On the consumption side, the inter-temporal consumption stream can be represented by the Euler equation: u
′(Ci,t+1)
u′(Ci,t)
=
δ
rid
, where overall consumption Cdt, must equal overall production by the firms Ydt for the product market to clear.
36In equilibrium, the fees will be affected by the decisions of public and private schools, since they compete in the same
market.
37The set-up is agnostic about heterogeneity in public schools – some may be more efficient than others.
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s.t.
M∑
m=1
pmxm ≤ Rd , (1.15)
where ∂A
∂xm
> 0, ∂
2A
∂xm∂xm
< 0, ∂
2A
∂xm∂xn
> 0. From the first order conditions, it is easy to derive the
optimal amount of inputs of type m: x∗md(Rd,pm), where
∂x∗m
∂Rd
≥ 0 and ∂x∗m
∂pm
≤ 0. An increase in
government funding Rd thus increases the amounts of each input in the schooling-access production
function, increases the overall access to education Ad and reduces the marginal costs of schooling for the
students in the district.38
1.3.3.2 Private schools
Private schools are profit maximizers and have heterogeneous costs.39 An increase in the demand for
schooling from households will increase their profitability, and more private schools will enter. Building
more public schools affects the entry of private schools and determines the extent of crowd-in or crowd-
out. If private schools are merely crowded out one-for-one, then the funds may have been better spent
elsewhere.
Private schools are price takers in the competitive market and charge a fee pd. Muralidharan and Sun-
dararaman (2015) are among the first to use causal evidence to show that students in private schools
have the same test scores as public school students for the subjects that are taught in school. They are,
however, more cost-effective. Private schools, in my model, therefore, have the same output as public
schools, but may do so at a different cost. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity in private school efficiency
(Kremer and Muralidharan, 2007).
The total educational output (in student-years) Qjd by school j is a function of its aggregate inputs Xjd
in the following way: Qjd = θdXj . Here the aggregate output of the private schools depends on the
average skill level of the district θd. This is meant to capture demand externalities. For instance, Birdsall
(1982) models the demand for schooling from households, as a function of the aggregate supply of
public schools. An expansion of public schooling, will then increase the overall demand for all schools,
including privately owned ones. Another alternative comes from peer effects in school participation. If
certain students are encouraged to go to school, then the demand from their neighbors may also rise
(Bobonis and Finan, 2009).40 There are, however, quadratic costs associated with using inputs Z(Xj).
The school chooses inputs to maximize profits:
max
Xj
pdθdXj − Z(Xj) (1.16)
38See Appendix 1.12.1 for a parametric example of this set-up.
39Alternatively, they could have been modeled as having heterogeneous productivities, with the same result.
40Output in the public schools may also depend on θd, without a qualitative change in the results.
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The costs Z(Xj) = z1jXj + 12z2dX
2
j have a simple quadratic formulation.
41 There is a heterogeneity
in costs z1j across schools, where some schools use their inputs more effectively than others, and a
heterogeneity in costs z2d across districts, where certain districts have better infrastructure for setting up
a school. This is meant to capture the fact that in some districts it is cheaper to hire teachers (Andrabi
et al., 2013) and some have better physical infrastructure like electricity, drinking water, roads, and Block
Resource Centers (BRCs) than others (Jagnani and Khanna, 2016). The demand for inputs can, therefore,
be found from the first order conditions, and the supply curve of schooling is:
Qjd = θdX
∗
j = θd
pdθd − z1j
z2d
, (1.17)
whereas, the school’s profits are:
pijd =
(pdθd − z1j)2
2z2d
, (1.18)
Since there is free entry of private schools into these regions, schools will enter until pijd = 0. The
marginal school, therefore, will have a cost parameter z˜1d = θdpd. If costs are drawn from a distribution
F (z1j), then the fraction of schools that enter is given by: F
(
θdpd
)
.
Notice what guides the entry and exit decision of schools is the average productivity level in the district
θd, the price pd, and consequently the cost z2d which depends on the infrastructure levels. If we see a fall
in the supply of private schools along with a fall in the equilibrium price, then it is clear that the strongest
driving force is that an increase in the supply of public schooling drives down the equilibrium price and
crowds-out private school.
Alternatively, if we see a rise in the supply of private schools in the light of an expansion in public schools,
there are two possible reasons. The first is that demand externalities and peer effects – captured by θd
– drive up the equilibrium price and induces private schools to enter. The second is that infrastructure
upgrades and the presence of more teachers lowers the operating costs – captured by z2d – and lead to
more private school entry and further lowers the equilibrium price. The best evidence for how private
schools respond comes from Andrabi et al. (2013), who show that how an expansion in public schooling
increased education for girls, and these girls became teachers in Pakistani districts. This increase in
the number of teachers allowed private schools to enter the market soon after. Similarly, Jagnani and
Khanna (2016); Pal (2010) find that physical infrastructure upgrades can induce private-school entry in
India.42
41While it is easy to hire the first few teachers or administrators, it is more costly to hire the next few as the pool of potential
candidates dwindles.
42See Appendix 1.12.1 for a derivation for the overall supply of private schooling in the region – in the parametric formu-
lation, it is easy to see that ∂p
∗
d
∂z2d
> 0. The intuition is simple a fall in the operating costs will increase the supply of private
schools and lower the equilibrium price. On the other hand, an increase in the demand externality will increase demand for
schooling and raise the equilibrium price. Seeing how prices change will allow us to distinguish between the various potential
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Last, Kremer and Muralidharan (2007) argue that private schools may exist in regions where public
schooling has failed, suggesting that they may end up serving different sub-regions within a district.
Public-school officials may then target regions where there are fewer private schools in the first place,
and dissipate any concerns of crowd-out or any likelihood of crowd-in. Together, these predictions on
equilibrium quantities and prices will allow us to determine which of these mechanisms are stronger than
others.
1.3.4 Definition of an Equilibrium
The exogenous elements of equilibrium are the student utility, schooling-cost functions, educational ac-
cess functions, private firms’ production functions, and the amount of exogenous government spending
on schooling. What is endogenous is the years of education, the earnings-returns to education, the optimal
inputs in the schools, the output of firms, the fraction of private schools that enter, and the equilibrium
price and quantity of schooling.43
Appendix 1.12.1 characterizes and derives the education-sector equilibrium. For the product market to
clear, the amount of consumption Ctd must equal the amount of output Ytd. For the labor market to
clear, the demand for workers `asd with education level s must equal the supply. The equilibrium amount
of schooling determines the supply of labor at skill level s, and the demand for labor is determined by
Equation (1.4).
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) Given the following dimensions of the model: A student utility function
U(C), returns to education function log w(s) and cost functions κ(s, r,Γ); access to schooling function
A(xm), and prices of inputs pm; exogenous revenues from the government Rd; distribution of private
school costs F (z1j), and cost functions for private schools Z(Xj); firms’ production functions Y , dif-
ferent productivities for each education level θsd, the elasticity of substitution between education groups
σE , and age groups σA; there exists an equilibrium that determines: The returns to an additional year of
schooling βasd that varies by district, age-cohort and skill level; the distribution of the optimal years of
schooling S∗d , and the monetary price of going to school p
∗
d; the optimal inputs into the access function
x∗m(Rd, αm,pm); optimal private school inputs X
∗
j (pd, z1j); and equilibrium earnings wasd and quanti-
ties of each type of worker `asd.
mechanisms.
43In line with the literature, so far I have assumed perfect foresight. When there are general equilibrium effects, students
know exactly what the earnings will be including the general equilibrium effects. If expectations were adaptive, and students
did not take into account the GE effects, they would get “too much” education, causing the skilled wage to fall even further.
The subsequent cohort would then need to adjust its expectations as well, and the equilibrium is approached very slowly as
each cohort revises its expectations. For a cobweb style model see Freeman (1975).
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1.4 Identification, Policy Outcomes and Economic Benefits
I use this model to generate sufficient statistics which determine the overall economic consequences of
the policy, including the general equilibrium effects. To estimate these sufficient statistics, I use a RD
based on a policy which expanded the public-school system. Improving access to schooling by building
newer schools or upgrading its infrastructure will reduce the marginal costs of schooling and induce
some students to get more education. Since the policy was large, the GE effects will affect the benefits
to not just the induced students, but all others in the local economy as well. In order to determine the
labor market earnings of all the different types of workers, I use the policy variation to isolate the GE
effects.
1.4.1 Using Policy Changes to Estimate Parameters
The variation in s∗id is driven entirely by the variation in the marginal costs rid. Since the costs of school-
ing are likely to be correlated with the ability of the worker Cov(ηi, i) 6= 0, a simple OLS regression
of earnings on education will give us biased estimates of the parameters. Moreover, comparisons in
the cross-section across different labor markets will provide biased estimates due to underlying baseline
differences in the skill distribution across these markets.
The equilibrium amount of schooling is affected by the expansion of public schooling:44
S∗d = φ1βasd + φ2Rd −
ηd
Γ
(1.19)
There are a few crucial components to this equation – the φ2Rd portion captures how more government
spending increases equilibrium schooling by making public schools more accessible, and making (via
adjustments in the market price) private schools more affordable (Appendix 1.12.1). The term φ1βasd,
captures how changes in the returns to education will affect equilibrium schooling. If, for example,
the labor-market general equilibrium effects substantially lower the returns to education βasd, then there
may be no detectable increase in the equilibrium amount of schooling. The final term ηd
Γ
is unaffected
by the schooling expansion. We would, however, expect it to be correlated with other district-level
characteristics causing biased estimates in standard estimation frameworks.
The districts that received the schooling expansion policy were selected based on a criteria that leads
to a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. Any district that had a female literacy rate below the
national average (based on the 1991 Census) was made eligible to receive the policy. Therefore, it is
44 See Appendix 1.12.1 for a parameterization of φ1 and φ2, where φ1 ≡
(
θ2d
Γθ2d+z2d
)
and φ2 ≡
((
z2d+Ψθ2d
)
(
∏
m
αm
pm
αm)
Γθ2d+z2d
)
,
and ηd = E[ηi|i ∈ d]..
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possible to compare districts just above and below this cutoff to determine the causal impact of the policy
on equilibrium schooling. Furthermore, we should expect that ηd is not different for districts that just fall
on either side of the cutoff.
Let us define Dd = 1 to be districts that just fall on the side of the cutoff that receives the policy, and
Dd = 0 districts that fall on the other side. In the neighborhood of the cutoff, we should therefore
expect:
Sd = φDd +
ηd
Γ
and E[ηd|Dd = 1] = E[ηd|Dd = 0] (1.20)
If the direct effects of increasing access to schooling outweigh any negative labor market general equi-
librium (GE) effects that depress returns, then we should expect φ > 0.
1.4.1.1 Returns to Education and Disentangling Earnings
The policy changes the distribution of earnings across the RD cutoff. In this section, I disentangle the
labor market GE effects of the policy with the help of Equation (1.4). In Equation (1.4), ψa captures the
cohort effect. θsd captures the pure productivity effect and a change in the amount of skill-biased capital
in response to the policy will change its value. The term 1
σA
log `asd is crucial for the cohort specific labor-
market general equilibrium effect, and 1
σE
log Yd+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
logLsd determines the general equilibrium
effect that affects all cohorts:45
logwasd = log %˜+ log θsd + logψa +
1
σE
log Yd +
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
logLsd − 1
σA
log `asd (1.4)
I exploit variation along various dimensions to disentangle the components of the change in earnings
across the RD cutoff. These dimensions include age cohorts, skill levels and treatment status. By restrict-
ing comparisons to be within cohorts, the cohort effect on earnings Ψa is differenced out. Cohorts that
were too old to change their years of education when the policy was implemented will be affected by the
labor-market general equilibrium effects if they work in the treated districts. The general equilibrium ef-
fects that affect all cohorts can thus be isolated by looking at the impact on the older cohort. If we restrict
comparisons to people of the same skill level across the cutoff, one can difference out the productivity
differences not related to skill biased capital and thus back out the cohort-specific general equilibrium
effect. This process allows me to completely identify all the components that affect earnings.
Since older cohorts participate in the same labor market, they are affected by the general equilibrium
45While this equation is represented in terms of production function parameters, the estimated GE effects will not depend
on the specific functional form of the production function as long as workers can be disaggregated into skilled and unskilled;
young and old.
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effects that affect all cohorts. There is thus a difference in the skill premium – the difference between
the skilled and unskilled wage – that exists among the older cohorts across the RD cutoff. By looking
at the earnings of both the skilled and unskilled workers in older cohorts separately, I can back out the
GE effects that affect all cohorts. Earnings for younger cohorts, however, will additionally be affected by
cohort-specific general equilibrium effects since there are more highly educated people in the younger
cohorts.46
For ease of exposition I restrict the analysis to two skill levels – skilled s and unskilled u workers. For
example, the fraction of each among the young y are represented by `sy and `uy respectively. For any
two-skill groups: ∆`sy ≡ (`sy,D=1 − `sy,D=0) = −∆`uy ≡ (`uy,D=1 − `uy,D=0).
Let D = 0 represent the local economies that do not receive the program, and D = 1 the districts that
do. If only a single individual was to acquire skill and change status from unskilled u to skilled s, there
would be no general equilibrium effects. If the person lives in the untreated region D = 0, then that
person’s earnings would change in the following manner:
log
was,D=0
wau,D=0
= log
θs,D=0
θu,D=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
log
Ls,D=0
Lu,D=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate skill distribution
− 1
σA
log
`as,D=0
`au,D=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cohort specific skill distribution
≡ βas,D=0 , (1.21)
where βas,D=0 is defined as the earnings returns to changing ones skill from u to s in a district where
D = 0. If however, the individual lived in a treated region D = 1, where there are a lot more educated
people or a lot more skill-biased capital because of the policy, the change in earnings would be:
log
was,D=1
wau,D=1
= log
θs,D=1
θu,D=1
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
log
Ls,D=1
Lu,D=1
− 1
σA
log
`as,D=1
`au,D=1
≡ βas,D=1 , (1.22)
where βas,D=1 is defined as the earnings returns to changing ones skill from u to s in treated regions
D = 1. These returns differ because of the differences in the skill distribution of the workforce and the
amount of skill-biased capital across regions. The difference in the returns to acquiring skill between
these two regions is ∆βas ≡ βas,D=1 − βas,D=0. Across the RD cutoff these returns will be different
because of a change in the skill composition of the workforce and the flow of skill biased capital. These
are the GE effects on the returns to education:
46In the estimation exercise, there are a few rules that need to be followed in order to get unbiased estimates. First, wage
comparisons must always be made across the RD cutoff. Second, the same cohorts must be compared across the cutoff, and
last the same skill group must be compared across the cutoff.
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∆βas =
(
log
θs,D=1
θu,D=1
− log θs,D=0
θu,D=0
)
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)[
log
Ls,D=1
Lu,D=1
− log Ls,D=0
Lu,D=0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GE effects on all cohorts
− 1
σA
[
log
`as,D=1
`au,D=1
− log `as,D=0
`au,D=0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Additional GE on young
(1.23)
Since the policy also changed inputs within schools, we may expect there to be an increase in the quality
of schooling. While some quality improvements lower the marginal cost of schooling, others may in-
crease the returns in the labor market. Such improvements would therefore attenuate the change in the
returns to education.
In order to disentangle the general equilibrium effects on each cohort, one can look at the discontinuity in
the skill premium of the younger and older cohorts separately. By restricting the population to a specific
skill level (and cohort) one can ensure that the differences in earnings across the RD cutoff are only due
to differences in the skill distribution and the amount of skill-biased capital.
The change in returns in Equation (1.23) can be split up into two components. The first is the GE
effect that affects all cohorts. To estimate this effect, I look at the change in the skill premium for the
older cohort o. Empirically, this is the earnings differential between the skilled older population and the
unskilled older populations:47
log
wso,D=1
wso,D=0
− logwuo,D=1
wuo,D=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
GE effects on all cohorts
=
(
log
θs,D=1
θu,D=1
− log θs,D=0
θu,D=0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Skill biased capital
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)[
log
Ls,D=1
Lu,D=1
− log Ls,D=0
Lu,D=0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate skill distribution
(1.24)
Notice that we would expect that these two portions of the GE effects on all cohorts counteract each other.
On the one hand, an increase in the skilled workforce will attract more skill-biased capital and raise the
skill premium. On the other hand, increasing the relative supply of skilled workers makes them less
valuable in production, lowering the skill premium. If there is differential migration, and skilled workers
migrate out of the treated districts in search of work, then it will weaken the strength of the ‘Aggregate
skill distribution’ component of the GE effects.
The second component of the GE effects is the additional GE effect on the young y that is driven solely
by the change in the age-specific skill distribution. This component can be measured by estimating the
47The change in the skill premium for older cohorts will be the GE effects on all cohorts regardless of the specific for-
mulation of the production function. Similarly, all estimates of the returns and GE effects do not rely on the production
function.
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earnings differential between the skilled young and unskilled young, and differencing out the earnings
differential between the skilled old and unskilled old:48
[
log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
− logwuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
]
−
[
log
wso,D=1
wso,D=0
− logwuo,D=1
wuo,D=0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Additional GE on young
= − 1
σA
[
log
`ys,D=1
`yu,D=1
− log `ys,D=0
`yu,D=0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Age specific skill distribution
(1.25)
To estimate the two different returns βas,D=0 and βas,D=1, I use discontinuities in the average earnings of
the young, and the wages of the skilled young, and unskilled young separately:49
log
wy,D=1
wy,D=0
= `sy,D=1log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+ `uy,D=1log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+ ∆`sy log
wsy,D=0
wuy,D=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
βys,D=0
(1.26)
log
wy,D=1
wy,D=0
= `sy,D=0log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+ `uy,D=0log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+ ∆`sy log
wsy,D=1
wuy,D=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
βys,D=1
(1.27)
The change in the average earnings for the younger cohorts is a weighted average of how the skilled and
unskilled wages change, and the shift from unskilled to skilled work multiplied by the returns to skill.
These relationships can be used to derive the returns to skill in both the treated and untreated districts
separately. At the same time, the average years of education in the districts change across the cutoff in
the following manner:
∆S = (`sy,D=1s1 + `uy,D=1s0)− (`sy,D=0s1 + `sy,D=0s0) (1.28)
= ∆`sys1 + ∆`uys0 = ∆`sy(s1 − s0) ,
where s0 is the years of education for the skilled group, and s1 are the years for the unskilled group, and
∆`sy is the fraction of students induced into getting more skill.
It is important to remember that the shift in the skill-distribution will change overall output as well. If an
individual that has a skill level s were to switch districts from D = 0 to D = 1, that person’s earnings
48Notice that if σA < σE then the two components may be of opposite signs.
49See Appendix 1.12.4 for detailed derivations of these equations.
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would be different not only because of the skill distribution, but also because of the differences in overall
output Yd and skill-biased capital across the regions:50
log
ws,D=1
ws,D=0
=
1
σE
log
YD=1
YD=0
+ log
θs,D=1
θs,D=0
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
log
Ls,D=1
Ls,D=0
− 1
σA
log
`as,D=1
`as,D=0
(1.29)
1.4.2 Outcomes and Economic Benefits
The model predicts that when the district receives more funds for expenditure on public schooling, the
following happens: First, public administrators build more schools, increasing the access to schooling
(Section 1.3.3.1). This lowers the marginal cost of schooling for households, and induces certain students
to get more education (Section 1.3.2). At the same time, private schools decide whether to enter or exit the
education sector, leading to either a crowd-in or crowd-out of private schools (Section 1.3.3.2). When the
newly skilled workforce joins the labor market they earn the higher skilled wage (Section 1.3.1). There
is, however, a distributional impact on the earnings of skilled and unskilled workers (Section 1.4.1). If
skilled workers are more productive and attract more skill biased capital, then there is an increase in
overall output, productivity and consumption (Section 1.3.1).
The changes in overall benefits will depend on the reduction in the costs of schooling for younger cohorts,
the increase in overall output due to the acquisition of skills by workers, and the labor market returns. The
increase in total output depends on the productivity parameters and the change is the skill distribution.
At the same time, the general equilibrium effects will have distributional consequences.51
The welfare for a young high-skill person that would have acquired skill even in the absence of the policy
rises by the reduction in the total costs of education, but is dampened by the GE effect that affects all
cohorts and the additional GE effect on younger cohorts. The welfare for older cohorts is unaffected by
the reduction in the costs of schooling. The skilled old however are adversely affect by the GE effects
that affect all skilled workers, whereas the unskilled old benefit from the increase in their earnings. All
these groups additionally benefit from any overall increases in output, and all young workers that get
education benefit directly from a reduction in the total costs of schooling.
Let βas,D=0 be the returns to education in untreated districts, and βas,D=1 be the returns including the
general equilibrium effects. ∆βas is thus the change in the returns due to the GE effects. The labor-
market welfare change for those who were always going to acquire skill even in the absence of the policy
50If the capital that flows in to these regions is skill-biased, then we just need to interpret the GE effects as including not
just the change in the aggregate skill distribution but also an inflow of skill-biased capital. See Appendix 1.12.2. If aggregate
output prices change, then the skill-premium is unaffected since both the skilled and unskilled within the same district face
the same price change.
51Aggregate profits for private schools has a closed form solution and will change due to the policy. The extent of this will
depend on the increase in productivity θ¯d and the decrease in the equilibrium price of schooling pd). Furthermore, the returns
to capital and land may change as well, depending on the ease of mobility and transaction costs. However, my analysis only
concentrates on the earnings of workers.
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is just the difference in the skilled wage at the cutoff: logwas,D=1
was,D=0
. Similarly, for those workers who would
never acquire more skill even in the presence of the policy, the difference in the unskilled wage at the
cutoff captures their labor market welfare: logwau,D=1
wau,D=0
. For the younger cohorts, who are induced into
getting more skill, the labor market welfare change depends on the skilled wage in the treated districts
and the unskilled wage in the untreated districts: log wys,D=1
wyu,D=0
. To estimate this component of welfare, I
use the returns to schooling βys,D=0, since:
log
wys,D=1
wyu,D=0
= log
wys,D=0
wyu,D=0
+ log
wys,D=1
wys,D=0
= βys,D=0 + log
wys,D=1
wys,D=0
(1.30)
The change in labor market benefits for those induced into getting more skill therefore consists of two
components – the returns to skill in the untreated districts and the change in economic benefits to the
‘always skilled.’ In the absence of any GE effects, the change in earnings for a person induced into
getting more education would simply be βys,D=0. Lastly, let δ be the discount rate, and τ be the years
between when the labor market returns are realized and the costs of schooling are borne. To compare the
labor market benefits to the reduction in total costs of schooling to get a measure of aggregate welfare
change, I discount the labor market gains by the real interest rate δ, over the time period τ . For a
student induced into getting more education, the costs include tuition costs and the opportunity cost of
a foregone unskilled wage.52 The benefits, however, include the present discounted value of a skilled
worker’s earnings stream.
1.5 Data
In order to study the policy in a comprehensive manner, I put together a number of large datasets that
have not been combined in this manner before. The data are merged at the district level since districts are
the relevant local economy and labor market in this context (Duflo and Pande, 2007). I combine data on
school-level inputs, household level data on years of education, migration decisions and amount spent on
schooling, labor market data on earnings and occupations, and firm-level data on types of manufacturing
in the different regions. Doing so allows me to study how the policy affects the entire district rather than
just individual households.
Furthermore, it is important to study the dynamic consequences of the policy. For this purpose, I assemble
a yearly panel data set that allows me to track schools, firms and other characteristics of the local economy
over time. Given the changes in district boundaries over time, this panel is particularly challenging to
create. Details of all the data sets can be found in Data Appendix 1.13.
Data for inputs into schools comes from the District Information System for Education (DISE). Table 1.1
summarizes the variables of interest in the year 2005, twelve years after the DPEP started. The top panel
52Empirically, I will not measure the non-monetary costs of schooling.
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classifies schools by ownership (government vs private), and when they were built (before 1993, the first
year of the earliest program or after). 27% of all schools existing in 2005 were built post 1993, and
while 20% are government schools, the remaining 7% are private schools. There is large variation in the
level of infrastructure - while 84% of the schools have drinking water, only 31% have constant electric
supply. DISE also collects information on Block and Cluster Resource Centers, which are often used for
training teachers, and have computerized facilities, which are used to access other teaching materials. On
average, schools are about 13 kms away from the closest Block Resource Center (BRC), and are visited
by a BRC official about 1.5 times a year. The data also has information on various sources of funding,
one of which is the Teacher’s Learning Material (TLM) grant that all schools are eligible for irrespective
of other programs. On average, schools got about Rs. 1517 ($38) in total from the TLM grant every
year.
In order to study educational outcomes, household surveys and Census data were used. The Census has
detailed tables at all three of the administrative levels - states, districts and sub-districts. A panel of
districts can be created using the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census years, all of which include district-level
statistics. The 1991 Census determines the running variable for the RD, since the 1991 female literacy
rate was used to determine which districts are eligible for DPEP funds.
I use three different rounds of a household survey to study the impact on education, earnings, expendi-
tures, migration and other labor-market characteristics. The National Sample Survey (NSS) is a nationally
representative survey used by many researchers studying India. It is the largest household survey in the
country, asks questions on weekly activities for up to five different occupations per person, and records
earnings during the week for each individual in the household. Summary statistics for the 2009 NSS
round are presented in Table 1.2. In 2009, only about 60% of the population had finished primary school,
and on average people had about 6 years of education and earned about Rs 1466 ($30) a month.
Last, to study the behavior of firms, I use the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), which is a census of all
manufacturing firms in the country that employ more than ten persons. These data are available at the
establishment level, and have information on the type of products produced, wages paid, and number of
employees. One can then use these data to study whether changes in the skill level of the population can
affect firm mobility and production decisions.
1.6 Estimation
In order to target the DPEP program to districts that were worst off in terms of educational outcomes, a
selection criterion was used. Districts that had a female literacy below the national average (based on the
previous 1991 Census) were eligible for the program, but not all such districts were selected. Further, in
some states that had no low-literacy districts, a few districts were selected at the state’s discretion. This
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imperfect assignment requires a fuzzy regression discontinuity design using the 1991 female literacy
rate as a running variable. The fuzzy design allows for imperfect assignment, since not all low-literacy
districts were selected, and for states with no low-literacy districts, some high-literacy districts were se-
lected. To my knowledge, there are no other programs that use the district-level 1991 female-literacy rate
as cutoff. I empirically test and show that cohorts that were too old to change their schooling decisions
by the time the policy was implemented have no discontinuity in educational attainment.
The RD allows me to compare districts just above the literacy cutoff to those just below. Since we should
not expect any discontinuity in the distribution of individual labor-market abilities or individual-specific
costs of going to school around the cutoff at baseline, the RD estimator is consistent. Furthermore, at the
cutoff, we should expect no discontinuity in pre-policy labor market characteristics and regional outputs
that would otherwise bias the estimated parameters. In order to estimate the GE effects, I further exploit
variation in cohort exposure and skill levels.
OLS estimates of the returns to education suffer from a few sources of concern. Since more able workers
are also more capable students, OLS estimates can suffer from an omitted variable bias. The variation
generated by the policy can be used to overcome this bias. The policy induces certain students to go to
school, whereas identical students in non-policy regions do not. Following students into the labor market,
it is therefore possible to compare wages in the two regions to determine the returns to schooling for the
subpopulation that was induced into getting more education. At the same time, local labor markets may
differ widely across regions in terms of their skill distributions and skill premiums. This will confound
OLS estimates of the GE effects. The RD allows me to compare similar local economies that differ only
on the access to the DPEP policy.53
The first stage is presented in Figure 1.3. It is clear that the more literate amongst the eligible districts (i.e.
amongst the districts with lower than average female literacy) were selected for the program, leading to
a discontinuity at the cutoff. There is also visible imperfect assignment at both ends, with not all eligible
districts being selected, and not all selected districts being eligible. Since it is clear that policy makers
selected the most literate of the low-literacy districts, there is a high likelihood of political manipulation
that is correlated with a whole host of unobserved characteristics in these regions. Given such a set-
up, regression specifications that do not allow for these differences in unobserved characteristics will
be biased. A RD specification can, therefore, provide a causal estimate of the impact of this program.
This will be the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) for districts near the cutoff value (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). The parameters estimated should be thought of as being representative only for districts
near the RD cutoff. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, parameters like the estimated returns to
education are for the students who were induced into getting more schooling and lived in the districts
near the cutoff. The GE effects as well depend on what type of students get induced into getting more
53One additional concern with OLS estimates is the measurement error in the independent variable (Griliches, 1977). This
can especially be an issue in developing countries where the levels of education may not be clearly defined. The RD helps
tackle the attenuation bias that arises from classical measurement error.
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skill, as this may affect the amount of skill biased capital flowing in and the change in the effective
supply of labor. These general equilibrium effects, however, will also affect sub-populations that were
not induced into getting more education.
Estimating causal impacts requires that there is no perfect manipulation of the running variable or the
cutoff, which is likely in this case since the cutoff chosen was the national average of the female literacy
rate from the previous 1991 Census. Furthermore, the McCrary (2008) tests indicate that the density of
districts and of households around the cutoff is not discontinuous (Figure 1.4), since the p-value of the
change in density at the cutoff is 0.71. Other falsification tests will be discussed below that solidify the
RD assumptions that there were no other discontinuities at the same cutoff.54
While RD results will be represented graphically, the coefficients of interest will also be calculated using
a two-stage least squares procedure where the optimal bandwidth will be calculated using two different
methods. The optimal bandwidths determine what fraction of the sample is used from the regions near
the cutoff to estimate the effect of the policy in the neighborhood of the cutoff. I use the Calonico et al.
(2014b) method, and the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method to select these bandwidths. The
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method uses a data-driven bandwidth selection algorithm to identify
the optimal bandwidth for a local linear regression given a squared loss function, whereas the Calonico
et al. (2014b) method also performs a bias-correction and develops robust standard errors for such a
procedure.55 Results using both the optimal bandwidth procedures are presented, and are robust to using
more parametric approaches like local linear and quadratic control-function approaches as suggested by
Hahn et al. (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008).56
1.7 Results and Discussion
The household level analysis can also be split up by the age groups that should and should not have been
directly affected by the DPEP program. In Appendix Figure 2.8.5 one can see a sharp drop in schooling
enrollment at the age of 19, because by that age students have usually finished schooling. Since the
household survey was conducted 16 years after the start of the program, anybody above the age of 35
should not be directly affected by the program. Those under the age of 35 in treated districts, however,
should be directly affected.
I present RD figures showing the discontinuity along the running variable for the year 2005, which was
54Cattaneo et al. (2015) offers an alternative test for manipulation at the cutoff that does not rely on the selection of binning
parameters. The p-value of a discontinuity in the density using their method is 0.97, indicating almost no likelihood of
discontinuity in densities.
55I use the code written by Calonico et al. (2014a) to estimate the parameters.
56The results are robust to using various alternative procedures that are as yet unpublished (Appendix Table 1.15). The first,
described in Bartalotti and Brummet (2015) allows for computing the standard errors at an aggregated level. I thank Quentin
Brummet for sharing his code. The second method allows for different optimal bandwidths on either side of the cutoff and for
standard errors at an aggregated level.
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the last year before the phase-out of funds begin. The 2005 figures can be thought of as capturing the
cumulative effects of the last twelve years of funding increases. Alongside the RD figures, the 2SLS
coefficient over time will be presented. How the 2SLS coefficient changes over time shows what happens
to the outcomes of interest once the funding is cut in 2006, and stopped entirely in 2007. The RD figures
that will be shown are Intent-to-Treat (ITT) estimates, so to scale up the effects by the probability of
treatment, the two-staged least squares (2SLS) coefficient will be shown alongside. These 2SLS coeffi-
cients and standard errors are calculated using the Calonico et al. (2014b) optimal bandwidth selection
procedure and bias-correction methods.
1.7.1 School Building and Survival
One of the primary objectives of the DPEP program was to build new schools. New schools should
increase access to schooling in areas that did not have schools. This will lower the marginal cost of
schooling for students who no longer need to travel as far for a school. At the same time, we may expect
private schools to respond to this governmental schooling expansion as well.
I present RD figures for the number of schools and school-level inputs using the DISE data. Figure 1.5
shows the effect of the program on schools built once the program was underway in 1994. While the top
panel shows the fraction of all schools that were built post 1993, the middle panel shows the discontinuity
in government schools. Both panels show that DPEP districts had a substantially larger fraction of new
schools than non-DPEP districts. The Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates indicate a 4.9 percentage point
increase in the fraction of government schools that were new.
The size of the discontinuity and trend over time are robust to the choice of the bandwidth. In Appendix
Figure 1.13 I show alternative versions where I plot the total schools per capita. The lower panels show
the RD coefficients for different types of optimal bandwidths (CCT - Calonico et al. (2014b), I&K -
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)), and by also restricting the bandwidths to be the same as in the first
year of the data.57
Studying how the coefficient in Figure 1.5 changes over time allows me to trace out the longer term
effects of the program. In all of the figures, the first coefficient plotted for the year 2005 shows a large
discontinuity in the fraction of new schools, whereas the other coefficients in later years show a smaller
difference among the districts on either side of the cutoff. While large sources of funding were still
being received by these districts in 2005, more schools were being built. However, once the funding was
whittled down there was no longer any differential impact on the fraction of new schools built. This is
because in the absence of funds, regions on the other side of the cutoff catch up by building schools at an
even more rapid rate.
57This was a rapid period of school building, affecting the sample size from year to year. As the sample grows, the
bandwidths get smaller, so restricting to the same bandwidth as the first year, approximately checks the results for a balanced
panel of districts.
28
As a falsification test, I can also look for any differential impacts on the fraction of schools that were
built in the twenty year period prior to the program (1973 to 1993) out of all schools built before 1993.
If schools have a short lifespan, then more funding may allow schools to last for longer. However, this
was a time when more schools were being opened rather than old schools being shut down. Therefore,
we should not expect any discontinuities in the number of older schools, and they would serve as a clean
falsification test in this context. Appendix Figure 1.14 shows the lack of a discontinuity in older schools,
both for government and private schools.
1.7.2 Private Schooling Response
How private schools respond to such interventions, however, is also crucial for determining the overall
benefits. Private schools may be crowded out of the local education sector with the entry of new govern-
ment schools. An expansion in public schooling may lower the competitive price that private schools can
charge and price out the less efficient private schools. However, it is also possible for them to enter given
the likelihood of peer effects, and changes to the local economy and infrastructure with such a large-scale
program. In the bottom panel of Figure 1.5, there is no evidence of crowd-out. If anything, there is mild
evidence of crowd-in in 2005, which declines rapidly in the later years as funding is phased out.
What then drives the crowd in? On the one hand, the demand externality could raise the equilibrium
price and pulls in private schools; on the other, the fall in operating costs may induce private school
entry and lower the equilibrium price. In Section 1.3.3.2 I discuss how we can determine which of these
mechanisms is stronger by seeing how the price changes. In Section 1.7.6 – and specifically Table 1.7 –
it is clear that household expenditure on schooling falls suggesting that the cost-reduction mechanism is
stronger.
In Section 1.7.8 I look at what drives this cost reduction. Figures 1.9 show that the initial increase in the
supply of female teachers and teachers with a college degree may be an early driver of these effects – but
they die out quickly. Infrastructure upgrades, like electricity and drinking water may help drive the cost
reductions (Figures 1.9, 1.22 and 1.21).
The school building results, therefore, indicate that more government schools were built in DPEP areas,
and there is no evidence of a crowd-out of private schools. We should expect that this would then increase
the access to schooling for households in treated districts, and lower the marginal costs of going to school.
A lower marginal cost will then lead to more years of schooling attained by the households.
1.7.3 Education and Earnings
The DPEP program was specifically targeted towards the primary and upper primary levels, and we may
expect the largest impacts at those levels. Since the survey was collected 16 years after the start of
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the program, there has been enough time for many of these students to become part of the labor force.
However, any student who was 19 at the time of the program (or 35 at the time of the survey) should
be unaffected by the program since student enrollment sharply drops at that age, and child-labor laws
prevent many workplaces from hiring children below eighteen.58
I check for a lack of a discontinuity in schooling attainment at the cutoff for persons above the age of
35, using the same RD methods. The left panel of Figure 1.6 shows how the older populations do not
have any discontinuities in literacy, probability of finishing primary school, or upper primary school. The
tables discussed below will also show there is no economically or statistically significant discontinuity in
educational outcomes for older populations.
Looking at the younger population in the right panel of Figure 1.6, one can see discontinuities in different
levels of education. Appendix Figure 1.15 shows the analogous figures for the full sample, rather than
the sub-sample of those who reported earnings. The 2SLS-LATE numbers are shown in Table 1.3. The
young have 0.57 more years of schooling in regions that were just eligible for the program. There is
no statistically significant discontinuity in the older population.59 These results indicate that the policy
directly affected cohorts that were young enough to change their schooling attainment, and had no impact
on the education of older cohorts.
Figure 1.7 and Table 1.4 show the RD impacts on education and log earnings for those who reported
earnings, across the different bandwidth selection procedures and age groups. After scaling up the ITT
estimates by the probability of treatment, the 2SLS increase in the years of education is 1.6 years, and
younger students in regions eligible for the program had a 0.129 percentage point increase in the likeli-
hood of finishing primary school.
In terms of earnings, there was an increase of about 0.25 log points for the younger cohorts (Table 1.4).
Even though older populations had no discontinuity in education, their earnings are lower by about 0.21
log points due to the GE effects. As we would expect, I find that the general equilibrium effects are largest
for close substitutes, like cohorts that were close to the treated cohorts. In Appendix Table 1.9, the sample
is broken up into more age groups, and even though they are imprecisely estimated, there do seem to be
larger effects on the 36 to 45-year-olds which is the closest age group to the treated cohorts.
Comparing Tables 1.3 and 1.4, it is clear that the impact on education is higher for the sub-sample that
reported earnings.60 However, as the top panel of Appendix Table 1.10 shows, there is no discontinuity
in the probability that earnings are reported at the cutoff. This suggests that the policy did not lead to any
differential selection into the group of persons that reported earnings.
The difference in the educational impacts between those that reported earnings and the full sample can be
58The Factories Act of 1948 and the Mines Act of 1952, govern the child-labor laws.
59As a robustness check, I restrict the sample to only those districts that had DISE school-level data. The results are seen in
Appendix Table 1.21 where the estimates are slightly larger, and more precisely estimated.
60This is similar to Duflo (2001).
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tied to the difference in labor market returns by gender. Only one-fourth of the sample reported earnings.
One of the strongest predictors of whether earnings are reported is a person’s gender, with males having
a higher proportion of reported earnings. Persons who are engaged in domestic work, and this is mostly
women, are least likely to report earnings. Individuals who are expected to gain in the labor market are
the most likely to change their years of education. Since men are more likely to be in occupations that
report earnings, and women are more likely to be engaged in domestic work, we should expect men to
gain the most from increased education and therefore be more responsive to these interventions.
I find that the effects are concentrated among males, which is similar to the related literature (Ashraf
et al., 2015; Breierova and Duflo, 2003). In Appendix Tables 1.11 and 1.12, one can see that the results
are almost entirely driven by males. This is in line with the effects of this policy on enrollment estimated
by Jalan and Glinskaya (2013). In the full sample, men increase their years of education by about 0.9
years, whereas women increase theirs only by 0.2 years. For the sub-sample of those who report earnings,
however, the impact on education is similar in magnitude, but more precisely estimated for men. There
is also little to no change in the earnings of women, even though men’s earnings do rise.
To study where in the education distribution the impacts were felt, Table 1.5 looks at the fraction of
people who have completed at least a given level of education. Since the program was targeted to the
primary and upper-primary sections, the biggest increases are seen here. For the sub-sample that reported
earnings, literacy rates are higher by 6 percentage points, and the likelihood of finishing primary school
is higher by 12 percentage points.61
I support my RD results by also performing a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis. In Appendix
Table 1.13 I compare older cohorts to younger cohorts and DPEP districts to non-DPEP districts. For
the full sample, the years of education are higher by 0.389 years, and for the sub-sample of those who
reported earnings education is higher by 0.458 years and log earnings increase by 0.065.
1.7.4 Returns to Education: Conventional Instruments
The DPEP set-up is ideal for estimating the returns to education using household survey data. In my
sample, a simple OLS regression of log earnings on years of education and a quadratic age profile,
yields a Mincerian return of 10%. Instrumental variable (IV) estimates, however, will estimate a 2SLS-
LATE weighted by the probability of being induced into getting more education by the instrument. Card
and Lemieux (2001); Imbens and Angrist (1994); Oreopoulos (2006) discusses why IV estimates of the
returns to education are larger than their OLS counterparts. In general, we may expect this to be the
case since a reduction in marginal costs that affects all students equally will induce those with higher
61As another robustness check I collapse all the household data into district-age cells, and re-run the regressions. The
results do not change, as can be seen in Appendix Table 1.14. Collapsing the data, however, is not recommended, since we are
losing valuable information about the variability in the outcomes that may be different on each side of the cutoff – the optimal
bandwidth procedure utilizes this variability.
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returns into getting more education.62 Another possibility is that OLS estimates suffer from classical
measurement error (Griliches, 1977).
One IV method to estimate the returns to education is to simply use the RD cutoff to first estimate the
change in the years of eduction for the younger cohort, and then the corresponding change in log earnings
for the same cohort. By taking the ratio of the change in log earnings to the change in years of education,
one can find an estimate of the returns to schooling. Under the assumption that the policy only induces
some younger workers to get more education, this method will identify the change in earnings due to an
additional year of schooling, for this marginal group. On the other hand, as the model shows, the policy
should simultaneously affect both the skill premium and the overall output in the district. Since the
change in the average earnings is not just driven by the switch in the fraction of students from unskilled
to skilled groups, but also by the changes in earnings of skilled and unskilled workers, the estimated
returns would be confounded by the changes in output and the skill premium.63
The estimates in Table 1.4 can be used to calculate the returns taking the ratio of the change in log earnings
and the change in years of education. The ratio of 0.25 log earnings and 1.65 years gives us a return
of about 15.5%.64 However, due to the size of the confidence intervals, this number is not statistically
indistinguishable from numbers as low as 7% and certainly not from the OLS estimated Mincerian returns
of 10% estimated in this sample. This estimate, therefore, lies reasonably within the range of estimates
found in the literature (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).65
Another IV method is to use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy. In Appendix Table 1.22 and
Figure 1.17 I compare DPEP districts to non-DPEP districts, and the older cohorts to the younger co-
horts.66 I estimate the difference-in-differences coefficient for three different subsamples. For the full
sample, there is an increase in 0.3 years of education, and a 5.5 percentage point increase in the literacy
rate. There is also a 3.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of finishing primary school. The
estimates are similar even when restricting the sample to be in the neighborhood of the RD cutoff, and
around the cohort-cutoff. For the subsample that reported earnings, there is also a statistically significant
increase in earnings. The 2SLS IV-LATE returns can be estimated by taking the ratio of the change in log
62See Carneiro et al. (2011) for a nuanced alternative interpretation based on the generalized Roy model.
63From equation (1.26) we know: logwy,D=1wy,D=0 = `sy,D=1log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+`uy,D=1log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+∆`sylog
wsy,D=0
wuy,D=0
. For changes
in partial equilibrium, logwuy,D=1wuy,D=0 = log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
= 0, and the change in average earnings across the RD cutoff recover the
returns to skill log wsy,D=0wuy,D=0 for the compliers ∆`sy .
64Appendix Table 1.18 shows the 2SLS-LATE version of this exercise, where the first-stage is the change in the years of
education rather than the probability of receiving DPEP funds.
65A survey by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) finds Mincerian returns higher in low-middle income countries. In Asia
these are near 10% and the returns to finishing primary schooling are around 20%. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) update this
exercise, and document a range of Mincerian returns from 2.7% to 35.3%.
66For person i in age cohort a and district d, the following difference-in-differences regression was estimated:
yida = βDiDTda + µd +$a + ida , (1.31)
where µd is a district fixed effect, $a is a cohort fixed effect, and Tda = 1 if the individual lives in a DPEP district and is
young enough to be affected. Under the usual parallel trends assumption, βDiD is the difference-in-differences parameter.
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earnings and the years of education. This 2SLS return is 15.9%, which is statistically and economically
indistinguishable from the RD-2SLS return of 15.5%.
The difference-in-differences strategy, however, already accounts for some portion of the GE effect.
Portions of the change in average earnings due to an increase in output, and the GE effects that affect
older cohorts are differenced out. It is, therefore, impossible to estimate the overall GE effect using the
DiD method without additional assumptions. It is, however, possible to measure the ‘additional GE on
the young’ component by looking at how the skill-premium changes differentially for younger rather
than older cohorts. This component depresses the returns to being skilled by about 7.9 percentage points
(Appendix Table 1.22).
1.7.5 Returns to Education and the Labor Market General Equilibrium Effects
However, as pointed out in the model section, the methods of taking the ratio of the younger cohort’s
change in earnings and years of education is confounded by the fact that earnings are affected by the
general equilibrium effects in the local economy. Average earnings of all persons in treated districts are
affected by changes in overall output. At the same time, the change in the skill distribution and the inflow
of skill-biased capital affects the earnings skill premium, as captured by Equation (1.23). While older
cohorts are affected by the change in the aggregate skill distribution and inflow of skill-biased capital,
younger cohorts are additionally affected by the change in the cohort-specific skill distribution for the
young.
Given these general equilibrium effects it is necessary to use the method outlined in Section 1.4.1.1 and
specifically, Equations (1.26) and (1.27) to derive the returns to education with and without the labor
market general equilibrium effects. Table 1.6 estimates the returns by dividing the population into these
skilled and unskilled groups. I define skilled workers as those having finished upper primary school as the
policy was targeted at getting students through this level of schooling, and because the largest earnings
increase in OLS regressions on untreated districts comes when a student finishes upper primary school.67
There was a 17 percentage point shift into the skilled category across the cutoff.
The estimated returns to shifting into the skilled group in the absence of GE effects is 19.9%. The returns
to being skilled with the GE effects, however, are only 13.4%. This constitutes a 32.5% decrease in the
returns attributable to the GE effects. This change in the skill-premium can be split up into the portion
that affects all cohorts, and the additional impact only on the young. 91.87% of change in the GE effects
are explained by the ‘additional impact on the young’ term. The GE effect that affects all cohorts may be
small because the two components that determine this effect may counteract each other – an increase in
the relative supply of skilled workers will tend to lower the skill premium, but an inflow in skill biased
67In going from literate-below primary to finishing primary schools, average earnings increase by 10%, whereas in going
from primary to upper primary school average earnings increase by 20%.
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capital may increase this skill premium. Furthermore, the additional impact on the young term may be
high because the young and the old may not be close substitutes in production.
1.7.6 Total Output, Consumption, and Educational Expenditure
The change in overall output depends on the productivity of the different skill levels and the shift in the
labor force from one skill level to another. As workers acquire more skill, and/or if skill-biased capital
flows into the region, overall productivity and output in the region may increase. In the top panel of
Figure 1.8, one can see the impact on total output (the District Domestic Product). These regressions
are underpowered, and the standard errors are quite large. Between 2000 and 2006, the increase in GDP
associated with the policy was between 0.137 and 0.190 log points (Appendix Table 1.24).
The change in total output will lead to a change in total consumption. In the top panel of Table 1.7, one
can see that the change in consumption expenditure in the last year of the policy (2004-5) was about
0.17 log points. At the same time, in 2004 the money spent for educational purposes (tuition, fees,
books and stationery) falls by about 0.21 log points.68 In the bottom panel of Figure 1.8 one can see the
discontinuity in education expenditure. This fall in educational expenditure is persistent even five years
after the program ended in 2009. The decline in total expenditure on education-related items is driven
largely by lower expenditures on school tuition and fees. There is, in fact, an increase in expenditure
on other education-related items, like books and stationery (Table 1.7). We may expect expenditures on
books and stationery to rise when households gain more education, as these are complementary to the
consumption of education.
Changes in consumption and the costs of education will directly impact overall economic benefits. The
increase in output and consumption benefit all cohorts, whereas the fall in the costs of education benefit
those in the younger cohorts who attend school. The fall in the costs of schooling even benefit those who
are not induced into getting more education – at an extreme, policies that successfully reduce the costs
of schooling can have significant economic benefits even if they do not change the equilibrium years of
education.
1.7.7 Productivity & Movement of Firms, Capital, Workers
Local economies at the district level that received educational funds for at least a decade witnessed
a transition in the skill level for younger cohorts in their workforce. For this to have happened, any
combination of the following four things may have taken place. First, skilled workers may have migrated
out, dampening the portion of the GE effects that depends on the change in the aggregate skill distribution.
Second, existing firms may have switched the composition of their workforce by hiring more skilled
68This is consistent with Jalan and Glinskaya (2013) who estimate a 20-40% fall in household educational expenditures.
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workers. Third, new firms may enter and hire these skilled workers. Last, workers may have utilized
their increase in skill and adopted newer technologies in production. The entry of skill-biased capital,
therefore, will increase the returns to skill in treated districts and be a crucial determinant of the GE
effects.69
To test the first possibility about worker migration, I assemble the 2007-8 round of the NSS household
survey which asked detailed questions on migration. Worker migration is extremely low in the Indian
context (DasGupta, 1987; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009; Topalova, 2005).70 It is, therefore, unlikely
that those who acquired skills migrated out of these districts. By analyzing the NSS 2007-8 waves,
we can see that of all the households that reported having any migrants across districts, only 30% of
the migration was work related, whereas more than half were for marriage reasons. Appendix Table
1.10 supports the claim that the policy did not impact migration. There are no economically significant
changes to the number of out-migrants or the number of households that migrated to that district.71
On the other hand, firms are relatively more mobile in India (Ghani et al., 2015). I compile data from the
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), which is a census of all manufacturing firms. The results for these are
shown in Appendix Figure 1.18. In Figures 1.18, one can see that even at the manufacturing establishment
level, the average wage paid to workers increases as educated workers join the labor market, in and around
the year 2004. Furthermore, I classify firms based on their products as ‘high-skill’ firms. The figure shows
that there is a steady increase in the fraction of firms that produce more mechanized products. This is
suggestive of the fact that either existing firms shifted production and employed more high-skill workers,
or newer firms entered and hired these skilled workers. Both mechanisms are suggestive evidence in
support of an inflow of skill-biased capital into these regions.
One relevant question is where is this capital flowing from, and in the absence of the policy would it have
gone to regions that lie just on the other side of the cutoff. If this is indeed the case, then it would attenuate
the GE effects on earnings. It is, however, unlikely that regions just above the cutoff receive less capital
due to the policy. First, policy regions are geographically dispersed all over the country (Figure 1.12)
rather than being neighbors of districts just on the other side of the cutoff. Second, anecdotal evidence
support stories of people residing in major cities – that have very high literacy rates – often investing in
69Regions around the RD cutoff are geographically dispersed, so it is less likely that the migration of firms or workers
happens among regions near the cutoff.
70Many studies on India are explicit about ignoring migration (Anderson, 2005; Banerjee et al., 2008; Foster and Rosen-
zweig, 1996). Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) show that for a sample of rural males aged 20-30, the permanent migration
rate outside their village was 8.7%, a lot of which may have taken place within the same district. Deshingkar and Anderson
(2004) also show that rates of rural-urban migration are much lower in India than in comparable countries, and Munshi and
Rosenzweig (2015) show that male worker migration is extremely low despite the presence of large wage gaps across regions.
One possible reason lies in the uncertainty related to getting work at the destination and the fixed cost of migrating (Bryan
et al., 2014). Duflo and Pande (2007) argue that the district is the relevant local labor market in the Indian context, and workers
of different skills can find employment elsewhere in their own district.
71For example, the total number of out-migrants ranges between 4.2 and 10.9 persons per district - this includes migrants
for any purpose (like marriage, education, temporary work, etc.). It is not possible to find RD estimates by finer skill groups
or age cohorts since almost nobody is migrating.
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villages that they originate from, suggesting that the source of capital are not regions near the cutoff. In
Figure 1.24, I look at the density of capital-intensive firms in the early period and the the late period for
the part of the country that should not have received the policy. Regions near the cutoff (normalized to
0), if anything, have an increase in the firms involved in mechanized production and providing higher
compensation. On the other hand, regions with high female literacy – often the major cities – show a
mild decrease. This is suggestive evidence to support the fact that, if at all, that as the workforce changes
in DPEP regions, capital may flow out of the major cities but not the regions that lie just above the
cutoff.
In general, there are some clear changes to the labor market for the workers in these regions. The bottom
half of Appendix Table 1.10 shows that the probability of being paid monthly (as opposed to daily) is
higher, and the fraction unemployed is lower in the treated regions. The last possibility, that workers
adopted newer technologies given their increased levels of education is, therefore, likely to be true in this
context (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996).
1.7.8 Teachers, Infrastructure, and Other Funding
While the primary focus of the program was to increase educational attainment by building schools and
hiring teachers, there may have been improvements in quality given such a large amount of funding.
On the one hand, such improvements may have increased the returns to schooling in the labor market,
attenuating the GE effects on the returns. In Appendix Table 1.23 I use a relatively recent dataset – known
as the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) data. This is geographically the most comprehensive
test-score dataset in the country. I consider six different test score variables, and only one of them shows
a significant increase – being able to identify numbers between 1 and 9 has a 5 percentage point increase
at the cutoff. This is, at best, mild evidence of increasing test scores, and if better test scores translate
into higher returns then it may attenuate the estimated GE effects. On the other hand, better ‘quality’
in terms of better infrastructure may have made it easier for students to finish a grade and further lower
the marginal costs of schooling. In this subsection, I explore how various inputs at the school level were
changed around the RD cutoff. Furthermore, I can study what happens when the DPEP funding dissipates
over time.72
Card and Krueger (1992) show that more qualified teachers and female teachers have important impacts
on schooling in the US. In India, female teachers may also encourage female student enrollment and
are, therefore, important. In 2005, when program funding was still high, the number of college-educated
teachers and the number of female teachers in DPEP districts was higher. However, this discontinuity
dissipated over time, showing that once the funding is no longer targeted to DPEP districts, there is a low
72Even though funds to DPEP districts declined relative to other regions, overall funding for schools in the country did not
fall.
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retention rate of such teachers (Figure 1.9). A lack of targeted funds may have led to a lack of incentives
for retaining these teachers.73
Since, under DPEP, funding was stepped up to districts below the cutoff, there may have been a crowd-
out of other funds that schools were supposed to receive. The Teachers Learning Material (TLM) grant
is funding that is available to schools regardless of whether they lie in DPEP districts or not. In the
top panel of Figure 1.10, one can see that regions that were eligible for DPEP systematically spent less
TLM funds, showing the possibility that other funds were actually crowded out when DPEP funds were
allocated.74
Tangible infrastructure, however, seems to last even when the DPEP funding is reduced (Figures 1.9 and
1.10). Drinking water, electricity, and library books are consistently higher in regions that received the
DPEP (Appendix Figure 1.22). Infrastructure upgrades like girls’ toilets may be important in getting
girls to school. While there was constant funding, there were significantly more facilities for girls, and
there is a slight dissipation as the funding is stopped. Other inputs, such as medical checkups, are also
consistently higher for schools in DPEP districts.
The condition of the classrooms also seem to have deteriorated over time once funding was stopped.
While, in 2005, schools in DPEP regions had a lower number of classrooms needing some repair, over
time more of these classrooms broke down (Figure 1.10). These results indicate that a constant source of
funding may be needed to keep the rooms in good condition.75
One significant change in the DPEP regions is the introduction of pre-primary sections, which was
thought to be a good way to get children into schools at a young age. Many more schools in DPEP
regions have such pre-primary sections after the policy, and there are more pre-primary teachers and
students in these schools (Figure 1.10 and Appendix Figure 1.20).
Under the DPEP regional educational centers called Block Resource Centers (BRCs) and Cluster Re-
source Centers (CRCs) were built, with facilities for training teachers, and other learning materials that
teachers could access. There were also government officials at these centers who would visit the schools,
and could assist with teacher training at these schools. In Figure 1.10 and Appendix Figure 1.21, it is
clear that the distance to the closest center was lower for DPEP regions, since many more centers were
built under DPEP. Over time, however, once the funding was reduced, centers continued to be built in
non-DPEP regions, and the differential effect dissipated. In the lowermost panel, however, one can see
73The dissipation in the discontinuity does not necessarily imply that teachers left the DPEP districts – it may also be the
case that non-DPEP districts hired teachers at a relatively more rapid rate once the DPEP funding was gone.
74Appendix Figure 1.19 shows that DPEP regions both received less and spent less of TLM grant money.
75While there are clear changes to tangible infrastructure, it is unclear whether these may have contributed to any changes
in the quality of instruction. In fact, quality may suffer if new schools are forced to employ teachers they would not have
otherwise employed, or if there are negative peer effects because of an increase in low ability students. Furthermore, the
policy did lead to a crowd out of other funds (Figure 1.10). There may also have been a crowd-out in extra-curricular work –
in Appendix Figure 1.23 we see that treated regions employed fewer teachers for non-teaching assignments and students spent
fewer days in non-teaching assignments.
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that the number of academic inspections and visits by center officials was, over time, consistently higher
in treated areas.76
1.7.9 Overall Economic Benefits
Changes in overall output and reductions in the total cost of schooling will directly impact benefits to
households. The change in labor market earnings, however, depend on the returns to skill and the GE
effects on these returns. Table 1.6 shows the returns by skill group, which helps back out the parameters
and the changes in yearly labor market benefits shown in Table 1.8. For these calculations, the average
real interest rate during that period was used (5%). Furthermore, a gap of 10 years is assumed between
the time the costs of education are borne and the labor market returns are realized.77
In the top panel of Table 1.8, I present the results for those in the younger cohort who were induced
into getting more skill because of the policy. This is about 17% of the young population. Their welfare
increases by 0.121 log points, and the GE effects depress this increase in welfare by 23.3%. At the same
time, workers who were always going to acquire skill even in the absence of the policy are worse off
by 0.037 log earnings points, whereas workers who were always going to be unskilled are better off by
0.014 log earnings points.78
Since unskilled workers are better off and skilled workers are worse off, it is also possible to estimate the
transfer in labor-market benefits from the skilled to the unskilled due to the GE effects. Among the older
cohorts this transfer is 0.004 log points, and among the young it is 0.05 log points. This indicates that
purely when looking at labor-market benefits, those persons who were always going to be skilled even in
the absence of the policy, actually lose out, whereas those who were never going to acquire skill even in
the presence of the policy benefit.
To measure the change in lifetime welfare for students induced into getting more schooling, I compare
the cost of an additional year of schooling to the benefits in the bottom panel of Table 1.8. These costs
include not just the tuition fees but also the opportunity cost of a foregone unskilled wage. The benefits,
however, are the present discounted value of the skilled earnings stream. All cohorts and skill groups
benefit from increases in the overall output. Furthermore, the young cohorts who acquire skill benefit
76One last consideration is the medium of instruction in such schools. English-medium education may have greater potential
returns in urban labor markets but higher costs for the students who are unfamiliar with the language. At the same time, Hindi-
medium education may be valued elsewhere in the country, whereas regional languages are only valued in certain localized
areas. In left panel of Figure 1.22, one can see that the schools in DPEP regions are more likely to be Hindi-medium and less
likely to be in regional languages. While the discontinuity is slight, there is sharper evidence of a kink at the cutoff indicating
that the relationship between the medium of instruction and literacy changes across the DPEP cutoff.
77The average real interest rate comes from the World Bank. Changing the interest rate or the gap of 10 years does not
affect the percentage change in welfare due to the GE effects, only the levels.
78Note that these results focus on labor-market benefits. A policy such as this should also change the prices of non-tradables,
like land, affecting the welfare of non-workers as well. Given the scant number of land transactions in the data, there is no
discernible effect on land prices.
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from the reductions in the total costs of schooling. Even young students who were not induced into
getting additional education benefit from the reductions in schooling costs.79
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that large-scale education investments can and do generate substantive general
equilibrium effects in the labor market and the education sector. Bringing together a school-level dataset,
census data, household surveys, and firm-level data, I perform an intensive analysis of the DPEP program,
which measurably increased educational inputs and increased the years of education and earnings for
students. With the help of the policy, I estimate the parameters of a general equilibrium model using a RD
approach. The estimates imply that the return to acquiring skill is 13.4%, but that is 6.5 percentage points
lower than it would be in the absence of general equilibrium effects. There are also large distributional
effects, where labor market benefits are transferred from the skilled to the unskilled, especially among
the young. High-skill workers who would have acquired skill even in the absence of the policy lose
out in terms of labor market earnings. Overall welfare, however, is higher, driven by decreases in the
household’s costs of education and increases in output in the local economy.
These findings have two important implications. First, we should take care when extrapolating the ben-
efits demonstrated by small-scale schooling interventions, as scaled up versions of such interventions
may have GE effects. Second, using large-scale variation to estimate the returns to education may con-
flate the individual returns and the general equilibrium effects. This is because an experiment where a
single individual receives more education is inherently different from the variation induced by changes
in policies like nationwide tuition subsidies, schooling expansions, compulsory schooling laws or other
regional variation. One limitation of my study, however, is that the estimates are not generalizable to
regions further away from the RD cutoff in the absence of stronger assumptions.
While there was a larger fraction of new schools built under these policies, over time other regions caught
up once the funding was cut. There were lasting impacts, however, on physical infrastructure such as
electricity and drinking water. As the funding was cut, the gap in the number of more qualified teachers
across eligible and ineligible districts dissipated, and the condition of classrooms deteriorated over time.
In light of these results, it is reasonable to propose that if policy makers wish to retain teachers, then the
regions would require a constant source of funds over a long period.
Furthermore, implementation by the government is inherently different from researcher-based experi-
ments. In a companion paper (Khanna, 2015), I compare this policy to more decentralized policies that
79These results do not necessarily indicate that the policy was cost effective. I have shown that the directs impacts were
concentrated on men, that reported earnings, and only for certain cohorts. In other results I find that the impacts were mostly
restricted to the treated districts that had relatively high literacy rates. The interventions had low persistence as well. Given
the large amounts of funds invested, the overall cost effectiveness of this policy is questionable, and is left for future research.
39
were implemented at the sub-district level. Eligible sub-districts were identified on dual criteria, that
allows me to use a multi-dimensional RD (MRD) approach to isolate the impacts.80 I find evidence
suggesting that the decentralized policies were more effective at raising literacy rates, especially for
girls.
The debates about the role of the government in health and education investments usually center around
the economic benefits of the policy. I show that economic benefits to household depend on a few crucial
factors — the costs of education, the labor-market returns to education, and the general equilibrium
changes in earnings. While these are sufficient in capturing the direct economic benefits, more education
can have other welfare consequences as well. For example, more education can lead to better health
or more informed political participation (Sen, 1999). Exploring these relationships is left for future
research.
Identifying who benefits and who does not in the universe surrounding such a policy, and what works and
what does not is key to making such large-scale infrastructure investments more targeted and effective.
The results in this paper, however, help explain why scaled up government policies may have different
impacts than researcher-led micro interventions (Acemoglu, 2010; Bold et al., 2013a; Deaton, 2010).
In light of these results, it is clear that understanding all the consequences of large general equilibrium
effects is crucial for both researchers and policy-makers when considering nation-wide interventions in
public policy.
80The paper is also one of the first to use a new empirical strategy: the fuzzy multi-dimensional regression discontinuity
method, and details various estimation procedures that future researchers may apply. Since the MRD approach is new to the
literature, I provide Monte-Carlo evidence on the best estimators in such a context. Since many policy interventions may have
more than one cutoff with imperfect compliance, this estimator can be used in other contexts as well.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Foreign Aid and DPEP Expenditure (in USD mn)
Foreign aid for expenditure on primary and upper primary education, and funds disbursed for DPEP. 1999 Indian rupees
converted to USD using the 1999 exchange rate of Rs. 40 to $1. Sources: Foreign Aid from Colclough and De (2010). DPEP
expenditures data compiled by author from Ministry of Human Resources and Development Reports, National Institute of
Educational Planning and Administration, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question Numbers: 1807- 07.03.2006; 552- 24.02.2009; 55 -
26.02.2008; 267- 22.03.2005; 1320- 10.12.2003; 2018- 4.3.2003, and Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2855- 19.04.2002.
Figure 1.2: Social Sector (Health and Education) Grants/Loans from Central to State Governments
Central government grants and loans to State governments for spending in the social sector (health and education), and as a
proportion of total grants/loans. 1999 Indian rupees converted to USD using the 1999 exchange rate of Rs. 40 to $1. Source:
External Assistance Brochure of CAA&A, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
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Figure 1.3: First Stage of DPEP
First stage graphs showing probability that a district received DPEP funds. Optimal bin sizes calculated using Calonico et al.
(2014b) method.
Figure 1.4: McCrary Density Tests
District Level McCrary Test Household Level McCrary Test
McCrary (2008) tests for discontinuity in density at the cutoff. These tests look for evidence of one-sided manipulation of the
running variable by testing the discontinuity in the density at the RD cutoff.
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Figure 1.5: Fraction of Schools Built Post 1993
Fraction of All Schools Built Post 1993 All Schools - RD Coefficient Over Time
Fraction of Government schools Built Post 1993 Government Schools - RD Coefficient Over Time
Fraction of Private schools built post 1993 Private schools built post 1993
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. Top panels show RD graphs using the 2005 data. RD graph
optimal binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.6: RD figures - Levels of Education
Literacy - Older Literate - Younger
Finished Primary School - Older Finished Primary - Younger
Years of Education - Older Upper Primary - Younger
National Sample Survey 2009 for persons who report earnings in primary occupation. Appendix Figure 1.15 shows the
analogous graphs for the full sample of persons. Figures made using Calonico et al. (2014b) method of using regression
curves to approximate the conditional means on either side of the cutoffs and the equally spaced sample means, and optimally
spaced bins. 44
Figure 1.7: RD Years of Education and Earnings - Young Sample
Years of Education Years of Education - Earnings Reported
Earnings (Rupees) Log(Earnings)
National Sample Survey 2009 for persons below 35 years of age. ‘Earners’ refers to those who report earnings in primary
occupation. Figures made using Calonico et al. (2014b) method of using regression curves to approximate the conditional
means on either side of the cutoffs and the equally spaced sample means in optimally spaced bins. Average exchange rate in
2009 is Rs. 40 = $1.
45
Figure 1.8: Change in Overall Output and Household Expenditure on Education
Log District GDP in 2004 RD 2SLS Coefficients - Same Bandwidth
Log(Educational Expenditure) Log(Expenditure on Tuition/Fees)
RD graph optimal binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure. ‘Same bandwidth’
restricts bandwidth to be the same as the first year’s optimal bandwidth.
Educational Expenditure Source: National Sample Survey 66th Round.
District Domestic Product Sources: Department of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of West Bengal;
Planning Commission; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Uttar Pradesh; Department of Economics
and Statistics Government of Tamil Nadu; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Rajasthan; Department of
Planning Government of Punjab; Planning and Coordination Government of Odisha; Directorate of Economics and Statistics
Government of Maharashtra; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Kerala; Planning Programme Moni-
toring and Statistics Department Government of Karnataka; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Bihar;
Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Assam; Andhra Pradesh State Portal.
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Figure 1.9: Teachers, Drinking Water, Restrooms and Electricity
Teachers (per school) with College Degrees Teachers (per school) with College Degrees
Female Teachers (per school) Drinking Water
Girls’ Restrooms Coefficient Over Time: Electricity
Source: DISE data. RD graphs (Regression Function Fit) use the 2005 data. RD graph optimal binning and 2SLS RD
coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.10: Crowd Out of Other Funds, Classrooms, and Pre-Primary Sections
TLM grants Spent (2005) RD Coefficient Over Time: TLM grants Received
Classrooms Needing Major Repair (2005) RD Coefficients: Classrooms Need Major Repair
Coefficient Over Time: Pre-Primary Schools Coefficient Over Time: Distance to CRC
Source: DISE data. All schools, regardless of their which district they are in, are eligible to receive the Teacher Learning
Materials (TLM) grant. Cluster Resource Centers (CRCs) provide facilities and training to teachers. RD graphs for TLM
grants received (rather than spent) can be found in Figure 1.19. Classrooms needing minor repair and in good condition can
be found in Figure 1.19. 48
1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: School Level (2005)
Mean SD
Fraction of Schools:
Built post 1993 0.277 0.447
Gov schools built post 1993 0.200 0.400
Pvt school built post 1993 0.075 0.263
Built between 1973-93 0.227 0.419
Gov schools built 1973-93 0.170 0.376
Pvt Schools built 1973-93 0.055 0.228
Fraction of Schools Having:
A Girl’s Toilet 0.400 0.490
Electricity 0.312 0.463
Playground 0.549 0.498
Medical Checkups 0.541 0.498
Ramps 0.182 0.386
A Boundary Wall 0.506 0.500
Drinking Water 0.846 0.361
A Pre-primary section 0.213 0.410
Block and Cluster Resource Centers:
Visits by BRC Official 1.485 2.543
Distance to BRC (km.) 13.462 15.936
Visits by CRC Official 4.496 5.612
Distance to CRC (km.) 4.438 8.689
Teacher Learning Materials Grant:
Amount Received (Rs.) 1517.100 8010.138
Amount Spent (Rs.) 1332.604 7611.869
Source: DISE (2005). Fraction of schools are for schools that still exist in 2005. BRC is Block Resource Center, and CRC is
Cluster Resource Center. All schools, regardless of DPEP status, are eligible for Teacher Learning Material Grants (TLM).
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Household Level
Non DPEP Non DPEP DPEP DPEP All All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Finished Primary School 0.71 0.45 0.60 0.49 0.67 0.47
Finished Upper Primary 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.55 0.50
Years of Education 7.40 5.26 6.14 5.38 6.95 5.34
Male 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Age 37.75 14.63 37.39 14.59 37.59 14.62
Weekly Earnings 42.17 51.29 31.55 38.50 38.92 47.43
Source: National Sample Survey (2009). Age in years. Earnings in 2005 USD, where Rs. 40 = $1.
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Table 1.3: Education Changes - Full Sample
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.573 0.279 0.571 0.303
(0.190)*** (0.242) (0.185)*** (0.224)
Observations 61,787 34,119 65,650 41,893
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00253 0.249 0.00205 0.175
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00175 0.168 0.0246 0.103
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0365 0.0252 0.0574 0.0263
(0.0191)* (0.0226) (0.0154)*** (0.0218)
Observations 39,326 36,584 68,050 40,068
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0562 0.264 0.000185 0.227
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.130 0.419 0.0840 0.404
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10, for all districts, and all persons between the ages of 16 and 75 (including those who did
not report earnings).
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b).
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Table 1.4: Education and Earnings for those with Reported Earnings
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 1.654 -0.381 1.569 -0.199
(0.491)*** (0.590) (0.417)*** (0.553)
Observations 10,175 7,997 14,277 8,630
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000753 0.519 0.000168 0.719
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00142 0.469 0 0.217
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.129 -0.0403 0.171 -0.0536
(0.0353)*** (0.0454) (0.0484)*** (0.0497)
Observations 14,277 8,630 10,175 7,997
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000249 0.375 0.000419 0.280
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00374 0.0291 0.000358 0.241
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Earnings in Rupees Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 217.6 -401.5 306.4 -327.4
(113.9)* (187.8)** (99.61)*** (176.2)*
Observations 10,175 7,997 14,277 8,630
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0561 0.0325 0.00210 0.0632
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.580 0.0138 0.706 0.000419
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Log Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.256 -0.217 0.326 -0.151
(0.0829)*** (0.105)** (0.0703)*** (0.0988)
Observations 10,175 7,994 14,277 8,627
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00197 0.0389 0 0.126
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0806 0.00227 0.311 0
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10, for all districts, and all persons between the ages of 16 and 75 that reported earnings.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b).
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Table 1.5: Fraction of People that Have Finished At Least a Given Level of Education
Literate Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0623 -0.0643 0.0655 -0.0300
(0.0368)* (0.0513) (0.0289)** (0.0383)
Observations 9,003 7,413 14,277 11,088
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0906 0.210 0.0236 0.434
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0827 0.104 0.0417 0.00229
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Some pre-primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0622 -0.0617 0.0657 -0.0181
(0.0373)* (0.0513) (0.0293)** (0.0363)
Observations 9,003 7,413 14,277 12,625
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0956 0.229 0.0250 0.617
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0927 0.121 0.0220 9.12e-05
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.121 -0.0616 0.139 -0.0288
(0.0445)*** (0.0491) (0.0390)*** (0.0419)
Observations 9,273 7,869 11,972 9,920
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00663 0.209 0.000354 0.493
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00747 0.117 0.000443 0.0815
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Upper-primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.167 -0.0557 0.170 -0.0291
(0.0518)*** (0.0509) (0.0485)*** (0.0430)
Observations 9,045 7,729 10,175 9,920
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00129 0.274 0.000443 0.499
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.000798 0.230 0.000240 0.0250
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for persons between 16 and 75 years of age that reported earnings.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
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Table 1.6: Returns, and Wage Parameters
Fraction Change in Returns
Switched ∆β
Estimate 0.173 -0.065
SE (0.059) (0.030)
Returns without GE Returns with GE % Change in returns
βy,D=0 βy,D=1
Estimate 0.199 0.134 -32.5%
Bootstrapped p-val [0.055] [0.098]
Change for older cohorts Additional on Young % Change on young
-0.0053 -0.0594 91.87%
National Sample Survey 2009-10. The estimation follows the procedures described in the Model section 1.3,
and detailed in Appendix 1.12.4, specifically Equations (1.23), (1.26) and (1.27).
Younger cohorts are those between 17 and 35, whereas older cohorts are between 36 and 50.
P-values for returns with GE βy,D=1 and returns without GE βy,D=0 were bootstrapped using 1000 draws of
sampling with repetition. The null was created by jointly permutating the RD running variable, treatment status
and probability of treatment.
The results in this table further suggest that the elasticity of substitution across age-cohorts is approximately
σA = 5, and in the absence of movement in skill-biased capital the elasticity of substitution across skill groups
would be σE = 4.24.
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Table 1.7: Household Expenditures
Log(Consumption Expenditure)
2004-5 2009-10
RD Estimate 0.179 0.172 0.405 0.112
(0.0372)*** (0.0334)*** (0.0682)*** (0.0322)***
Observations 27,372 33,758 12,563 26,420
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0 0 0 0
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0 0 0 0
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K CCT I and K
Log(Total Educational Expenditure)
2004-5 2009-10
RD Estimate -0.217 -0.510 -0.191 -0.232
(0.154) (0.127)*** (0.135) (0.118)**
Observations 8,922 11,388 8,205 9,937
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.159 0 0.157 0.0489
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0535 0 0.0668 0.0171
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K CCT I and K
Log(School Fees and Tuition)
2004-5 2009-10
RD Estimate -0.504 -0.977 -0.578 -0.616
(0.204)** (0.165)*** (0.186)*** (0.150)***
Observations 8,308 12,034 7,608 10,219
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0136 0 0.0018 0
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0029 0 0.0005 0
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K CCT I and K
Log(Expenditure on newspapers, books, internet, libraries, stationery)
2004-5 2009-10
RD Estimate 0.140 -0.0572 0.120 0.0189
(0.121) (0.101) (0.0996) (0.0914)
Observations 8,783 14,068 12,614 14,207
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.247 0.573 0.230 0.836
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0591 0.256 0.449 0.885
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K CCT I and K
Household Expenditure Sources: National Sample Survey 2009-10.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) method. ‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al.
(2014b)
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Table 1.8: Labor Market Benefits
Change in Yearly Labor Market Benefits for
(1) Young, Induced into getting more Skill
With GE Without GE % Change Fraction of cohort
0.121 0.157 -23.3% 0.17
(2) Always Skilled (Young)
With GE Without GE % Change Fraction of cohort
-0.037 0 - 0.39
(3) Always Unskilled (Young)
With GE Without GE % Change Fraction of cohort
0.014 0 - 0.44
Transfer in Yearly Benefits from Skilled to Unskilled
Among Old Among Old Among Young Among Young
with GE without GE with GE without GE
0.004 0 0.051 0
Change in Lifetime Welfare for Induced Students
Costs Benefits Net
% Change
(due to GE)
5.153 6.596 1.443 -23.3%
Welfare numbers are in monetary log-points. GE - indicates general equilibrium effects.
‘Change in Benefits’ shown for the sub-population that was young and changed their years of education to
acquire skill. This is split up by ‘With GE’ effects, and a possible counterfactual of what would happen to
their welfare in the absence of GE effects (‘Without GE’). ‘% Change’ is defined as change in welfare with
the ‘Without GE’ as the base.
‘Induced into getting more Skill’ indicate the population that switched from unskilled to skilled only because
of the policy. ‘Always Skilled’ indicate the population that would have acquired skill even in the absence
of the policy. ‘Always Unskilled’ indicate the fraction of the population who would not have acquired skill
even in the presence of the policy.
‘Fraction switchers’ is estimated (across RD cutoff) difference in sub-populations that acquired a higher
level of education.
Yearly welfare calculations assume an interest rate of 2.37% and a gap of ten years between the costs of
education and the labor market returns.
Real Interest Rates from the World Bank. The World Bank uses the lending rate and adjusts it for inflation
using the GDP deflator. For the period 2010-13, the average real interest rate was 2.37%.
‘Change in Lifetime Welfare for Induced Students’ : Costs include (a) opportunity cost of foregone earnings
for unskilled work, and (b) tuition costs for students in DPEP districts near the cutoff. Costs are calculated
in 2004 (NSS 61st round).
‘Change in Lifetime Welfare for Induced Students’ : Benefits include present discounted value of lifetime
earnings stream assuming a real interest rate of 2.37%.
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1.11 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 1.11: Literacy and Enrollment
(a) Literacy Rates Across Census Years
Source: Census of India 2001 and 2011.
Distributions calculated over sub-districts.
(b) Enrollment Rates by Age
National Sample Survey 2009. The largest drop in school en-
rollment occurs between the ages of 19 and 20 - representing a
15 percentage point fall.
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Figure 1.12: Map of DPEP Districts
Orange and shaded districts received DPEP, whereas blue-unshaded districts did not.
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Figure 1.13: Schools Built Post 1993 - Bandwidth Selection
Total Schools (per cap) Built Post 1993 Total Government Schools (per cap) post 1993
Fraction New - CCT CCT Same Bandwidth for All Years
Fraction New - I&K Bandwidth I&K Same Bandwidth for All Years
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. CCT is Calonico et al. (2014b), whereas I&K is Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). ‘per cap’ figures normalized by total population in district. ‘Same Bandwidth for All Years’ is where
the estimation is restricted to have the same bandwidth as it is in the first year of the data.
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Figure 1.14: No Discontinuity in Number and Fraction of Old Schools
Total Number of Old Schools (built pre-1993)
Over Time: Private Schools (1973-93) as a Fraction of all
Old Pvt Schools (pre-1993)
Total Number of Old Gov Schools (1993)
Over Time: Government Schools (1973-93) as a Fraction of
all Old Gov Schools (pre-1993)
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. RD graphs (Regression Function Fit) use the 2005 data. RD
graph optimal binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.15: RD Figures - Levels of Education - Full Sample
Literate - Old Literate - Young
.
Finished Primary School - Old Finished Primary - Young
.
Years of Education - Old Finished Upper Primary - Young
National Sample Survey 2009 for all persons (whether or not earnings reported). Figures made using Calonico et al. (2014b)
method of using regression curves to approximate the conditional means on either side of the cutoffs and the equally spaced
sample means, and optimal number of bins.
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Figure 1.16: RD figures for DISE districts
Years of Education - Younger Years of Education - Older
Finished Primary - Younger Finished Primary - Older
Finished Upper Primary - Younger Finished Upper Primary - Older
National Sample Survey 2009. DISE districts include districts that have school-level DISE data. RD graph optimal binning
and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.17: Difference-in-Differences: Years of Education
Full Sample Short Bandwidth
Coefficients of regression that includes age fixed effects and district fixed effects. Difference-in-Differences coefficient based
on age and DPEP status. ‘Short Bandwidth’ restricts to sample near RD cutoff.
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Figure 1.18: Firm Movement
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (2001 to 2007). Firm level data. Wages and compensation calculated at the firm-level.
2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure. ‘High-wage’ or ‘high-compensation’ defined as
being above median wages for the entire country.
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Figure 1.19: Other Funds Spent, and Condition of Rooms
RD Coefficient Over Time: TLM grants Received RD Coefficient Over Time: TLM grants Spent
RD Coefficients: Classrooms Need Minor Repair RD Coefficients: Classrooms in Good Condition
RD Coefficients: Other Rooms Need Minor Repair RD Coefficients: Other Rooms Need Major Repair
All schools, regardless of their which district they are in, are eligible to receive the Teacher Learning Materials (TLM) grant.
Discontinuity for TLM grants spent, and for ‘Classrooms need Major Repair’ can be found in Figure 1.10.
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Figure 1.20: Pre-Primary Sections
Schools with Pre Primary Sections Coefficient Over Time: Pre-Primary Schools
Number of Pre Primary Teachers Coefficient Over Time: Pre-Primary Teachers
Number of Pre Primary Students Coefficient Over Time: Pre-Primary Students
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. RD graphs in the left-panel use the 2005 data. RD graph
optimal binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.21: Academic Inspections and Regional Resource Centers
Distance to CRC (2005) Coefficient Over Time: Distance to CRC
Distance to BRC (2005) Coefficient Over Time: Distance to BRC
Number of Academic Inspections Visits by BRC Official
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. Cluster Resource Centers (CRCs) and Block Resource
Centers (BRCs) provide facilities and training to teachers. RD graphs in the left-panel use the 2005 data. RD graph optimal
binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.22: Medium of Instruction and Other Infrastructure
Coefficient Over Time: English Medium Coefficient Over Time: Library Books
Coefficient Over Time: Hindi Medium Medical Checkups
Coefficient Over Time: Regional Language Coefficient Over Time: Playground
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. RD graphs in the left-panel use the 2005 data. RD graph
optimal binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure. Other infrastructure related
graphs can be found in Figures 1.9, 1.20, 1.21 and 1.19.
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Figure 1.23: Involvement in Non Teaching Assignments
Teachers (per school) in Non-Teaching Assignments Teachers (per school) in Non-Teaching Assignments
Days Involved in Non-Teaching Assignments Days Involved in Non-Teaching Assignments
Source: DISE (District Information System for Education) data. RD graphs in the left-panel use the 2005 data. RD graph
optimal binning and 2SLS RD coefficients calculated using Calonico et al. (2014b) procedure.
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Figure 1.24: Density of Capital Intensive Firms Above Cutoff
Firms with Mechanized Production High Compensation Firms
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) panel from 2001 (first year of data) and 2007 (last year of data).
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Table 1.9: Education, Earnings and Returns By Age Groups
Years of Education - Younger 16 to 25 26 to 35 16 to 25 26 to 35
RD Estimate 2.751 1.161 2.379 1.179
(0.768)*** (0.672)* (0.559)*** (0.535)**
Observations 4,071 5,747 7,301 8,874
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000340 0.0839 0 0.0277
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.000170 0.108 0 0.0213
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Years of Education - Older 36 to 45 46 to 55 36 to 45 46 to 55
RD Estimate -0.821 0.856 -0.450 0.649
(0.787) (1.008) (0.684) (0.850)
Observations 4,502 3,158 5,508 4,285
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.297 0.396 0.510 0.445
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.180 0.257 0.171 0.198
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Log(Earnings) - Younger 16 to 25 26 to 35 16 to 25 26 to 35
RD Estimate 0.403 0.136 0.481 0.265
(0.134)*** (0.111) (0.0973)*** (0.0884)***
Observations 4,072 5,747 7,302 8,874
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00257 0.219 0 0.00270
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0109 0.844 0.00259 0.749
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Log(Earnings) - Older 36 to 45 46 to 55 36 to 45 46 to 55
RD Estimate -0.184 0.0350 -0.0585 0.192
(0.134) (0.182) (0.117) (0.157)
Observations 4,501 3,157 5,507 4,284
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.172 0.848 0.617 0.223
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0409 0.978 0.0697 0.432
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10, for all districts, and for persons that reported earnings.
Bandwidths: Calonico et al. (2014b) method. Bias corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values
using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b). Earnings regressions are restricted to the same bandwidth
as the years of education regressions.
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Table 1.10: Earnings Reported, Migration, Paid Monthly, and Unemployment
P(Earnings Being Reported) Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate -0.0147 -0.0208 -0.0135 -0.0201
(0.0209) (0.0185) (0.0223) (0.0190)
Observations 37,201 42,316 32,742 39,823
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.481 0.261 0.546 0.289
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.376 0.299 0.566 0.749
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Number of Migrants in District Total Migrants Households Migrated
RD Estimate 10.93 4.230 -7.671 -1.863
(38.95) (36.95) (4.590)* (3.474)
Observations 153 277 175 523
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.779 0.909 0.0947 0.592
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.786 0.853 0.0493 0
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K CCT I and K
Paid monthly (non-daily) Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.244 0.0450 0.239 0.0616
(0.0581)*** (0.0526) (0.0491)*** (0.0437)
Observations 7,962 7,680 10,395 9,869
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0 0.393 0 0.159
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0 0.375 0 0.403
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Fraction Unemployed Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate -0.0291 -0.00857 -0.0354 -0.00839
(0.00527)*** (0.00379)** (0.00616)*** (0.00343)**
Observations 82,936 38,060 62,393 50,887
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0 0.0237 0 0.0143
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0 0.0105 0 0.00256
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
‘Number of Migrants in the District’ uses the small-sample National Sample Survey 2007-8 (64th Round) that asks ques-
tions on migration. ‘Household Migrated’ is indicator for whether the household every migrated for any reason. ‘Total
Migrants’ counts the number of people who may have ever left the village for any reason - the most common reasons are
marriage (54%). Less than 30% of migration is for work-related reasons.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
The other panels use National Sample Survey 2009-10. ‘P(Earnings Reported)’ is probability that earnings are reported -
regresses indicator of whether earnings data is non-missing. ‘Paid-monthly’ is an indicator for whether the person receives
earnings at a monthly (as opposed to daily) frequency. ‘Unemployed’ includes those who ‘sought-work’, those who ‘did
not seek but were available for work’, did not work due to ‘sickness’ or ‘other reasons.’
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ‘CCT
corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b).
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Table 1.11: Education and Earnings - Men
Full sample Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Years of Education
RD Estimate 0.911 0.400 0.685 0.399
(0.345)*** (0.285) (0.245)*** (0.285)
Observations 16,197 29,622 34,248 29,622
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00827 0.161 0.00521 0.161
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00285 0.183 0.000255 0.0711
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Reported Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Years of Education
RD Estimate 1.641 0.121 1.623 0.454
(0.546)*** (0.615) (0.501)*** (0.495)
Observations 8,047 6,767 9,638 12,517
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00265 0.845 0.00119 0.359
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00485 0.992 0.00230 0.554
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Reported Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Finished Upper-Primary School
RD Estimate 0.166 -0.00540 0.171 0.0465
(0.0615)*** (0.0533) (0.0509)*** (0.0412)
Observations 6,947 6,589 9,841 13,236
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00697 0.919 0.000788 0.259
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00419 0.758 0.00520 0.661
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Reported Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Log Earnings
RD Estimate 0.356 -0.0691 0.366 0.139
(0.0921)*** (0.104) (0.0836)*** (0.0825)*
Observations 8,047 6,766 9,638 12,516
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000110 0.506 1.19e-05 0.0927
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00201 0.172 0.000377 6.60e-06
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for people between 16 and 75 years of age. Sample of males.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ‘CCT
corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b).
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Table 1.12: Education and Earnings - Women
Full sample Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Years of Education
RD Estimate 0.204 -0.0556 0.146 -0.0477
(0.344) (0.300) (0.352) (0.283)
Observations 17,244 16,834 16,486 19,809
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.553 0.853 0.678 0.866
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.864 0.840 0.953 0.676
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Reported Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Years of Education
RD Estimate 1.616 -0.131 1.489 -0.159
(1.099) (0.967) (0.904)* (1.011)
Observations 2,213 2,128 2,945 2,026
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.141 0.892 0.0994 0.875
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.127 0.736 0.0634 0.868
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Reported Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Finished Upper-Primary School
RD Estimate 0.161 -0.0593 0.156 -0.0605
(0.0818)** (0.0757) (0.0894)* (0.0821)
Observations 2,620 2,157 2,250 1,998
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0493 0.434 0.0801 0.461
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0486 0.365 0.0246 0.433
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Reported Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Log Earnings
RD Estimate -0.0910 -0.119 0.0684 -0.140
(0.162) (0.180) (0.136) (0.188)
Observations 2,213 2,126 2,945 2,024
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.575 0.509 0.615 0.457
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0761 0.187 0.0651 0.181
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for people between 16 and 75 years of age. Sample of females.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ‘CCT
corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b).
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Table 1.13: Difference-in-Differences Table
Full Sample
Years of Education Non DPEP DPEP Difference
Young 8.742 7.634 -1.108
0.098 0.105 0.143
Old 6.255 4.758 -1.497
0.118 0.096 0.152
Difference 2.487 2.876 0.389***
0.071 0.074 0.102
Reported Earnings
Years of Education Non DPEP DPEP Difference
Young 8.57 7.20 -1.37
0.14 0.15 0.20
Old 7.91 6.08 -1.83
0.15 0.15 0.21
Difference 0.66 1.12 0.458**
0.13 0.13 0.18
Log Earnings Non DPEP DPEP Difference
Young 6.759 6.521 -0.238
0.031 0.026 0.041
Old 7.102 6.800 -0.303
0.031 0.026 0.040
Difference -0.344 -0.279 0.065**
0.023 0.021 0.031
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for people between 16 and 75 years of age.
The two dimensions for the Difference-in-Differences are district (received policy vs did not
receive policy) and age (young enough to change schooling).
Table reports means for each sub-group and standard errors calculated at the district level below
the means.
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Table 1.14: District-Age Cells
Literate Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0833 -0.0132 0.0808 -0.0139
(0.0381)** (0.0526) (0.0414)* (0.0567)
Observations 3,983 3,064 2,839 2,736
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0289 0.802 0.0510 0.806
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0157 0.568 0.0944 0.718
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.103 -0.0238 0.104 -0.0275
(0.0453)** (0.0557) (0.0464)** (0.0571)
Observations 3,892 3,064 3,432 2,899
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0224 0.669 0.0249 0.630
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0224 0.464 0.922 0.798
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Upper-Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.142 -0.0358 0.158 -0.0363
(0.0557)** (0.0562) (0.0527)*** (0.0566)
Observations 3,908 3,080 4,798 3,057
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0109 0.524 0.00278 0.522
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0146 0.464 0.677 0.663
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.975 -0.415 1.153 -0.430
(0.598) (0.673) (0.461)** (0.670)
Observations 3,526 3,182 6,470 3,296
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.103 0.538 0.0123 0.521
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.178 0.537 0 0.831
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Log Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0922 -0.0842 0.289 -0.0738
(0.110) (0.138) (0.0860)*** (0.137)
Observations 3,526 3,182 6,470 3,296
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.400 0.540 0.000768 0.590
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.822 0.257 0 0.344
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10. Data collapsed to the district-age cell level. Sample of persons that reported earnings,
ages between 16 and 75 years.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ‘CCT
corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b).
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Table 1.15: Robustness: In-Progress RD Methods for Bandwidths and Standard Errors
Panel A: Bartalotti and Brummet (2015) Standard Errors
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 1.654 -0.337 1.569 -0.0985
(0.742)** (0.877) (0.650)** (0.836)
Bandwidth CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.121 -0.0580 0.139 -0.0266
(0.0615)** (0.0793) (0.0568)** (0.0669)
Bandwidth CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Upper-Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.167 -0.0507 0.170 -0.0291
(0.0766)** (0.0659) (0.0730)** (0.0610)
Bandwidth CCT CCT I and K I and K
Panel B: Two-sided Bandwidth with district-age group Standard Errors
Years of Education Finished Primary
Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 1.188 -0.0516 0.115 -0.0350
(0.632)* (0.706) (0.0526)** (0.0605)
Finished Upper Primary Finished Secondary
Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.174 -0.0512 0.169 -0.0182
(0.0631)*** (0.0518) (0.0797)** (0.0659)
National Sample Survey 2009-10. Sample of persons that reported earnings, ages between 16 and 75 years.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to
change their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
method. ‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
Panel A: Uses the Bartalotti and Brummet (2015) method to compute standard errors at the district-age group
level. The optimal bandwidths are chosen using the Calonico et al. (2014b) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
methods. I thank
Panel B: Uses an in-progress method developed by some authors of the Calonico et al. (2014b) paper that allows for
a separate optimal bandwidth on either side of the cutoff and allows for computing standard errors at the district-age
group level.
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Table 1.16: Parametric RD - Short Bandwidth
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.999*** 0.769 0.911** 0.782
(0.387) (0.487) (0.383) (0.488)
Observations 128,799 124,077 128,799 124,077
R-squared 0.039 0.022 0.030 0.024
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
Reported Earnings
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 1.406*** 1.194 1.416*** 1.206
(0.498) (0.892) (0.493) (0.892)
Observations 26,898 29,343 26,898 29,343
R-squared 0.026 0 0.028 0
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
Reported Earnings
Finished Upper Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.107** 0.0912 0.108** 0.0916
(0.0458) (0.0633) (0.0455) (0.0632)
Observations 26,899 29,346 26,899 29,346
R-squared 0.022 0 0.023 -0.006
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
Log Wage & Salary Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.470*** 0.358** 0.544*** 0.413**
(0.138) (0.174) (0.126) (0.170)
Observations 26,894 29,342 26,894 29,342
R-squared 0 0 0 0
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
National Sample Survey 2009-10. Parametric RDs using local linear and quadratic functions. Bandwidth restricted to 0.3
on either side of the cutoff. Sample of persons between 16 and 75 years.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
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Table 1.17: Parametric RD - Longer Bandwidth
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.665* 0.632 0.781** 0.662
(0.345) (0.401) (0.352) (0.427)
Observations 133,669 129,192 133,669 129,192
R-squared 0.043 0.035 0.035 0.030
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
Reported Earnings
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 1.035** 0.913 1.097** 0.992
(0.416) (0.716) (0.449) (0.789)
Observations 28,290 30,836 28,290 30,836
R-squared 0.044 0.011 0.032 -0.004
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
Reported Earnings
Finished Upper Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0832** 0.0711 0.0865** 0.0766
(0.0398) (0.0511) (0.0418) (0.0561)
Observations 28,291 30,839 28,291 30,839
R-squared 0.036 0.011 0.028 -0.002
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
Log Wage & Salary Earnings Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.427*** 0.332** 0.399*** 0.305**
(0.117) (0.145) (0.113) (0.147)
Observations 28,285 30,835 28,285 30,835
R-squared 0 0 0 0
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
National Sample Survey 2009-10. Parametric RDs using local linear and quadratic functions. Bandwidth restricted to 0.4
on either side of the cutoff. Sample of persons between 16 and 75 years.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
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Table 1.18: Returns to Education using Two-Staged Least Squares
First-Stage Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Years of Education
RD Estimate 1.654 -0.381 1.569 -0.199
(0.491)*** (0.590) (0.417)*** (0.553)
Observations 10,175 7,997 14,277 8,630
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000753 0.519 0.000168 0.719
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00142 0.469 0 0.217
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
2 SLS Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
Log(Earnings)
Years of Education 0.155 0.567 0.208 0.744
(0.0465)*** (0.699) (0.0494)*** (1.706)
Observations 10,175 7,994 14,277 8,627
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000856 0.417 0 0.663
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0394 0.269 0.569 0.813
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for persons between 16 and 75 years of age. ‘2SLS’ regressions treats the first stage as
‘change in years of education’ as opposed to probability of receiving DPEP funds.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
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Table 1.19: Robustness: Widening Age Restrictions - Full Sample
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.605 0.209 0.600 0.287
(0.166)*** (0.237) (0.176)*** (0.225)
Observations 74,342 35,064 63,388 39,456
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000266 0.378 0.000641 0.202
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0 0.262 0 0.165
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0288 0.0218 0.0429 0.0243
(0.0176) (0.0222) (0.0147)*** (0.0216)
Observations 42,713 37,199 66,472 39,839
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.102 0.327 0.00346 0.259
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.219 0.457 0.0599 0.456
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Upper Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0729 0.0276 0.0765 0.0299
(0.0216)*** (0.0216) (0.0178)*** (0.0185)
Observations 42,713 36,145 70,270 57,738
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000754 0.201 1.81e-05 0.106
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00188 0.277 8.64e-09 0.344
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for sample of persons aged 15 to 100 years of age.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ‘CCT
corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
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Table 1.20: Robustness: Widening Age Restrictions - For Reported Earnings
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 1.733 -0.374 1.674 -0.113
(0.487)*** (0.589) (0.438)*** (0.534)
Observations 10,559 8,002 12,866 9,057
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000372 0.525 0.000132 0.832
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.000668 0.477 0.000359 0.186
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Primary School Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.136 -0.0607 0.149 -0.0272
(0.0443)*** (0.0488) (0.0422)*** (0.0403)
Observations 9,822 8,002 10,560 11,033
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00210 0.214 0.000412 0.500
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.00178 0.121 0.000143 0.0543
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Upper Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.173 -0.0549 0.172 -0.0334
(0.0514)*** (0.0506) (0.0503)*** (0.0381)
Observations 9,662 7,734 10,117 13,441
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000773 0.278 0.000637 0.380
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.000549 0.236 0.000545 0.00170
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Log(Earnings) Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.272 -0.218 0.298 -0.112
(0.0834)*** (0.105)** (0.0747)*** (0.0956)
Observations 10,560 7,999 12,867 9,054
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.00109 0.0380 6.57e-05 0.242
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0508 0.00217 0.839 4.39e-06
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10 for sample of persons aged 15 to 100 years of age that reported earnings.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
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Table 1.21: Robustness: Restricting to DISE districts
Years of Education Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.978 -0.0310 0.770 -0.105
(0.269)*** (0.202) (0.216)*** (0.177)
Observations 21,099 34,331 31,727 46,462
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000275 0.878 0.000356 0.552
Fuzzy CCT Correct p-value 0 0.888 0 0.308
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.0801 -0.00677 0.0647 -0.00571
(0.0221)*** (0.0172) (0.0168)*** (0.0186)
Observations 21,258 46,012 35,465 37,713
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.000280 0.694 0.000111 0.759
Fuzzy CCT Correct p-value 0 0.387 0 0.707
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
Finished Upper Primary Below 35 years Above 35 years Below 35 years Above 35 years
RD Estimate 0.144 0.00521 0.126 0.00343
(0.0314)*** (0.0180) (0.0250)*** (0.0175)
Observations 18,169 37,713 22,612 41,715
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0 0.772 0 0.845
Fuzzy CCT Correct p-value 0 0.867 0 0.450
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT CCT I and K I and K
National Sample Survey 2009-10.
The sample of ‘Below 35 years’ are of school going age during the policy, whereas those ‘Above 35’ are too old to change
their schooling in response to the policy.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method. ‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
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Table 1.22: Difference-in-Differences (Full Model)
Full Sample Years of Education Literate Finished Primary Finished Upper Primary
Estimate 0.332*** 0.0551*** 0.0386*** 0.0196***
(0.0388) (0.00311) (0.00338) (0.00363)
Observations 279,452 279,483 279,483 279,483
R-squared 0.176 0.189 0.193 0.170
Small Bandwidth Years of Education Literate Finished Primary Finished Upper Primary
Estimate 0.311*** 0.0426*** 0.0302*** 0.0209**
(0.106) (0.00764) (0.00834) (0.00959)
Observations 144,248 144,261 144,261 144,261
R-squared 0.108 0.118 0.117 0.103
Reported Earnings Years of Education Literate Finished Primary Finished Upper Primary
Estimate 0.377** 0.0558*** 0.0410*** 0.0299**
(0.155) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0150)
Observations 66,093 66,098 66,098 66,098
R-squared 0.157 0.166 0.164 0.139
Log(Earnings) 2SLS Returns
Estimate 0.0596** 0.159***
(0.0251) (0.0473)
Observations 66,086 66,081
R-squared 0.241 0.393
Log (Earnings) Log (Earnings) Additional GE on young
Skilled Unskilled
Estimate -0.0611** 0.0183 -0.0794**
(0.0283) (0.0213) (0.0354)
Observations 37,748 28,338
R-squared 0.311 0.225
National Sample Survey 2009-10 – 17 to 75 year olds. Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects. Diff-in-diff
coefficient on interaction between being below 35 and in DPEP district. Robust standard errors at the district level.
‘Small Bandwidth’ restricts the sample in two ways: (1) restricts ages to be +/− 15 years of the 35 year cutoff, (2) restricts
districts to have female literacy ∈ (−0.2, 0.2). ‘2SLS Returns’ estimates two-staged least squares returns where the first stage
dependent variable is the years of education, and the second stage dependent variable is log-earnings. ‘Additional GE on
young’ estimates the GE effect that only affects the skill-premium of the young (note: this excludes the average change in
wages due to changes in output, and the portion of the change in the skill premium experienced by all-cohorts).
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Table 1.23: Test Scores
Panel A: Reading Scores 2008 Read Letter Read Word Reading Level 1
RD Estimate 0.00411 -0.0158 -0.0147
(0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0120)
Bandwidth CCT CCT CCT
Panel B: Math Scores 2008 Numbers 1-9 Numbers 10-99 Subtraction
RD Estimate 0.0531 0.0197 0.0196
(0.0116)*** (0.0136) (0.0137)
Bandwidth CCT CCT CCT
Panel C: Reading Scores 2012 Read Letter Read Word Reading Level 1
RD Estimate -0.0143 0.0164 0.0216
(0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0145)
Bandwidth CCT CCT CCT
Panel D: Math Scores 2012 Numbers 1-9 Numbers 10-99 Subtraction
RD Estimate 0.0514 -0.0277 0.0351
(0.0156)*** (0.0184) (0.0183)*
Bandwidth CCT CCT CCT
Source: Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) Data – years 2008 and 2012 – for children
(aged 3 through 15) still in school.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method.
Variables: ‘Read Letter’ is if the child can recognize the letter. ‘Read Word’ is if the child can read
the word. ‘Read Level 1’ if the child has achieved reading level 1. ‘Numbers 1-9’ if the child can
identify the digits between 1 and 9. ‘Numbers 10-99’ can identify 10 through 99. ‘Subtraction’ can
perform simple subtractions.
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Table 1.24: District GDP
Log(District GDP) 2000-06
RD Estimate 0.137 0.190
(0.132) (0.126)
Observations 664 838
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.303 0.132
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.316 0.141
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K
District GDP (Rupees) 2000-6
RD Estimate 5,346 3,711
(2,874)* (3,142)
Observations 1,109 650
Fuzzy Conventional p-value 0.0629 0.237
Fuzzy CCT Corrected p-value 0.0181 0.236
Mean dependent variable 17471.8 17471.8
Bandwidth selection procedure CCT I and K
District Domestic Product Sources: Department of Statistics
and Programme Implementation, Government of West Bengal;
Planning Commission; Directorate of Economics and Statis-
tics Government of Uttar Pradesh; Department of Economics
and Statistics Government of Tamil Nadu; Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics Government of Rajasthan; Department
of Planning Government of Punjab; Planning and Coordina-
tion Government of Odisha; Directorate of Economics and
Statistics Government of Maharashtra; Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics Government of Kerala; Planning Pro-
gramme Monitoring and Statistics Department Government of
Karnataka; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Govern-
ment of Bihar; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Gov-
ernment of Assam; Andhra Pradesh State Portal.
Bandwidths: ‘CCT’ is the Calonico et al. (2014b) method.
‘I and K’ is the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method.
‘CCT corrected p-value’ is the bias-corrected p-values using
the method in Calonico et al. (2014b)
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1.12 Derivations in the Model
1.12.1 Education Sector
1.12.1.1 Supply of Public and Private Schools
Public schools want to maximize the overall access to education Ad for the students in the entire district
d. The district d receives Rd from the government, and spends pm for each input xm into the schooling
production functions. The vector of inputs at the district level xm can consist of new schools, better
qualified teachers, better infrastructure, more resource-centers, etc.
max
xm
Ad(xm) (1.32)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
pmxm ≤ Rd , (1.33)
where ∂A
∂xm
> 0, ∂
2A
∂xm∂xm
< 0, ∂
2A
∂xm∂xn
> 0. From the first order conditions, it is easy to derive the optimal
amount of inputs of type m: x∗md(Rd,pm), where
∂x∗m
∂Rd
≥ 0 and ∂x∗m
∂pm
≤ 0. An increase in government
funding Rd, thus increases the amounts of inputs into the schooling-access production function, and
increases the overall access to education for the students in the district Ad.
For example, one functional form that is consistent with the setup is a simple Cobb-Douglas func-
tion:
A(xm) =
∏
m
xαmm , (1.34)
where 0 < αm < 1 and
∑
m αm = 1.
The optimal amount of inputs of type m are therefore x∗m = Rd
αm
pm
, and the overall access to education is
given by:
Ad(Rd,pm) = Rd
∏
m
(
αm
pm
)αm
(1.35)
An increase in government funding increases the overall access to education in a proportional manner
under the Cobb-Douglas form.
Private schools, however, are profit maximizers with heterogeneous costs:
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max
Xj
pdθ¯dXj − Z(Xj) , (1.36)
where the costs are Z(Xj) = z1jXj + 12z2dX
2
j . The supply-curve of schooling for school j is there-
fore:
Qjd = θ¯dX
∗
j = θ¯d
pdθ¯d − z1j
z2d
, (1.37)
Since there is free entry of private schools into these regions, schools will enter until pijd = 0. The
marginal school, therefore will have a cost-parameter z˜1d = θ¯dpd. If costs are drawn from a distribution
F (z1j), then the fraction of schools that enter the region is given by: F
(
θ¯dpd
)
.
The overall supply of private schooling is therefore:
Ssypvt,d =
∫ pdθ¯d
0
θ¯d
pdθ¯d − z1j
z2d
˜f(z1)dz1j =
θ¯d
z2d
[pdθ¯d − Ed(z1j|z1j < pdθ¯d)] , (1.38)
where ˜f(z1) is the conditional distribution of private school costs of entrants.
The aggregate profits of private schools, Π, will also be affected by changes in prices and average pro-
ductivity, where the aggregate profits are:
Π =
∫ θ¯dpd
0
(pdθ¯d − z1j)2
z
dF (z1j) (1.39)
1.12.1.2 Education Market Equilibrium and Changes in Policy
The demand for schooling is determined by the household decisions, where s∗id =
βd−r¯d−ηi
Γ
. Given a
distribution for ηi ∼ H(η), the overall demand for schooling in district d comes from households:
SDdd =
∫
βd + ΨAd − pd − ηi
Γ
dH(η) =
βd + ΨAd − pd − η¯d
Γ
, (1.40)
where η¯d = E[ηi|i ∈ d]. The overall supply of schooling comes from both public and private schools:81
SSyd =
θ¯d
z2d
[pdθ¯d − Ed(z1j|z1j < pdθ¯d)] + Ad (1.41)
81Alternatively, the public-school “supply” can be separated from the notion of access Ad. For example, the supply of
public schools, specifically, could be x∗school = Rd
αschool
pschool
. Doing this, would not change the model’s predictions.
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Here, it is clear that the supply of public-schools doesn’t depend on the fees, since many do not charge
fees, and profit-maximization is not the motive of public school provisioning. Together, equations (1.40)
and (1.41) determine the equilibrium price and quantities of schooling in the district. Depending on the
distribution of z1j , a closed-form solution may be found. For example, if the conditional distribution of
private school costs is uniform ˜f(a) ∼ U [0, pdθ¯d], then the equilibrium price and quantity is:82
p∗d =
βd + (Ψ− Γ)Ad − η¯d
Γ
(
θ¯2d
z2d
)
+ 1
and S∗d =
θ¯2d (βd + ΨAd) + z2dAd
Γθ¯2d + z2d
− η¯d
Γ
(1.42)
Improving access to schooling, by building newer schools or upgrading its infrastructure will reduce
the marginal costs of schooling (Behrman et al., 1996; Birdsall, 1985). For example, under the Cobb-
Douglas public-schooling production function, one can see that the fall in the marginal costs of schooling
are directly in proportion to the increase in revenues from the government.
rid = −RdΨ
∏
m
αm
pm
αm
+ p∗d(Rd) + ηi (1.43)
One can define D = 1 for districts that received government funds. Then the optimal years of schooling
becomes:
S∗d = φ1βd + φ2Rd −
ηd
Γ
, (1.44)
where φ1 ≡
(
θ¯2d
Γθ¯2d+z2d
)
and φ2 ≡
(
(z2d+Ψθ¯2d)(
∏
m
αm
pm
αm)
Γθ¯2d+z2d
)
. In equation (1.44) the equilibrium amount of
schooling is affected by the expansion of public schooling.
1.12.2 Elasticity of Capital
So far the model assumes (a) that capital is perfectly supplied at the rate R∗, and (b) is not skill-biased.
If however, capital was fixed at a value K¯d in a district, it would not change the qualitative predictions
of the model, nor the parameters estimated. The average earnings for a worker with age a and skill s in
district d would be:
82If the supply of public schools was instead modeled as x∗school, then the equilibrium quantity would be S
∗
d =
θ¯2d(βd+ΨAd)+z2d
(
Rd
αschool
pschool
)
Γθ¯2d+z2d
− η¯dΓ . This would produce the same qualitative results going forward.
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logwasd = log
(
∂Yd
∂`asd
)
= log θsd + logψa +
((
1
σE
− 1
)(
1
%
)
log Yd −
(
1
σE
− 1
)(
1− %
%
)
log K¯d
)
+
(1.45)(
1
σA
− 1
σE
)
logLsd − 1
σA
log `asd ,
Here the term
((
1
σE
− 1
)(
1
%
)
log Yd −
(
1
σE
− 1
)(
1−%
%
)
log K¯d
)
is common across cohorts and skill
levels. Along with Yd, it gets differenced out in the derivation.
1.12.3 Skill Biased Capital
In Model subsection 1.3.1 I introduce skill biased capital as affecting the productivity parameter θsd.
Below, I explicitly model skill biased capital to show how flexible forms of introducing it do not influence
the estimation strategy or results. In the following set up, the noticeable changes are where Equation (1.3)
has been modified into Equation (1.48), which includes an elasticity of substitution between labor `sd and
skill biased capital ksd represented by σs:
Yd = L
%
dK
(1−%)
d (1.46)
Ld =
(∑
s
θsdL
σE−1
σE
sd
) σE
σE−1
(1.47)
Lsd =
(
Λsk
σs−1
σs
sd + (1− Λs)`
σs−1
σs
sd
) σs
σs−1
(1.48)
`sd =
(∑
a
ψa`
σA−1
σA
asd
) σA
σA−1
(1.49)
Given this new set up, earnings can be represented by Equation (1.50), instead of Equation (1.4):
logwasd = log %˜+logψa+
1
σE
log Yd+
(
1
σs
− 1
σE
)
logLsd+
(
1
σA
− 1
σs
)
log `sd− 1
σA
log `asd (1.50)
This new set up does not change the estimation or the interpretation of the estimates. In the following
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equation, that replaces Equation (1.24) to estimate the GE effects on all workers, the skill-biased capital
term is captured by the term Lsd:
log
wso,D=1
wso,D=0
−logwuo,D=1
wuo,D=0
=
(
1
σs
− 1
σE
)[
log
Ls,D=1
Lu,D=1
− log Ls,D=0
Lu,D=0
]
+
(
1
σA
− 1
σs
)[
log
`s,D=1
`u,D=1
− log `s,D=0
`u,D=0
]
(1.51)
1.12.4 Deriving Equations (1.26) and (1.27)
In Equations (1.26) and (1.27) I derive how to estimate the two different returns to education βas,D=1 and
βas,D=0, in terms of earnings for the younger cohorts. First to derive βas,D=0, we use the fact that the
average earnings is a weighted average of skilled and unskilled workers:
log
wy,D=1
wy,D=0
= (`sy,D=1 logwsy,D=1 + `uy,D=1 logwuy,D=1)− (`sy,D=0 logwsy,D=0 + `uy,D=0 logwuy,D=0)
= `sy,D=1(logwsy,D=1 − logwsy,D=0) + (`sy,D=1 − `sy,D=0) logwsy,D=0+
`uy,D=1(logwuy,D=1 − logwuy,D=0) + (`uy,D=1 − `uy,D=0) logwuy,D=0
= `sy,D=1log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+ `uy,D=1log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+
(`uy,D=1 − `uy,D=0) logwuy,D=0 + (`sy,D=1 − `sy,D=0) logwsy,D=0
= `sy,D=1log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+ `uy,D=1log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+ ∆`sy log
wsy,D=0
wuy,D=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
βas,D=0
(1.52)
Similarly, I derive βas,D=1 in terms of observable wage discontinuities that I can estimate:
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wy,D=1
wy,D=0
= (`sy,D=1 logwsy,D=1 + `uy,D=1 logwuy,D=1)− (`sy,D=0 logwsy,D=0 + `uy,D=0 logwuy,D=0)
= `sy,D=0(logwsy,D=1 − logwsy,D=0) + (`sy,D=1 − `sy,D=0) logwsy,D=1+
`uy,D=0(logwuy,D=1 − logwuy,D=0) + (`uy,D=1 − `uy,D=0) logwuy,D=1
= `sy,D=0log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+ `uy,D=0log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+
(`uy,D=1 − `uy,D=0) logwuy,D=1 + (`sy,D=1 − `sy,D=0) logwsy,D=1
= `sy,D=0log
wsy,D=1
wsy,D=0
+ `uy,D=0log
wuy,D=1
wuy,D=0
+ ∆`sy log
wsy,D=1
wuy,D=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
βas,D=1
(1.53)
1.13 Data Appendix
DISE: Data for inputs into schools comes from the District Information System for Education (DISE),
which was established to collect data at the school level in order to inform policy makers in the Indian
government about the bottlenecks in the education sector. While a limited number of their variables are
available freely at an aggregated level, the bulk of their interesting data is obtainable only at a school-
by-school basis on their website. I therefore collected 10% of the data, stratified by year, on a school-
by-school basis and compiled it for each school separately. DISE claims to cover all the schools in the
country (about 1.45 million schools in 2014) each year between 2005 and 2014, and consists of detailed
information on number of schools, when they were built, whether they are public or privately owned,
number of teachers by levels of education, and various infrastructural features. The DISE data was
initially meant to cover only in DPEP districts, but was expanded to cover the rest of the country in the
early 2000s. The data is collected by head teachers, and verified by cluster resource coordinators and
block educational officers. Cross verification is done by head teachers of one school for another, and by
Department of Education officials. See table 1.1 for summary statistics for the year 2005.
Census data has a limited number of outcome variables, including literacy by gender and rural-urban
status. The Census has detailed tables at all three of the administrative levels - states, districts and sub-
district. A panel of sub-districts can be created using the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Census years, all of which
include sub-district-level statistics. The panel is particularly challenging because of splits and merges
in various districts, so I used detailed information on administrative areas to compile the panel. The
1991 Census determines the running variable for the RD, since the 1991 female literacy rate was used
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to determine which districts are eligible for DPEP funds. I calculate this female literacy rate in 1991 for
females above 6 years old, and exactly replicate the numbers highlighted in the DPEP reports.
National Sample Survey (NSS): I use household surveys to study the impact on education, earnings,
expenditures, migration and other labor market characteristics. The National Sample Survey (NSS) is
a nationally representative survey used by many researchers studying India. It is the largest household
survey in the country, and asks questions on weekly activities for up to five different occupations per
person, and earnings during the week for each individual in the household. The NSS asks detailed
questions about thirteen different levels of education, which I convert into years for some of the analysis.
There is also a consumption module which asks detailed questions on expenditures on various goods,
including education-related expenditures, with a 30 day recall period. The probability-weighted sample
is constructed using a two-staged stratified sampling procedure with the first stage comprising of villages
and block, and the second stage consisting of households. Households are selected systematically with
equal probability, with a random start.
I use three different rounds of the NSS data. The 2004-5 “thick” round is the last large-sample round
while the policy was still in place. This allows me to get at costs of education from the household side.
The 2007-8 small-sample “thin” round asks detailed questions on migration, which I use to test the effect
of this policy on migration decisions as well. The main dataset, however, is the 2009 round, which was
used to study the longer term impacts of the DPEP policy. The 2009 round is the first large-sample round
after the end of the DPEP program, and has the added advantage of allowing enough time for students
affected by the policy to become a part of the labor market. Summary statistics for the 2009 NSS round
are presented in Table 1.2. In my analysis, I restrict individuals to be between 17 and 75 years of age,
and the results are robust to relaxing these constraints.
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI): To study the behavior of firms, I use the Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI), which is a census of all manufacturing firms in the country that employ more than ten persons.
This data is available at the establishment level, and has information on the type of products produced,
wages paid, and number of employees among other things. One can then use this data to study whether
changes in the skill level of the population can affect firm mobility and production decisions.
District Domestic Product (DDP) Data: DDP data is compiled from each state’s statistical office and
made into a panel. The series is for gross (rather than net) domestic product, and the base year is the
year 2000. The various statistical offices are: Department of Statistics and Programme Implementation,
Government of West Bengal; Planning Commission; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government
of Uttar Pradesh; Department of Economics and Statistics Government of Tamil Nadu; Directorate of
Economics and Statistics Government of Rajasthan; Department of Planning Government of Punjab;
Planning and Coordination Government of Odisha; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government
of Maharashtra; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Kerala; Planning Programme
Monitoring and Statistics Department Government of Karnataka; Directorate of Economics and Statistics
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Government of Bihar; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Assam; Andhra Pradesh
State Portal.
Creating the Panel: Due to splits and merges, and other changes in district boundaries, creating a
consistent dataset is a non-trivial task. Only 41% of districts were unaffected by changes in district
boundaries between 1991 and 2009. Of the 607 districts in the 2009 NSS household survey data, 571
were successfully merged with the 1991 Census (to obtain the running variable) and the list of DPEP
districts. This merging was done based on administrative Census reports and shapefiles using Arc-GIS.
Of these, 551 were merged with the manufacturing industries ASI data (the other twenty districts had no
manufacturing firms). The school-level DISE dataset only covers 408 of these districts since the schools
were surveyed only in the larger states. The household-level results will therefore be shown for both the
entire dataset and the sub-sample of DISE districts only as well.
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CHAPTER 2
Incentivizing Standards or Standardizing
Incentives? Affirmative Action in India
I study the impacts of affirmative action policies on schooling incentives in India. My results indicate
that when the probability of getting into college or of getting a job is increased through affirmative ac-
tion, minority group students are incentivized to stay in school longer given the prospects of directly
benefiting from such policies in the near future. This approach is unique, in that it focuses on the in-
centives affirmative action gives to those who are not yet eligible for the policy per se. I create a com-
prehensive primary dataset using state commission reports which allows for a regression discontinuity
and difference-in-discontinuities analysis. These results are supported at the national level by using a
difference-in-differences approach, and utilizing variation in state-level policies. Together these estima-
tors consistently show that affirmative action policies incentivize about 1.38 more years of education for
the average minority group student, and 2.2 more years of education for a student from a marginal mi-
nority sub-group. Given the debate about the effectiveness of such policies, my research shows that it is
particularly important for both researchers and policy makers to take into account these incentive effects
when evaluating affirmative action programs.
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2.1 Introduction
Affirmative action is a contentious issue for policy-makers and academics in many countries across the
world, including the US, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Nigeria and Brazil. The research and policy debates
center around issues of college-mismatch (Arcidiacono et al., 2011), direct effects on college enrollment
or test-scores of beneficiaries (Bagde et al., 2016), and the consequent effects on non-minority groups
(Bertrand et al., 2010). However, there is little known about the impacts on human capital investment
incentives for potential future beneficiaries. Since affirmative action changes the returns to education,
this can lead to large indirect effects on skill-acquisition. In this paper, I study the causal impact of
affirmative action policies on educational attainment in India, focusing on policies that make it easier for
minority-groups to get into college or get a government job. I find that by raising the future expected
returns to education, such policies incentivize minority-group students to stay in school for longer.
I take three distinct empirical approaches in this analysis. First, I study a nationwide law change that
reserved federal government jobs for certain lower-caste candidates. These jobs required specific educa-
tional qualifications, thereby raising the returns to certain educational levels. By comparing eligible to
non-eligible castes, and student age-cohorts that were young enough to change their schooling decisions
to those who were too old, I determine the change in educational attainment for the average low-caste
student. I find that, on average, such students attain 1.38 more years of education. These effects are
absent among non-eligible minority groups, non-eligible candidates within the eligible minority groups,
and low-income students from the upper caste.
The average effects, however, say little about how this impact would change as we increase the ‘intensity
of reservations,’ which I define to be the fraction of seats reserved relative to the fraction of the population
that is from the minority group. So for my second approach, I use affirmative action laws for college-
admission and government jobs at the state level, rather than the federal level. I create an original dataset
based on historical laws passed in each state in the country by petitioning the Government for archived
commission reports. I then exploit three sources of variation – the timing of these laws, the minority
groups eligible, and this intensity of reservations – to determine how changing the intensity of these
programs affects educational attainment. Certain states reserve a larger fraction of their seats than other
states. By comparing low-intensity states to high-intensity ones, I show that the relationship between the
change in educational attainment and relative fraction of seats reserved is concave. This suggests that
extremely intensive affirmative action programs may detrimentally lower the educational attainment of
minority groups.
These results, however, do not address the effects of expanding these benefits to an additional marginal
sub-group. India has numerous sub-castes, some of which are eligible for affirmative action benefits,
and others that are not. In my third approach, I compare sub-castes that just received the programs to
sub-castes that just lost out, to causally identify this parameter. One of the states in India conducted
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a large socio-economic survey and ranked the sub-castes on an ‘index of backwardness’ in order to
determine which sub-castes should be eligible for these programs. Any sub-caste that had a score greater
than half of the total value of the index was eligible. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design I
compare sub-castes on either side of the cutoff. Since the educational attainment of older members of
these castes should not be affected by the introduction of this policy, I further use them as a control
group in a difference-in-discontinuities approach. I find that, on average, a student from the marginal
sub-caste in that state attains 2.2 more years of education. This suggests that there are plausibly large
positive unintended effects of expanding the coverage of these programs to other marginal minority sub-
groups.
While the Regression Discontinuity (RD) and Difference-in-Discontinuities approach exploit certain pol-
icy features in a particular Indian state, the cross-state intensity and the national-level Difference-in-
Differences approaches are representative of the entire country. All estimators consistently point towards
an increase in educational attainment for the targeted minority group in response to reservations in higher
education and government jobs. More importantly, the different estimators determine different parame-
ters that would be useful for any welfare analysis of these policies. While the Difference-in-Differences
approach estimates the average impact, the RD determines the impacts on the marginal sub-caste. The
state-level variation allows me to determine how these impacts vary with differing intensities of the poli-
cies. All three parameters are crucial for any meaningful discussion of the costs and benefits of these
policies.
This paper is unique in its approach, in that it is among the first papers to empirically study the causal
impacts on incentives before the benefits of the policy actually kick-in. Unlike the other papers in the
India context, I use nationally representative data to look at the impacts on the entire country, rather
than on a subset of engineering colleges. While most research focuses on college-admissions I also look
at labor market affirmative action policies, and study the impacts on the extensive margin of drop-outs
rather than the intensive margin of test-scores. Last, I compile an original data set of state-level laws, and
exploit a state’s law to perform a regression discontinuity and a difference-in-discontinuities analysis to
identify the causal impact of the policies.
In the rest of this section I discuss the possible effects of affirmative action programs by couching it in the
relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the returns to education and affirmative action policies. In
Section 2.2 I discuss the context of caste and class in India, and the underlying legal and historical foun-
dation behind these policies. After which, in Section 2.3 I discuss the data and provide some descriptive
evidence of the trends over time for different socio-economic groups. In Section 2.5, I set-up a dynamic
optimization model with testable implications, and predictions on what may confound the empirical anal-
ysis. The main focus of this paper is Section 2.6. It discusses the various empirical strategies used and
their corresponding results. The last section concludes, and discusses policy implications.
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2.1.1 Returns to Education and Human Capital Investments
Government education policy in low-income countries is usually associated with lowering the costs of
education rather changing the returns (King and Orazem, 2008). Numerous examples of schooling ex-
pansionary programs that reduce both the monetary and non-monetary costs for students can be found
across the developing world.1 The government policies I study in this paper, are therefore unique in that
they change the future returns, rather than the current costs of schooling. Since the benefits are in the
future, programs that affect returns are likely to have different impacts than an immediate tangible fall in
the costs of schooling. Furthermore, while costs are easy to perceive, information on returns and future
opportunities may be poor in low-income settings. This lack of information may skew the demand for
schooling (Dinkelman and Martinez, 2014; Jensen, 2010).
Nonetheless, outside of government programs, a large literature exists on human capital investments in
response to changes in the returns to education. This is true not just of the US (Freeman, 1976; Griliches,
1997; Kane, 1994; Ryoo and Rosen, 2004), but also in the developing world, and especially the Indian
context. On the one hand, this research finds evidence of increases in schooling with increasing returns.
One of the earliest papers in the Indian context by Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) shows how the Green
Revolution led to an increase in primary schooling arguably because of higher returns to education.
Similarly, Kochar (2004) finds that households increase schooling in response to higher returns in the
nearest urban labor market, and Jensen (2012) shows that better jobs for women in the IT sector of Delhi
increases schooling for girls. At higher education levels, Khanna and Morales (2015) studies how an
increase in returns to IT sector jobs in the US and India increases enrollment in engineering schools in
the 1990s.
On the other hand, increasing the returns to education may have adverse effects in such low-income
settings. Jensen and Miller (2015) show that strategic incentives amongst rural Indian households can
actually lower educational attainment in response to higher returns to education. They argue that parents
that want a child to remain at home and look after them, curb their child’s migration opportunities by
lowering their educational investments. Similarly de Brauw and Giles (2008) find that school attainment
falls in rural China in response to better migration opportunities, because of higher opportunity costs of
schooling. It is, therefore, unclear what the expected impacts of increased returns are in the developing
country context.
1Some examples can be found in Indonesia (Duflo, 2001), Burkina Faso (Kazianga et al., 2013), Zimbabwe (Aguero and
Bharadwaj, 2014), Nigeria (Osili and Long, 2008), Sierra Leone (Cannonier and Mocan, 2012), Uganda (Deininger, 2003),
Zambia (Ashraf et al., 2015), Kenya (Bold et al., 2013b), Tanzania (Sifuna, 2007), West Bank & Gaza (Angrist, 1995), and
India (Afridi, 2010; Chin, 2005; Khanna, 2016).
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2.1.2 Affirmative Action in the US and India: Theory and Evidence
Theoretical work on affirmative action discusses different types of behavioral responses. The Coate and
Loury (1993) employer-learning model shows that under certain assumptions such policies can indeed
encourage effort, and over time the policies could lead to a ‘benign equilibrium’ where employers’ nega-
tive stereotypes about the minority group are eradicated. However, under other assumptions it could lead
to a ‘patronizing equilibrium’ where the negative stereotypes persist, potentially discouraging human
capital accumulation. Furthermore, if employers devalue the credentials of any minority group candi-
date because of the affirmative action policies, it can disincentivize members of the minority group from
obtaining education.
Similarly, in a signaling model, affirmative action may discourage investments for low-ability minority
group students. Suppose that in the absence of affirmative action, even the high-ability low-caste students
would not get into college and only finish high-school. Then the low-ability low-caste students would
finish high-school as well, so as to take advantage of being ‘pooled’ with the high-ability students. If
affirmative action allows the high-ability low caste students to attend college, then we get a separating
equilibria where the low ability students would drop out a lot earlier.2
It is, therefore, crucial to understand not only who is affected but also how intense these programs are.
In the Indian context, affirmative action programs are more salient and larger in magnitude than in most
other countries. Reserving a large fraction of seats may allow low-ability low caste students to get into
college and into public sector jobs, exacerbating employers’ negative stereotypes. If such employers
discriminate against future applicants it may discourage further human capital investments. On the other
hand, large-scale reservations may also lead to a higher ‘pooling equilibrium’ whereby both the high
and low ability students from the minority group get more education – the low-ability students taking
advantage of being pooled with the high-ability students. It is, therefore, important to study not just the
average impacts of the entire minority group, but also how increasing the intensity of reservations affects
these average impacts, and how enlarging the definition of the minority group may affect outcomes for
this additional sub-group. I explore all these parameters in my results.
What then should be the form of affirmative action? Fryer and Loury (2005) show that ‘equal opportu-
nity’ is often not enough to close educational inequalities that arise from historical discrimination, and
increasing the probability of getting into college may motivate students to graduate from school, over-
coming ‘effort pessimism.’3 Hickman (2013) uses an auction theory based structural model and compares
various forms of potential policies to show that race quotas in the US would induce more human capital
investment by minorities, but could involve a larger welfare loss. The literature also mentions ‘compla-
cency’ effects of such policies on incentives for schooling – for instance, smarter sections of the minority
2This is a modification of a result shown in Bedard (2001).
3Anthropological studies in the American context suggest that difficulties faced by minority groups in finding employment
(‘job ceiling’ hypothesis) discourage them from attaining education (Ogbu, 2003).
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group could put in less effort knowing that it is easier to get into college.4 In the political and academic
sphere these possible outcomes are the topic of contentious debate. Nonetheless, there is little empirical
evidence to back up these claims.5
The evidence in the US context highlights large possible costs associated with such policies. Arcidiacono
et al. (2014, 2011) study the impact of affirmative action policies on college fit and mismatch, and show
that laws banning the use of racial preferences in California public colleges lead to better match quality
and higher graduation rates in colleges. The form of preferential treatment is also important – Domina
(2007) shows that the diversity programs enacted in Texas, after affirmative action was banned, boosted
educational outcomes at the high-school level. Furthermore, eliminating the use of affirmative action
in Texas and California state universities did not seem to adversely impact the SAT-sending behavior of
highly qualifies minority group students (Card and Krueger, 2005). Lastly, if peers are seen to benefit
from this policy, then a ‘role model’ effect may also have a positive impact on educational attainment.
However, evidence in the American context shows little support for ‘role model’ hypothesis – it instead
posits that benefiting minority students are less popular because they are accused of ‘acting white’ (Fryer
and Torelli, 2010; Ogbu, 2003).6
In the Indian context, the literature has focused on the direct impacts on a sample of engineering colleges.
Empirical work suggests that college-reservations are well targeted, improve the performance of the
minority groups in question, and have “strong positive economic effects” (Bertrand et al., 2010). Bagde
et al. (2016) also look at a sub-sample of engineering colleges in a particular Indian state, and argue that
reservations have a “significant and substantial positive effect both on college attendance and first-year
academic achievement.” On the other hand, Krishna and Robles (2015) look at a detailed data set from
an engineering college in India and show that affirmative action policies lead to mismatch – minority
students end up earning less than they would have if they picked less selective majors. While these
papers study a group of engineering colleges and focus on outcomes at the collegiate level, my work
looks at educational attainment at all levels of schooling (before the policy benefits kick in), and studies
the country as a whole.7
2.2 Caste, Class and Reservations in India
In India, affirmative action policies are defined on the basis of caste or social class, and the policy in-
terventions are much larger and more salient than in most other countries. The Constitution identifies
4Assuncao and Ferman (2015) show that affirmative action policies reduces test scores for the minority group in Brazil.
5Weisskopf (2004) provides a theoretical comparison of affirmative action policies in the US and India, and discusses the
various expected effects of such policies, including the impacts on incentives to stay in school.
6Teacher-student pairings of the same race, however, have been found to have positive impacts, which may be evidence in
support of a role-model effect (Dee, 2004).
7In a somewhat different vein, Rao (2016) studies a program that required Delhi public schools to admit students from
poorer backgrounds, and found that this had large positive impacts on the prosocial behavior of richer peers.
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certain castes as the most disadvantaged group and codifies them as the Scheduled Castes (SCs). It also
enumerates certain aboriginal tribal groups, which are referred to as Scheduled Tribes (STs). Over time
there has been an attempt to identify groups that are better-off than SCs and STs but less well to do than
upper caste members of the different communities. These groups are known as Other Backward Classes
(OBCs). There is almost no literature on affirmative action for OBCs, and I focus on this group in my
paper.
Over time, the Indian government has instituted laws whereby a certain percentage of seats in colleges
or government jobs are set aside for low-caste candidates. This ‘reservation policy’ primarily benefits
SCs, STs and OBCs in various ways. The primary purpose of this law is to provide a level playing field
for communities that have suffered from historical discrimination. The Constitution states that “the State
shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of society
.... and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.” This law allows states to
autonomously reserve seats for different communities in state-run universities and in government jobs,
producing useful variation from a researcher’s point of view. There is some macro-level evidence high-
lighting the possible effects of these laws on SC-STs – Desai and Kulkarni (2008) show that educational
inequalities have been falling over time for SCs and STs, that do benefit from reservations, but have not
been declining for the Muslim community who are excluded from the current reservation policy.
In 1980, a Commission was established to determine what percentage of seats should be reserved in
national universities and federal government jobs for OBCs (Mandal, 1980). The report recommended
reserving 27% of the seats in national colleges and federal jobs for the OBCs that they identified. This was
met with large protests from the urban upper-class public who argued that they were being discriminated
against, and that the disadvantaged groups already had a ‘level playing field’ (Kohli, 2001). In 1993,
the federal government implemented the first stage of the Mandal (1980) Commission recommendations
by reserving 27% of government jobs for OBCs, and then in 2006 the reservations in colleges were
implemented. The Indian Supreme Court excluded the more well-off members of the OBC community
(known as the ‘creamy layer’) from taking advantage of these policies, and this is another source of
variation that is exploited.8
These caste-based reservations at the central level exist alongside the state laws, which vary in intensity
across states. In one empirical strategy, I focus on the state of Haryana, which ranked sub-castes on
the basis of their socio-economic disadvantage, and classified the worst-off sub-castes as OBCs. This
ranking allows me to obtain a Regression Discontinuity estimate of the impact of these policies. I, there-
fore, exploit variation across various dimensions: caste, age, region and eligibility in order to determine
the impact of such policies. While state-level laws provide quotas in both educational institutions and
government jobs, the federal law changes studied here will focus on OBC reservations in government
8In 1993, the Supreme Court upheld the implementation of reservations for OBCs in government jobs in the landmark
case: Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, 1993 and introduced the concept of the creamy layer.
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jobs.9
Importantly, there are four categories of government jobs, all of which are eligible for quotas. The highest
category (Groups A and B) require finishing high-school or having a college degree, and these comprise
of 11.5% of all the jobs. These are mostly high-level civil servants. The next level (Group C) need
candidates to finish either middle school or secondary school, and consist of 58% of the jobs. The last
category (Group D) consist of the last 30.5% of the jobs, and require candidates to be either literate
or complete primary school. Group C and D jobs include lower skilled jobs like revenue inspectors,
assistants, clerks and drivers. Therefore, the incentive effects will not just be seen in graduating from
high-school, but also in attaining certain levels of education that make candidates competitive for these
jobs.
My paper is among the first to look at reservations in government jobs. Prakash (2010) shows that
policies in the 1980s that reserved jobs for a different minority group – the Scheduled Castes (SCs) – had
significant impacts on the probabilities of formal sector employment and wages for this specific minority
group. Given that OBCs are slightly better off than SCs to start with, we may expect that there would
be even more qualified OBCs to avail of these quotas. My work tests whether these future prospects of
better employment and wages can actually induce students to reach the educational thresholds required
for these jobs.10
2.3 Data
For this analysis, I compiled a number of data sources specifically for this analysis. These include a
few different household surveys and governmental commission reports. First, I use the Indian National
Sample Survey (NSS), which is a representative repeated cross-section carried out every five years. This
data set has information on educational attainment, field of graduate study, caste, age, and host of other
labor market outcomes along with a comprehensive consumption expenditure module. The nationally-
representative ‘thick’ rounds of the data set are enumerated every 5 years. Since this paper focuses on
affirmative action policies instituted in the early 1990s, the main data set used is the 2000 module, which
was also the first round to ask questions about whether the person is OBC or not.11 The 1995 round
is too early to capture the effects of policies instituted in the early 1990s, since changes in schooling
decisions take time. Whereas the 2005 round is too late and may suffer from other confounding policies
9This is because the federal level implementation of OBCs in higher educational institutions only happened recently in
2009.
10In the US, there is a literature that shows that schemes like the federal contractor program, under which the targeted
groups of women and African-Americans, were given preferential treatment, increased their employment and the demand for
them in such sectors (Leonard, 1984; Smith and Welch, 1989), but there is little consensus on the impacts of court-ordered
affirmative action in the US (Donohue, 1991).
11The NSS 55th Round was collected between July 1999 and June 2000 using a stratified two stage sampling design. First,
clusters (rural villages or urban blocks) were sampled, and then 12 households within each cluster were sampled.
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introduced in the interim years, and changes in definitions of the OBC group across waves of the survey.12
In my robustness checks I use the 2005 rounds as well to show that my results are consistent with either
round.
The data set has information on level of education, rather than years of education. The various levels
of education are (a) illiterate, (b) literate without formal schooling, (c) literate with formal schooling,
(d) primary school, (e) middle school, (f) secondary school, (g) higher secondary school, (h) college
educated. Even though, we may expect the level to matter for eligibility for jobs and colleges, I discuss
how to translate these levels into years to be consistent with the rest of the literature, and present results
for both changes in the levels of education and years of education.
Primary source data was compiled on affirmative action policies instituted by the federal government and
the various Indian states. I did this by obtaining government reports via the Right to Information (RTI)
Act. This dataset is comprehensive in that it has information on reservation policies for all states in the
country. Furthermore, detailed knowledge on classification and identification of OBCs was found for a
few states. The states in question had Committee Reports that laid out the methodology for identifying
Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and their recommendations for reservation policy. Therefore, some of
the estimation procedures will allow me to look at the effect on the entire country, while more detailed
analysis has been done for the states where the in-depth reports were obtained.
The third source is the ARIS-REDS (Additional Rural Incomes Survey and Rural Economic and De-
mographic Survey 1999) data set. Unlike the NSS data, ARIS-REDS has information on disaggregated
sub-castes. While the NSS is nationally representative, it only has information on four broad caste cat-
egories. Despite having a smaller sample, the ARIS-REDS asks respondents their sub-castes, and thus
has social-group information at a finer level. Unfortunately, neither of these data sets have information
on educational aspirations and expectations, nor test scores, which would have been useful for additional
analysis.
2.4 Descriptive Evidence
By the end of the decade, in 2000 – when the NSS dataset was collected – there were about 3.9 million
Central Government jobs, and 45% of them were in the Indian railways. Only 15% of these jobs were in
large cities, 53% of them were in rural areas, and the rest were in small towns. In the 2000 NSS survey,
60% of all organized sector jobs and 14.8% of all enterprise-based jobs, and 2.5% of all jobs were in the
public sector (both state and central government).
12One big policy change in 2000 was the introduction of OBC level scholarships under the Ninth Five Year Plan (see
Gupta(2004)). Another was the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. If the 2005 data set was used,
then this policy would make it impossible to disentangle the direct effects of reservations in government jobs, because of the
coincidental presence of scholarships and MDGs
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Table 2.1: Social Groups in India. Source : NSS 2000
SC ST OBC Others Total
Sample Size 94098 66798 195579 237102 593577
Proportion of Sample (%) 15.85 11.25 32.95 39.94 100
Mean Education Level 3.62 3.90 4.26 5.55 4.63
Mean Years of Education (Approx.) 3.037 3.4042 3.9035 5.678 4.4186
Illiterate (%) 46.20 50.93 42.13 28.02 38.34
College Educated (%) 1.96 1.63 2.79 8.42 4.76
Household Month Exp (Rs.) 1245.89 1444.92 1440.81 2074.11 1609.51
Per Cap Month Exp (Rs.) 398.67 427.32 446.33 519.02 465.67
Urban (%) 30.87 22.61 33.21 48.17 37.62
Work in Agriculture (%) 56 72.89 53.31 40.36 51.53
Wage work (not Casual) % 26.61 32.65 40.46 68.38 45.85
‘Others’ are general category individuals (i.e. not SC, ST or OBCs). ‘Mean Education Level’ covers 8 levels
of education from illiterate to college graduates. Nominal exchange rate: approx Rs. 50 to $ 1. Household
Monthly Expenditure deflated by rural-urban-region-wise CPI.
Table 2.1 uses NSS data to summarize the primary variables of interest by social groups. About one-third
of the sample was self-reported to be OBCs. The proportion of SCs (16%) and STs (11%) are smaller.
Looking at the mean education level by social group, it is clear that SCs and STs have the lowest rates of
educational attainments, whereas OBCs do slightly better than them, but worse than the non-OBC/SC/ST
group (known as ‘Others’ or ‘upper-caste’). The mean education level for the upper-caste group is 5.5,
indicating that not a large proportion of them are in college either.13 The mean expenditure for schooling
is $6.85 on average, but about $16.8 for private school goers (Das et al., 2013b).
SCs, STs and OBCs have lower monthly expenditure compared to the rest of the population (Table
2.1). Furthermore, these three disadvantaged groups are predominantly rural and work in the agricultural
sector. They are also more likely to be employed as casual labor rather than in formal wage employment.
Kohli (2001) discusses how the Indian growth story has largely been concentrated on urban, English-
speaking, educated middle-class families, and the large-scale reforms of 1991 have been unable to bridge
the inequalities between these social groups.
In the 2000 NSS data, the yearly wage premium for public sector jobs relative to other jobs with any
enterprise is $485 for OBCs, and $465 for all people. Over the next decade, government wages were
still higher than private sector wages, but private sector wages were rising at a faster rate. Changes in the
education distribution and increasing the supply of skilled work to the public sector may have effects on
the public sector wage. This is however unlikely in this scenario since government wages are fixed for
a decade at a time by the Pay Commissions (1983, 1994 and 2006). These Pay Commissions fix wages
13This is important, since if we expect the upper-caste to have reached the ceiling in educational attainment then the
reservation policy should have no impact.
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and compensation for all public-sector employees and tie them to the rate of inflation.
Since different levels of government jobs, require different educational qualifications, I can study the
educational levels for public sector employees using the NSS data. The education distribution for OBCs
with government jobs displayed a skew towards higher levels of education. 15.45% of them had less than
or a primary school degree, 14.42% finished middle school, 25.13% finished secondary school, whereas
16.63% finished higher secondary school and 28.37% finished college.
Calculations using the NSS data show a large increase in public-sector (and semi-public) employment
for OBCs over time. In 1999-00 (six or seven years after implementation of the law), 22% of government
and semi-public sector jobs were held by members of the OBC community, whereas in 2004-5 this
number was about 27.7%. Representation of OBCs in government jobs has steadily increased since the
implementation of the policy to match the 27% amount of seats reserved for them.14
In the decade before the quotas were implemented (1981-91), all public sector employment grew by
24% whereas Central government jobs grew by only 7%. Since 1997 Central government full-time
employment actually slightly shrank because they began outsourcing and cut full-time jobs to part-time
contract work. Between 1998 and 2002, 31% of all public sector vacancies were filled by OBCs. Using,
the 2005 round of the National Sample Survey (NSS), one can also look at public sector employment
by cohort. Only 23.4% of public-sector employees for cohort born in 1946-55 are OBCs, whereas this
is number is 27.4% for the cohort born in 1976-85. By 2011, 6.9% of Central Government Group A
workers and 17% of Group D workers were OBCs. The Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and
Pensions, in 2012 claims that the “representation of OBCs is still low for the reason that reservation for
them started only in 1993. Moreover, those OBCs recruited before 1993 have not shown themselves as
OBCs [since] they were recruited/ appointed as general candidates.”
2.5 A Simple Theoretical Framework
In this section, I set up a simple dynamic optimization problem to highlight the possible effects of quotas
on the incentives for students in school, and the empirical challenges. Every period an agent chooses to
dropout or stay in school. If the returns to s years of schooling is w(s), then for a discount rate β, the
agent’s value function is:
Vs = max
Dropout,Stay
( ∞∑
t=s
βt−sw(s), −ci + αi + β
(
ps
1
1− βB + (1− ps)Vs+1
))
(2.1)
14For a large fraction of the OBC population, a government job may be their best option given the level of job-security, and
non-pecuniary benefits in addition to the pay. Furthermore, facing discrimination in the private sector employment market
may make a government job the only option for some.
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In this equation, B is the expected net benefits from going to college or getting a government job.15 The
simplest version of the model doesn’t allow for on-the-job search, and once the agent drops out and gets
a job at wage w(s) he/she earns that wage forever.16 The cost of an additional year of schooling for
person i is ci. This varies by person, and is drawn from a distribution F (c). αi captures the preferences
for schooling, and would then be affected by ‘role-model’ effects, if present.17 The probability of getting
into college or getting a government job ps is a function of various factors:
ps = ps(schooling, caste, quotas, grades, peers, ability, Zi) (2.2)
Where Zi is a vector of other individual characteristics that generate heterogenous responses to changes
in the probability. Heterogenous levels of optimal schooling are captured by a cost function ci. The
probability function can be different in various contexts. For example, different levels of government
jobs require different levels of education, which means that the probability ps could discretely jump
across levels of schooling. Getting into college, however, requires one to complete high-school, therefore
ps = 0 for any s below the last year of schooling.
For an increasing and concave wage function w(s), the value function converges to an optimum under
certain regularity conditions,18 and can be solved by using backward induction. The optimal policy
function has a threshold strategy, whereby a student chooses to drop out of school when his marginal
value from an additional year of schooling is less than the cost he/she must bear. Let this threshold level
of education be s∗.
When the probability of getting into college increases, it raises the expected value of an additional year
of schooling and lowers dropouts. Thus reservations in colleges can incentivize the marginal student to
stay in school for more years. ∂s
∗
∂quota
> 0.
The effects of reservations in government jobs is less apparent, and depends on the shape of the prob-
ability function. Since different government jobs have different thresholds – literacy, finishing primary
school, finishing middle school, high school or college – it depends on the distribution of where students
would expect to drop out in the absence of the quota. On the one hand, it could incentivize students
just below the job-qualification threshold to get at least as much education as the government job re-
quires. On the other hand, it may induce students just above a threshold to drop out at the threshold.
15Government jobs may not only pay a higher wage, over and above the going wage, but also provide job security.
16Currently the agent has perfect foresight. In alternative specifications, expectations of benefits can be made to depend
on the information set of the agent. This will allow us to see the impacts of a change in the peer group that benefits from
affirmative action, and incorporate the possibility of ‘role model’ effects.
17It is also easy to add an on-the-job ability that raises wages, that is correlated with costs of schooling.
18We need the slope of the wage function to be steeper than probability function:
1
1− βws(s) ≥ Bps
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For jobs that require only primary schooling, a student may be encouraged to drop out as soon as they
finish their primary-school rather than stick around for longer. The shape of the probability function,
and the different wages at each level of government job, therefore, determines how students respond to
quotas.
There are, however, factors that may confound the identification of these effects. If the quality of school-
ing and the number of schools increase, then costs of attending are lower, which also tends to discourage
the agent from choosing to drop out of school ∂s∗
∂ci
< 0. This is an important result as it will be the pri-
mary confounding factor in the empirical specification. The government of India made large investments
in schooling at around the same time that affirmative action policies were expanded. These investments
were made under the National Policy of Education (NPE) program in 1986, under two schemes – Op-
eration Blackboard and the District Primary Education Program (DPEP). Though the education reforms
were not caste/class specific, I compile original data and control for both schemes in robustness checks.
Furthermore, placebo tests with other minority-groups will be shown to provide evidence that no other
coincidental policies will produce these results.19
Another implication is the result on test scores. The factors that determine the probability of getting into
college p can be seen as substitutes. Marginal students who had a low probability of entering college may
now seek to improve their test scores when it is easier to get into college due to reservations. Whereas the
marginal student who has a high probability of getting into college may actually lower their effort input
when it is easier to enter college.20 This may lower the variance of the distribution of test scores for the
minority group in question.21 However, due to a lack of reliable data, I will be unable to examine how
test scores change in response to these policies.
There are few things that jump out from the model. First, the shape of the probability function ps de-
termines whether students are incentivized or disincentivized to get more education. Since different
government jobs have different educational requirements, students may be encouraged to drop out earlier
or later depending on which margin they lie on. Second, the probability ps depends on the extent of the
quotas, and more reservations will increase this probability even more. Therefore, the size of the impacts
are a function not only of if seats are reserved or not, but also how many seats are reserved. To get at this,
the paper will also exploit variation in the different intensities of reservations across states. Crucially, at
the time the Government implemented the quotas in 1993, it expanded the total number of jobs so as to
keep the number of jobs in the general category unchanged.
19One aspect, that may also affect the probability function, is the peer group. If changing the composition of classrooms has
peer effects, then that affects the interpretation of the results. There is little evidence of these negative peer effects, however
(Rao, 2016).
20In the model this can be seen if ‘quotas’ and ‘test scores’ are substitutes: ∂testscores∂quota =
∂testscores
∂p
∂p
∂quota < 0
21 Consistent with this result, Assuncao and Ferman (2015) show that in Brazil, there is a fall in high-school proficiency of
the minority group.
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2.6 Identification and Results
I use three different identification strategies to provide a consistent picture of what the incentive effects of
affirmative action policies are. While the Difference-in-Differences estimator will identify the Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET), the RD will identify a localized effect – in the neighborhood of
the cutoff – for the marginal sub-caste. The state-level variation shows how the treatment effect varies
with the intensity of treatment.
2.6.1 Difference-in-Differences
The double difference estimator will exploit variation on two fronts: (a) age and (b) social group. Some
cohorts were too old to be affected by changes in the reservation policy. Others will be young enough
(and still in school) and can thus change their level of educational attainment. Furthermore, only certain
social-groups were eligible, providing variation in policy implementation on the social-group front. As
discussed above, the federal government implemented reservations for OBCs in government jobs in 1993,
whereby 27% of all public sector jobs were reserved for this group.
If such measures incentivize attaining a higher level of education, we should expect to see this for the
OBC group. The average age for entering the last year of high-school lies between 17 and 18 years. In
Figure 2.8.5 one can look at the enrollment rates by ages and see a sharp drop off at the age of 18, which
is when most students finish high-school. This represents a 16 percentage point drop. The Factories
Act of 1948 and Mines Act of 1952 were the first laws to ban employment of persons under the age
of 18. Many public sector jobs are therefore only available to people who are at least 18. At the time
that reservations were implemented, anyone under the age of 17 or 18 years could have changed their
educational attainment. Since the data was collected 6 to 7 years after that, by that time anyone who is
above the age of 24 would not have been able to change their level of education.
Furthermore, there would be many high-schoolers who have already dropped out of school and will thus
find it hard to change their educational attainment. We should then see the impact of this policy being
larger for younger individuals. For instance, the impact on 15 year olds will be smaller than the impact
on 10 year olds, since many 15 year olds would have already dropped out of school.
Equation (2.3) is the Differences-in-Differences regression, where αa and κc are vectors of dummies
for age cohort and caste respectively. Here β0ac is a vector containing the relevant coefficients, and is
allowed to vary by age cohort a and caste c. The coefficient identifies the Treatment on the Treated
(β0ac = ATETac) for caste c in cohort a. For a > 24, we expect ATETc,a>24 = 0. If this condition
is violated, then we may not be satisfying the parallel trends assumption, which would then bias our
coefficient of interest. For a ≤ 24 and for the OBC group, we would expect ATETc=OBC,a≤24 > 0.
Furthermore, the younger is the members of the OBC group, the greater would the expected impact be
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Figure 2.1: OBC Coefficients of Diff-in-Diff Regression Across Age Cohorts
Plot of coefficients from Difference-in-Differences regression on ‘levels of education’. Standard errors clustered at state-
level. People above the age of 24 should be unaffected by implementation of policy. Vertical red line indicates the year of
implementation.
(i.e. ATETc=OBC,a > ATETc=OBC,a+1) since younger members find it easier to change their schooling.
A person who was sixteen at the time the law was passed may have already dropped out of schools many
years ago, and would therefore find it difficult to change their level of schooling; whereas a ten-year old
now knows the law is in place and can stay in school for much longer.
eduac = αa + κc + β0acαa ∗ κc + ac (2.3)
Since the NSS data only asks for education levels and not years of education, the results are produced
for both measures.22 The NSS data set has four broad social groups: (a) SCs, (b) STs, (c) OBCs and
(d) Others. The ‘Others’ category includes the upper-caste section of the population ineligible for any
reservations (i.e. not OBCs, SCs or STs). They comprise of 33% of the sample, have a higher monthly
per capita expenditure than OBCs, SCs and STs, and are more likely to be urban and salaried (Table
2.1). More than 67% of Muslims fall into this category, and almost 70% of them are Hindu. The above
regression specification was run where the the omitted social group was SC-STs and upper-caste mem-
bers, and ages above 50 were the omitted cohort category.23 Figure 2.1 plots these coefficients β0ac for
the OBC group across the various age cohorts, and confidence intervals based on standard errors at the
state-level.
22A rough translation from the level of education to the years of education maintains the results. However, because there is
no clear way to go from the level of education to the precise year of education, both forms have been presented. Furthermore,
in the Indian contexts, certain changes in levels of education may be more relevant than the years of education. For example,
the difference between being illiterate and literate without formal schooling will change the chances of acquiring a low-level
government job.
23The results are similar, but slightly larger when the omitted category does not include SCs and STs, and only includes
them as a separate non-omitted category instead (see Figure 2.8.6).
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The coefficients are close to zero and statistically indistinguishable from 0 for age cohorts above the age
of 24. This confirms the absence of pre-treatment differential trends. For those below 24, however, the
coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, it is larger for younger cohorts as the
model predicted. This is because younger cohorts have more time to change their educational decisions,
whereas many in the older cohorts would have already completed or dropped out of school and will thus
find it difficult to change their decisions. At its highest point, the coefficient is below 1, indicating that
the reservation policy caused an increase of at most one level of education for the OBC group – this could
be even something informal from a transition away from illiteracy to basic literacy.24
Since this is a difference-in-differences coefficient, it captures both the changes over cohorts and across
groups relative to older age cohorts. Young OBCs still receive less education than young upper caste stu-
dents, but the gap is smaller smaller than in the older cohorts by 1 level of education.25 In the Appendix,
there are a few other graphs. One of them reproduces the Difference-in-Differences figure but uses the
omitted category to be only upper-caste individuals (Figure 2.8.6) while controlling for the SC-ST cate-
gories. This merely makes the impacts slightly larger. Another figure translates the dependent variable
from levels of education to years of education (Figure 2.8.8).
Table 2.2: Difference-in-Differences – Years of Education
Education Years OBC vs. Others
Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
OBC 4.439 4.129 -0.310
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Others 5.579 6.654 1.076
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Difference -1.140 -2.526 -1.386
(0.018) (0.022) (0.029)
Using NSS 1999-2000 data. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Difference-in-
Differences value in bold. ‘Others’ are general category individuals (i.e. not SC, ST
or OBCs).
The Difference-in-Differences tables can be made by dividing the sample into younger and older cohorts;
and OBCs and upper-caste. Looking at the Difference-in-Differences results in Table 2.6.1 we see that
being an OBC in an age category eligible for education corresponds with a statistically and economically
significant increase in educational attainment of about 1.07 educational levels on average (Table 2.3),
24While the effects seem to be plateauing, the data also artificially truncates any larger effects for younger cohorts - since
those cohorts had not yet reached schooling age at the time of the survey.
25At the same time that the government implemented OBC reservations, they also upheld the decision to provide reserva-
tions in job promotions for the SC-ST groups, and established various National Commissions for the SC and ST groups. In
the early 1990s, new policies were initiated to ensure that vacant quota seats were being filled by SC-STs and that upper-caste
members were not appropriating the seats for themselves. These policies may attenuate any impacts I find on OBCs.
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and 1.38 years of education (Table ). The education gap that existed between older cohorts of OBCs
and upper-caste individuals is merely bridged by one level of education in the younger cohorts, but
upper-caste individuals still get more education than OBCs on average. The ATET in the tables is the
weighted average of all the ATETcas seen in the figures, where the weights are proportional to the cohort
sizes.
2.6.1.1 Addressing Possible Concerns with Differences-in-Differences
One possible concern with the Difference-in-Differences strategy is that of violating the parallel trends
assumption. By looking at the figures we can see that older unaffected cohorts do not have a trending
education gap with respect to the omitted categories (ATETc=OBC;a>24 = 0), suggesting that the parallel
trends assumption holds in this context. There may also be the concern of mean reversion. Since OBCs
have less education than the general category, a theory of mean reversion would predict that over time
this gap will fall. It is hard to see why this mean reversion should kick-in at exactly the same time as the
reservation policy is implemented.26 Nonetheless, I present evidence to show that mean reversion did not
affect other disadvantaged social groups, and the other estimation strategies discussed in this paper will
be unaffected by this issue of mean reversion.
Another concern arises if the omitted group is simultaneously ‘treated.’ Despite the fact that reservations
are only applicable to OBCs, we may see a change in behavior of upper-caste members of society for
various reasons. One possibility is akin to the John Henry effects discussed in the experimental literature,
where the control group may react adversely because they were denied treatment. Upper-caste members
of society may feel discouraged by the reservations and lower their educational attainment.27 Another
possible reaction by upper-caste members is to view these policies as increasing the competitiveness
of getting a job, and thus working harder and attaining more education in order to compete for these
spaces – these would attenuate the results downwards. As far as the federal law change is concerned,
these reactions are unlikely since the number of government jobs were expanded to ensure that general
category applicants were unaffected. Many states also expanded seats in colleges and jobs in order to
accommodate the quotas and ensure that general category applicants had the same number of seats as
before. However, there still existed a few states where quotas were implemented without the expansion
of seats and thus this may be a concern when interpreting some of the state-wise graphs that I will
present.28
The general equilibrium effects of such policies may also affect the interpretation of the coefficients
found. Increasing the number of seats could lower the wages paid in the government jobs, which may
then attenuate the ATETs found. Since the government wages are fixed (tied to inflation) for significant
26Furthermore, models of intergenerational transfers of human capital would predict the opposite trend.
27In the US context, there is no evidence of this happening (Ogbu, 2003).
28Furthermore, it is not clear how well the expansion of seats were handled at the federal level and could lead to additional
costs, and what margin these costs would lead to other cut-backs in expenditure.
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periods of time by the Pay Commissions, and for large sections of society this is the best possible job, the
changes in wages may be of little concern. On the other hand, there may be peer effects in the classroom,
which may affect the incentives for upper-caste students in attending school. Rao (2016), however, shows
that in a different context, where Delhi public schools were required to admit poorer students, there were
positive impacts on the prosocial behavior of richer peers, and only modest negative impacts on the test
scores in one out of three subjects.29
One possible remaining concern is that of simultaneous policy changes. As discussed above, in 1986 the
Indian government revamped the National Policy of Education (NPE) program and started spending on
the improvement of schooling infrastructure and the building of new schools and recruited more teachers
all across the country. They also expanded scholarships, provided access to adult education, and provided
incentives for poor families to send their children to school regularly. This program was not OBC specific,
but may still pose a problem to the double-difference identification strategy. The program will lower the
costs of attending school, and may matter the most for communities that have a higher cost of schooling.
The results could merely be picking up this declining gap because of this additional spending.
One of the largest expenditures was in hiring more primary school teachers under Operation Blackboard.
Chin (2005) shows that despite hiring new teachers, teachers-per-school didn’t increase and class sizes
didn’t decrease. There was merely a redistribution of teachers from larger to smaller schools. And for
girls, she finds that this may have impacted the primary school completion rate in states that had a higher
‘intensity’ of redistribution. I re-construct the measures for the intensity of Operation Blackboard, and
control for flexible forms of it in my analysis, and it doesn’t affect my results (Figure 2.8.11a).
The other large policy at that time was the District Primary Education Program (DPEP), originally piloted
in 1994, but expanded over the next decade expanded to other districts. Khanna (2016) uses a regression
discontinuity to show the program increased education at the cutoff, but this result did not differ by caste.
Figure 2.8.11c controls for a flexible polynomial of the DPEP intensity and an indicator for whether any
state received DPEP funds, and the results are identical to the graphs without controls.
Lastly, these school-building policies should also affect other disadvantaged groups like the low-income
upper-caste population, and the Muslim population.30 From Table 2.8 in the Appendix, we can look at
the educational attainment and per capita expenditure for the Muslims and poorer members of the upper-
caste category (non-OBC/SC/ST). Both categories have mean per-capita expenditures and land assets that
are lower than those of OBCs, and should thus be a relevant comparison group. While the poorest-fifth
29Other general equilibrium effects include states changing policies in light of the federal government policy change. In
order to tackle this I drop the states that introduced affirmative action policies around the same in a 5-year span around the
federal government policy. The results remain identical. Some states that had affirmative action policies for more than 20
years prior to the federal government change made minor changes to the amount of quotas, thus the parameter identified here
may include that – giving us the policy relevant parameter that includes the inducement of minor state-level law changes.
However, as I show, controlling for state-level laws, does not in any way affect the impacts of the federal level law change.
30Desai and Kulkarni (2008) propose a similar test – when looking at the trends in indicators for SC-ST they compare them
to the trends for Muslims. They have similar levles of socio economic indicators, and also have similar geographic dispersion.
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of the upper-caste category have very slightly more years of education than the average OBC; Muslims
have less years of education, which would imply the possibilities of a larger impact on Muslims.
Table 2.3: Difference-in-Differences Table - Levels of Education
Panel A: OBC vs. Others
Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
OBC 4.279 3.673 -0.605
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
Others 5.185 5.652 0.467
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016)
Difference -0.906 -1.978 -1.072
(0.014) (0.018) (0.023)
Panel B: Hindus vs. Muslims
Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
Muslim 3.965 3.565 -0.400
(0.015) (0.021) (0.025)
Hindu 4.527 4.293 -0.234
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Difference -0.562 -0.728 -0.166
(0.017) (0.024) (0.029)
Panel C: Rich vs. Poorer Others
Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
Others-Poorest 20% 4.059 4.420 0.361
(0.020) (0.030) (0.035)
Others-Richest 80% 5.500 5.909 0.409
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Difference -1.441 -1.489 -0.048
(0.022) (0.032) (0.039)
Dependent variable is levels of education. Using NSS 1999-2000 data. Standard Errors in Parenthe-
ses. Difference-in-Differences value in bold. ‘Others’ are general category individuals (i.e. not SC,
ST or OBCs). Levels of education determined by NSS.
Table 2.3 compares the Difference-in-Differences impacts on OBCs (Panel A) to the analogous impacts
on Muslims (Panel B), or the poorer upper-castes (Panel C). While the impact on Muslims is statistically
significant, it is economically small, being less than one-sixth of the effect on OBCs.31 The impact on
the poorest 20% of the upper-caste category is both economically and statistically insignificant. The
Difference-in-Differences result therefore indicates that the policies incentivized a rise in education by
1.07 levels (approximately 1.38 years) of education on average.
31The slight impact on Muslims can also be explained by the fact that some Muslim groups are also categorized as OBC
and could benefit from affirmative action policies
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Comparing the graphs in Appendix Figure 2.8.12, we can see that the largest impact is on the OBCs.
Muslims seem to experience little or no-impact, but there is a slight change in trend in the poorest-fifth
of the ‘Others’ category many years after the policy was implemented. Nonetheless, the effect on this
population is much smaller than the total impact on the OBCs. There still remains a large impact on OBC
schooling that can only be explained by the affirmative action policies. If Figure 2.8.13 I restrict the sam-
ple to be only OBCs, Muslims and poorest upper-caste, and plot the differential impact on OBCs where
the omitted categories are Muslims and the poorest upper-caste member. We can see that OBCs still have
a substantial differential effect. Furthermore, the other identification strategies used in this paper, will
not be threatened by this issue of simultaneous treatment. The figures also show little or no immediate
differential impact of launching the National Policy of Education in 1986 since persons between the ages
of 24 and 30 should be affected by the National Policy of Education but not by reservations.
These tables and pictures can also be produced by excluding college-goers. Artificially truncating the
sample by dropping all people who have college education allows us to focus on human capital accumu-
lation at the pre-collegiate level.32 Looking at Figure 2.8.10, in the Appendix, the impacts on the OBC
group is still starkly significant. It is natural that the impacts of these reservations lead to an increase
in educational attainment even at the pre-collegiate level, since many lower-level government jobs don’t
require collegiate education.
On can also look for secular trends across age groups and castes in the data. Since the 1999-2000 wave
was the first to ask the OBC identifier question a pre-policy analysis of this cannot be done. In the 2005
wave, one can see that the Difference-in-Differences graph is shifted about 5 to 6 years to the right, as
expected (Figure 2.8.7). This may help negate fears of age-specific caste trends that kick in at exactly
the age of 24. However, this result should be interpreted with caution, as between 1999 and 2005 a
few more sub-castes were added to the list of OBCs, and states added more reserved seats to state-level
quotas.
2.6.1.2 The Creamy Layer
The Indira Swahney v. Union of India, 1993 case prompted the Supreme Court to exclude the relatively
wealthier members of the OBC group from being eligible for these reservations. This excluded group
was referred to as the ‘creamy layer,’ and consists of sons and daughters of people with high-ranking
Constitutional Posts (the President, Supreme Court Judges, etc.), high-ranking civil service posts, and
large landowners. It also excludes sons and daughters of richer members of certain occupations (doctors,
lawyers, dentists, film professionals, authors, sportsmen, etc.). The members of these occupations are
subject to an income test, where their annual household income must be below Rs. 100,000 (approx.
32Since we are look at reservations in jobs and not colleges (in this section) there is no a priori reason to drop college goers,
other than to focus on pre-collegiate education.
113
$2000) in order to be eligible for reservations.33
Using the NSS Labor Force Survey data, I can identify certain occupational groups and industrial sectors,
and classify persons as whether they should be classified as ‘creamy layer’ or not. Then using the income-
information in the Labor Force Survey, I construct the total household income for adults. However,
this constructed measure will be far from perfect as (a) the labor force survey only identifies broad
occupational groups and not the specific occupations, and (b) persons close to the income cutoff may find
it easy to manipulate their bank statements and income tax returns, in order to qualify for reservations.34
Therefore, the creamy layer indicator will be at best, a close approximation of whether the persons took
advantage of these policies or not.
Table 2.4 produces the Difference-in-Differences tables for the creamy layer and non-creamy layer groups
separately. While there is some impact on the creamy layer group – which could be a result of income-
reporting manipulation, or other ways of getting around the eligibility criteria – the impact on the non-
creamy layer group is more than double the size than that of the creamy layer group. The triple -difference
estimator is the difference between the two double difference estimates in the table, and is a statistically
and economically significant 0.614 years of education. One can also run the triple-difference regression
(results shows in Appendix table 2.11), which produces the same estimate. The tables therefore show
that the bulk of the impact was on the non-creamy layer households.
2.6.1.3 Transition Between Education Levels and Quantile Effects
While the Difference-in-Differences estimate shows that on average, there was an increase of about 1.4
years of education for OBCs, it says little about the transition between the different levels of education. In
being eligible for government jobs, these levels of education are important milestones in the qualification
criteria. In order to see how the transition takes place, one can make Difference-in-Differences tables
for each level of education (using the highest attained grade as a 1/0 indicator). For example, looking
at Secondary School grade attainment in Table 2.9, it can be seen that only 8.7% of older OBCs had
secondary school as their highest grade attained, whereas this number is 14.6% of the older individuals in
the upper-caste category. The difference-in-difference coefficient (0.0281) shows that there is a relative
(to the upper-caste group) transition of the OBCs into having secondary school as their highest grade
attained.
These tables can be produced for every level of education to look at the relative transition of OBCs
in and out of certain grade levels. The difference-in-differences coefficients for each grade level are
reproduced in Table 2.10. These tables were also made for the sample excluding college goers, by
artificially truncating the data and dropping all college-goers, in order to focus on transitions in the pre-
33Since then this threshold has been raised and now stands at Rs. 600,000 (approx. $12000).
34Furthermore, the law stipulates that the income criteria will be applicable to ‘household’ income, where the definition of
‘household’ is also subject to manipulation.
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Table 2.4: Years of Education: Creamy Layer vs. Non-Creamy
Layer
Panel A: Creamy Layer
Old Young Difference
OBC 10.674 7.263 -3.412
(0.13) (0.16) (0.21)
Others 11.734 7.711 -4.023
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
Difference -1.060 -0.448 0.612
(0.14) (0.18) (0.22)
Panel B: Non-Creamy Layer
Old Young Difference
OBC 4.046 4.415 0.370
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Others 6.406 5.523 -0.883
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Difference -2.360 -1.108 1.253
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Triple Difference 0.641
(0.274)
Dependent variable is years of education. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Panel A consists of 9133 observations and Panel B has 370500 observations.
Households with no income or occupational information are excluded. The
Triple Difference estimate is the difference between the two double difference
estimates: 0.614 years of education. The triple difference estimator has stan-
dard errors clustered at the state-level.
collegiate level. The table indicates that the relative transition of OBCs before and after the policy,
has been away from illiteracy (and away from below primary and primary levels of education) and into
secondary school and college.35
The policy allows for reservations at any of the four classes of public sector jobs. While on average
students are incentivized to get another level of education, there may be parts of the distribution where
students get less education and drop out early to get a lower level public sector job. Figure 2.8.9 shows
35Between 2001 and 2002, the government tried to implement policies to universalize elementary education and the Millen-
nium Development Goals, but the effects of these policies are not being captured here since the dataset was collected before
the MDG projects were implemented.
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the quantile treatment effects. While there are a few quantiles where the treatment effect is negative, it
is mostly always positive. Furthermore, the biggest jump in the distribution is at the primary-level and
college levels.
2.6.2 The Intensity of Treatment and State Level Variation
Since different states have, over time, passed different laws reserving state-level seats and jobs for OBCs,
this kind of analysis can be done for each state separately. In the graphs in Appendix Figure 2.8.15, I per-
form a meta-analysis of all the state-law changes, where the vertical red line represents a marked change
in reservation policy for the OBC group in that state. By restricting the sample to the corresponding state
and plotting the coefficients, we can see that the state-wise changes in reservation policy have impacts
similar to the federal law change.
This cross-state meta-analysis can also be used to study how the difference-in-difference treatment ef-
fect varies by the intensity of reservations, and can address the issues of mean reversion and simulta-
neous policy changes mentioned above. While variation in social group and age were exploited in the
difference-in-differences section, it is possible to investigate another dimension of variation: ‘the inten-
sity of reservation policy.’ Since each state has its own reservation policy, there is variation in terms of
which states are more pro-reservations and which are less so. Let us define the ‘intensity of reservation’
as the ratio between the percentage of quotas and the population percentage for each group: quotas%
population%
.
For instance, in the state of Karnataka, this ratio is 53
36
= 1.47, whereas in the state of Madhya Pradesh it
is only 13
40.5
= 0.32, thus making the intensity higher in Karnataka than in Madhya Pradesh.
In the following regression specification, eduics is the education level obtained by a person i belonging
to caste c and residing in state s. OBC is an indicator for whether the person is OBC or not. Most states
made significant changes to reservation policies in the early 1990s.36 The variable young equals 1 for
cohorts that were still in school or will attend school after the changes in reservation policy have been
implemented. Zβ is a vector of controls.37 The parameter γ captures how the ATET varies with intensity
of treatment. It should be positive in sign if the older members of the reserved castes have relatively less
education than the younger members, and this disparity should be higher in states that had larger changes
to the intensity of reservations.
36The reason that the law changes from the early 1990s are used (as opposed to previous changes) is because the federal law
also changed at that time. The federal law change should not differentially impact residents of different states because people
are competing for federal seats with people all over the country. If state-law changes from periods both before and after the
1990s were studied, then they would be confounded by other changes like the federal law change.
37I present results with and without controls, where the controls include the intensity of SC and ST reservations, and the
interactions with the young indicator and SC ST indicators – this is a fully saturated model.
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eduics = youngi + intensitycs +OBCc + β0cOBCc ∗ youngi + β1csintensitycs ∗ youngi+
β2csOBCc ∗ intensitycs + γOBCc ∗ intensitycs ∗ youngi +Zβ + cs (2.4)
This specification is akin to a continuous form of the triple-difference estimator, where the three di-
mensions of variation are age, caste and intensity of reservations. As Gruber (1994) explains, such an
approach allows us to control for caste-specific trends (β0cOBCc ∗ young), and state specific trends in
laws (β1csintensitycs ∗ young). Controlling for these trends allows us to tackle the issue of simultane-
ous timings of policy; there is no reason to believe that the state-wise intensity of reservations should
be correlated with investments in schooling infrastructure. Furthermore, this method also allows us to
control for state-specific caste preferences β2csOBCc ∗ intensitycs, since certain states may care more
about certain castes, and the intensity variable would then be picking up these preferences. Last, this
approach also solves the automatic mean-reversion problem, since there is no reason to believe that non-
policy driven mean-reversion should be higher in states that have more favorable reservation policies than
others.38
Table 2.5: The Intensity of Treatment and State Level Variation
Education Level Full Sample Non 0 Intensity SC-ST Controls
OBC*Intensity* Young 0.182 0.178 0.168
Standard Errors:
State Level (0.0985)* (0.0983)* (0.0957)*
Region Level (0.0788)** (0.0788)** (0.0780)**
SC-ST Controls N N Y
Observations 508,410 503,981 508,410
R-squared 0.026 0.027 0.087
Dependent variable is level of education. Standard Errors in parentheses clustered at the
state-level (30 states) or region level (77 regions). Specification ‘Non 0 Intensity’ drops the
2 states that have no reservations for OBCs. Controls in all specifications include an OBC
indicator, a young indicator, the state-level intensity of reservations, and all double inter-
actions between these variables. The final column that has SC-ST Controls also include an
SC indicator, an ST indicator, state-level intensities of SC reservations, state-level intensity
of ST-reservations, a young indicator and all double interactions between these variables.
38 It may be interesting to see if the ‘intensity’ variable is correlated with the minority group’s situation in society. If
greater socio-economic disadvantage in the state is positively correlated with more intensity, then the treatment effect will
probably be larger (since there is potentially a larger gap to bridge). If however, more advanced minority groups, can (say via
political power) influence greater ‘intensity’, then the treatment effect will potentially be smaller. I find no evidence of such
heterogeneity and no significant correlation between intensity and the baseline socio-economic characteristics of the minority
groups.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship Between Treatment Effect in a state and state-level Intensity of Quotas
Auxiliary regression of relationship between the ATET and intensity of OBC reservations by state.
In Table 2.5 we can see that the effect of affirmative action policies is larger in states that have a higher
intensity of reservations. An increase in the intensity by one unit, increases the treatment effect of these
policies by between 0.17 and 0.18 levels of education for OBCs. This coefficient is stable across specifi-
cations with and without additional controls.
This regression specification, however, imposes a linear functional form. In order to explore non-
linearities in the relationship between intensity and the effect of reservations, I use a method proposed
by Donald and Lang (2007). This method also tackles the issue of having a small number of clusters.
I use a two-stage estimation procedure by first computing the treatment effect for each state, and then
regressing that treatment effect on the intensity of reservations. In order to find the treatment effect in
each state, I do a simple difference-in-differences using only the sub-sample of each state. I then plot the
difference-in-differences coefficient across the intensity of reservation by each state in order to find the
relationship. In Figure 2.2, I plot the relationship and display the auxiliary regression that captures this
relationship – which is increasing at a decreasing rate.39
39Figure 2.2 drops outlier states that have very large intensity values because of almost non-existant OBC populations.
These states are amongst the smallest in the country (Goa and Mizoram).
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2.6.3 Regression Discontinuity and Difference-in-Discontinuities
For my final empirical strategy, I exploit a state-determined methodology of identifying/classifying
OBCs, and obtain a Regression Discontinuity (RD) estimate of the the impacts of reservations. Such
an analysis is new to the literature, and provides a causal impact of affirmative action policies. The
biggest advantage of an RD estimate is that it is not encumbered by issues such as mean reversion and
simultaneity of government policy. Government spending on school infrastructure should have uniform
impacts on castes just below and above the cutoffs determined by the eligibility methodology. Thus there
should be no confounding effects of the government’s investment in schooling program. There is also the
benefit of identifying a different and interesting parameter – the effect of such policies on a student from
the marginal sub-caste.
Classification and identification of OBCs for state-level reservation policies is the prerogative of the
state government. States appoint committees to determine who the OBCs are and what reservations they
should be eligible for. Some committees conduct a socio-economic survey and collect data. They use
this data to rank the different sub-castes on the basis of socio-economic indicators. Castes above a certain
cutoff of ‘backwardness’ are eligible for reservations. This set-up allows us to estimate the impacts of
the reservation policy using a regression discontinuity design. If we have information on the index of
‘backwardness,’ we can compare sub-castes just above to those just below the cutoff to see what the
causal impacts of reservations are. The analysis in this section will focus on the state of Haryana, which
had one such methodology for classifying the OBCs.
The RD can then be aided by an additional source of variation – once again, certain cohorts were too
old at the time the policies were implemented to be affected by these reservations. I then perform a
difference-in-discontinuities analysis, using the sub-caste index to identify the discontinuity, and the age
cohorts to identify the difference in the discontinuities for each cohort.
In the state of Haryana, an ‘index of backwardness’ for each sub-caste is published, making it possible
for me to conduct a sharp RD. The Singh (1990) Haryana Backward Classes Commission Report was the
first ever committee in the state. Being the first is an added bonus, since it prevents any lingering policies
from contaminating the before-after analysis.40 The Committee conducted a survey and created a score
out of a total score of 60. Any caste that had more than half the total score was considered an OBC. A
half-way mark is an intuitive cut-off point and it is thus unlikely that the cut-off itself was manipulated
to include certain castes. It is also unlikely for people of different castes to manipulate their score as the
index is based on survey data where the respondents were probably unaware of the utilization purpose of
this data. I observe no bunching of castes just above the cutoff.41 Manipulation of the methodology from
40The handful of other states that used similar methodologies had lingering policies; furthermore, the other states don’t
publish the tables used to formulate the index.
41This would not be a valid way of testing manipulability if there were certain groups that wanted to move in opposite
directions. But since it is reasonable to believe that the marginal caste wants to be eligible for reservations, in the presence of
manipulation we should see bunching just above the cutoff.
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the government’s side is also unlikely, since they use the same methodology formulated by the Mandal
(1980) Federal Commission. Lastly, I test that the treatment is discontinuous at the cutoff and all other
baseline characteristics vary continuously.42
Singh (1990) identifies the OBCs by creating an index of ‘backwardness’ based on (a) social, (b) educa-
tional, and (c) economic disadvantage. The social disadvantage criterion looks at 10 indicators, including
employment in manual labor, the unorganized sector, and lack of access to proper sanitation and other
civic amenities. The educational criterion studies 10 other indicators related to drop-out rates, female
literacy, test scores and vocational education. And the economic index looks at 15 indicators such as
family assets, consumption expenditure, maternal mortality rates, unemployment rates, etc. The survey
was done in 53 villages and 4 towns, and the report produces caste-wise tables on each of the 35 indica-
tors used in the final index. From the raw data tables, I can reconstruct the index and it matches the final
index produced. While the RD analysis is done for only one state, it confirms a powerful causal finding
on affirmative action.
The data set used for the RD analysis is the ARIS-REDS 1999 data set. The nationally representative
NSS data cannot be used since it doesn’t have disaggregated sub-caste categories, which we require for
the RD analysis. Unlike the NSS data set, ARIS-REDS collects information on years of education rather
than levels. Therefore, the results in this section analyze the impact of affirmative action policies on the
years of education. In the RD results in Figure 2.3, the dependent variable is the difference in mean years
of education between the older and younger members of that caste.43 Once again ‘older’ is defined as
being too ‘old’ to enjoy the benefits of this reservation policy. There are 27 sub-castes for which the
ARIS-REDS and the Haryana Committee Report have matching caste names.44
If, however, we look at the mean education level of the population that is too old to be affected by
the reservation policy, we see no discontinuity at the cutoff (Figure 2.4). Furthermore, we can see a
slight downward trend, since a higher index indicates a larger socio-economic disadvantage. Looking
at regression Table 2.17 in the Appendix, we can see that the cutoff isn’t significant for the educational
attainment of the older population.
Based on the RD literature, I explore various regression specifications. Imbens and Lemieux (2008)
suggest changing the bandwidth and seeing if the results are robust to restricting the sample to a small
area just around the cut-off, whereas van der Klaauw (2008) suggests using a semi-parametric approach
of local linear regressions with higher order polynomials. I use higher order polynomials of the index
42In 1995, the Ramji Lal Committee – the second backward classes commission in Haryana – added 4 more castes to the
list. In the dataset used, this adds two castes below the cutoff to be eligible for reservations. However, since these castes will
have only felt the benefits for less than 3 years (the data was collected in 1999), they have been coded as ineligible. Doing so
doesn’t change the results.
43Dependent variable = mean education of young in subcaste c−mean education of old in subcaste c.
44While 34 of the ARIS-REDS castes could be matched to the names in the Committee Report, there wasn’t any data on
7 of these castes in the data-set – since the data set is much smaller than the NSS. Furthermore, the Scheduled Castes were
assigned highest possible index values as they were already eligible for these policies (and are therefore not castes near the
threshold) – this shows up in the bunching at the highest possible index value of 60.
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Figure 2.3: RD: Average change in years of education by caste
Regression Discontinuity on ded, defined as: mean years of education youngc −mean years of education for oldc.
Figure 2.4: RD: Mean Education by Caste of Older Population
Sample restricted to population above the age of 27 (too old to benefit from the reservation policy). Regression Discontinuity
on years of education.
121
value, in the spirit of the Heckman and Robb (1985) ‘Control Function Approach,’ and sub-samples
restricted around the cutoff, in the specifications below. Column headings have the index’s degree of
polynomial order, and if ‘Restricted’ is mentioned, then the sample only includes half the index-span
around the cutoff (index values of 15 to 44). ‘Flex Slope’ indicates that the slope is allowed to vary on
either side of the cutoff.45
The RD framework identifies the localized treatment effect in the neighborhood around the cutoff. Stu-
dents from sub-castes that are close to the cutoff may behave differently from the average student. The
coefficient of interest is the Neighborhood Average Treatment Effect (NATE) since it is the average im-
pact of the policies in the neighborhood around the cutoff of eligibility.46 In this context, there is a large
mass of students who get no schooling whatsoever. These students presumably belong to sub-castes
further away from the cutoff, having the highest levels of ‘backwardness.’ This NATE therefore may
be larger than the ATET found via the Difference-in-Differences methodology since the ATET is pulled
down by students who have the highest costs of schooling. The students that are far from the RD cutoff
with high values of ‘backwardness,’ would presumably only respond to extremely large changes in the
returns to education to first budge them on the extensive margin of attending school. Since a large number
of high-cost students will not increase their schooling despite these policies, the ATET may be lower than
the NATE.
I use three distinct regression specifications. The first – a Discontinuity-in-Differences – is what Figure
2.3 plots, where the dependent variable is the mean difference in education between the younger and
older members within a caste – this regression is at the sub-caste level. The second, restricts the sample
to only the young, and estimates the discontinuity for the young sample. The third – a Difference-in-
Discontinuities – combines a difference-in-differences approach with the RD approach to estimate the
differential discontinuity for the young.
In my first, approach – a Discontinuity-in-Differences – I control for a flexible polynomial of the index
f(index) and estimate the following regression:
ed youngc − ed oldc = β0 1index>0 + f(index) + c (2.5)
In Appendix Table 2.12, it is clear that despite having a small number of observations, the coefficient of
interest is both economically and statistically significant. Looking at the third order polynomial column,
the coefficient shows that the causal effect of reserving seats for backward classes is to increase their
high-school education by about 2.6 years.
In my second approach, I restrict the sample to young cohorts who would be able to change their school-
45Data-driven bandwidth selection procedures, like the one discussed in Calonico et al. (2014b) cannot be used in this
context as there are only twenty-seven mass points of the index.
46Another way to think about this parameter is to think of it as a weighted average treatment effect, where the weights are
the probability that each caste’s assignment value lies in the neighborhood of the threshold (DiNardo and Lee, 2011).
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ing decision, and control for the mean education level of the older population in that caste. I cluster the
standard errors at the caste level, and also show the p-values with a Wild-t small-cluster bootstrapping
procedure (Cameron et al., 2008). The added advantage of just performing the regression for the younger
population is that we can make sure that the discontinuity isn’t merely arising out of the older populations
education, and reconfirm the results ins Figures 2.3 and 2.4. In some specifications, I restrict the sample
to index values around the cutoff. The regression of interest is:
eduic = β 1index>0 + f(index) + ed oldc + ic for {−v1 < index < v2} (2.6)
Table 2.14 shows similar coefficients as before: the causal impact of reservations is to increase years of
high-school education by about 3 years for the average student in the neighborhood of the cutoff.
My preferred specification, however, is a Differences-in-Discontinuities approach, which is relatively
new to the literature (Grembi et al., 2016). This incorporates the discontinuity along the caste index, and
differences it across the older and younger age cohorts. In Equation (2.7), I interact the cutoff with the
variable Y oung. This interaction term should have a positive sign since the younger group will benefit
from the reservation policy. When Y oung = 0, the discontinuity should be insignificant (as seen in
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.17), but when Y oung = 1 those above the ‘backwardness’ cutoff should increase
their educational attainment. Therefore, the model predicts that the coefficient β1 will be positive:
eduic = β0 1index>0+β1 1index>0∗Y oungi+β2 Y oungi+f(index, Y oungi)+ic for index ∈ {−v1, v1}
(2.7)
Table 2.6: Difference in Discontinuities
Polynomial β1 Clustered SE CGM pval Flex Slope Restricted Sample R-squared
3rd 1.892*** (0.725) (0.100) 0.104
3rd 1.986* (1.056) (0.150) X 0.103
4th 1.681*** (0.627) (0.0300) 0.105
4th 1.156 (1.267) (0.358) X 0.108
5th 2.307** (0.999) (0.0360) 0.105
5th 1.850 (1.892) (0.470) X 0.111
1st 1.832** (0.724) (0.104) X 0.106
1st 1.418** (0.647) (0.138) X X 0.103
2nd 0.988*** (0.211) (0) X 0.105
2nd 1.603*** (0.467) (0.004) X X 0.113
Dependent variable is years of education. Level of significance (based on clustered standard errors): *** 0.01; ** 0.05;
* 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of half the index span around the cutoff (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’
allows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the cut-off. Standard Errors clustered at the
Caste-level, and Cameron et al. (2008) small-cluster Wild Bootstrap p-values also presented.
Table 2.6 shows an increase in education for the OBCs. Once again, the results are economically and
statistically significant and of a similar magnitude, giving us a consistent story across all the different
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possible specifications. The average value for the coefficients is about 2.22 years of education. This
last specification is the preferred specification, since it utilizes the entire data set and has the highest
power.
I conduct numerous robustness checks to validate these results. Tables 2.13 to 2.19 check the robustness
to the age-cutoff by dropping three years before and after the used cutoff. The results are stronger than
before. Tables 2.15 and 2.18 drop any person who ever attended college. It is important to check that other
factors are not discontinuous at the same cutoff, since the RD design requires all other factors (income,
assets, etc.) to vary smoothly at the cutoff. Looking at Table 2.21 in the Appendix, we see that there are
no other significant discontinuities at the same threshold (an index value of 30). The table presents results
on total expenditure, medical expenditure and work in casual labor, but robustness checks were done on
other variables as well. We can also look for educational discontinuities at any other value of the index.
When studying the impact on the average change in education between the younger and older cohorts, no
other values of the index have significant discontinuities. The only value that the discontinuity is visible,
is at the true cutoff (a value of 30 on the index). Figure 2.8.16 shows cutoffs at 20, 25, 35 and 40 – none
of which have significant discontinuities.
2.6.4 Summary of Empirical Section
So far this paper has used three different approaches to answer the primary question of interest: does
affirmative action incentivize students to stay in school? The double-difference strategy uses a nationally
representative dataset to identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATETca) for each age cohort
a and caste c. Exploiting variation in caste and age, the estimator finds that the students eligible for
reservations increased educational attainment. This was found to be true in response to the change in
federal law, as well as various states’ changes in law. The concern of confounding policies – like large
expenditures on school building – was tackled by looking at placebo groups that should have been affected
by school building but not by reservations. There wasn’t an impact on educational attainment for the
Muslim population and the low-income high-caste population, suggesting that the bulk of the impact on
lower-caste members was due to the affirmative action policies. I also compare the differential impact
between the excluded creamy layer and included non-creamy layer populations – the non-creamy layer
population was seen to have more than twice the impact than that of the creamy layer group.
The state-wise analysis exploits variation on a third front: the intensity of reservation policy. The paper
finds that the impact is larger in states that have a more generous reservation policy. Using a 2-stage
estimation procedure, I show the treatment effect of quotas is increasing, at a decreasing rate, with the
intensity of reservations.
The regression discontinuity approach looks at the introduction of OBC reservations in the state of
Haryana. OBCs were classified on the basis of an index of ‘backwardness,’ which provides the run-
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ning variable for the RD. Across specifications, I consistently find an increase in educational attainment
for the population eligible for reservations, and having no discontinuities in other dimensions. While the
RD is the most ‘internally valid’ of all the identification strategies used here, it could be less externally
valid than the other strategies that use the nationally-representative data since it focuses on the state of
Haryana. Haryana is similar to most North Indian states, but may be quite different from some South
Indian states. In Appendix Table 2.20 the means of the major variables are studied comparing Haryana
with the Rest of India. The one stark difference is that Haryana has virtually no Scheduled Tribes (STs).
The other differences are economically insignificant: the average Haryanvi is richer than the average In-
dian by about $1.1 a month, is half a year older, and has about one-tenth more levels of education. This
differences are small, and not statistically significant, suggesting that it is a representative North Indian
state.47
The Difference-in-Differences estimator identifies the Treatment on the Treated (ATET) of about 1.38
years of education. Whereas the NATE from the RD strategy is somewhere around 2.2 and 3.1 years of
education, the average impact is only about 1.38 years of education.48 The NATE may be the relevant
estimate of interest if the government is considering adding another sub-caste to the list of OBCs; whereas
the ATET may be the relevant estimate if the government wants to know the overall impact of changing
the amount of quotas for all OBCs. The state-level intensity variation tells us how increasing the intensity
of quotas may affect the magnitude of the treatment effect.
2.7 Conclusion
Using three different empirical strategies, I find that affirmative action policies encourage students to
increase their education by one more schooling-level. This has major implications as it indicates the
possibility of encouraging students just below the threshold of a certain level of education to cross that
threshold and get to the next highest level. Similarly, Shreshta (2016) finds that the Gurkha community
in Nepal attains one more year of education, on average, in response to a change in the mandatory
employment eligibility law of the British army. However, it is hard to translate the results in most of
the other literature into years of educational attainment. Kazianga et al. (2013) show that enrollment
rises by 20% when schools are made more girl-friendly, and Dinkelman and Martinez (2014) show that
absenteeism falls by 14% when information is provided about financial aid. Using the booming IT sector
near Delhi as a sign of an increase in returns to education, Oster and Steinberg (2013) find that school
enrollment rises by 4% to 7% when a new IT center is opened in the area. On the other hand, Jensen
and Miller (2015), and de Brauw and Giles (2008) show that schooling investments may actually fall in
response to higher returns.
47Nonetheless, South Indian states are culturally different from Haryana and have a history of reservations unlike Haryana.
48However, it is important to remember that the RD and Difference-in-Differences are looking at the impacts of different
policies: the difference-in-differences looks at the impact of reservations only in governmental jobs and not colleges.
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Contrary to the expectation of ‘complacency’ effects, I find that lowering standards may actually have
some positive incentive effects. There is, however, a non-linearity – very high levels of reservations
may lead to a ‘patronizing equilibrium’ (Loury, 1992). Furthermore, a patronizing equilibrium may get
strong with time as information updating takes place. While the model may be generalizable to other
contexts, like the US, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the empirical results would probably drastically differ by
context. For instance, in the US, affirmative action lacks the backing of certain salient features – like
explicitly reserving seats for certain groups – found in the Indian context. Furthermore, interventions in
the US are minor in size, compared to a 27% reservation of seats in all government jobs. This lack of
salience, and difference in policy-size may lead to different results.
The policies may also come with certain costs if there is a crowding out of educational attainment for
upper-caste members. The government has tried to mitigate this concern by increasing the seats in col-
leges and government jobs so that the absolute number of seats available to the upper-castes does not
change, but it is not clear what the possible costs of increasing seats are. Furthermore, such a large policy
is sure to have other general equilibrium effects in terms of the work-force composition and composition
of classrooms. Negative peer-effects, due to these changing compositions, may play a role, Although in
such a context they may be less of a concern – Rao (2016) finds that interaction with poorer students
actually encourages more prosocial behavior with small negative impacts on the test scores in only one
subject.
In terms of the benefits for the minority group however, an increase in 2.2 years of education can translate
into high wage gains since the estimated returns to education in developing countries vary between 7%
and 14% (Behrman, 1999; Duflo, 2001; Khanna, 2016; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Strauss and
Thomas, 1995). There are also various non-pecuniary benefits of education, like greater participation in
the political process and better health. Lastly, lowering educational inequalities – and possibly wealth in-
equalities – may be something intrinsically valuable to policy-makers. In light of these results, therefore,
policy-makers should keep in mind the externalities of such affirmative action policies.
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2.8 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.7: Difference-in-Differences Table – Years of Education
OBC vs. Others Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
OBC 4.439 4.129 -0.310
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Others 5.579 6.654 1.076
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Difference -1.140 -2.526 -1.386
(0.018) (0.022) (0.029)
Hindus vs. Muslims Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
Muslim 4.031 3.961 -0.071
(0.018) (0.025) (0.030)
Hindu 4.762 4.952 0.190
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Difference -0.731 -0.992 -0.261
(0.021) (0.030) (0.036)
Rich vs. Poorer Others Younger Cohort Older Cohort Difference
Others-Poorest 20% 4.111 5.083 0.972
(0.025) (0.037) (0.044)
Others-Richest 80% 5.989 6.983 0.993
(0.014) (0.017) (0.023)
Difference -1.879 -1.900 -0.022
(0.030) (0.041) (0.051)
Using NSS 1999-2000 data. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Difference-in-Differences
value in bold. ‘Others’ are general category individuals (i.e. not SC, ST or OBCs).
Table 2.8: Social Groups and Religions
Years of Education Land owned (acres) Per Cap Month Exp (Rs.)
ST 3.40 1.17 427.32
SC 3.04 0.39 398.67
OBC 3.90 0.99 446.33
Others 5.68 1.10 519.02
Richest 80% 6.07 1.14 578.00
Poorest 20% 4.10 0.96 283.17
Hindu 4.46 1.01 465.57
Muslim 3.61 0.49 424.17
‘Others’ are general category individuals (not SC, ST or OBCs). Nominal exchange rate: approx Rs. 50 to
$ 1. Household Monthly Expenditure deflated by rural-urban-region-wise CPI.
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Table 2.9: Proportion of Students with Secondary School
Secondary School Old Young Difference
OBC 0.0877 0.0736 -0.0141
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Others 0.1463 0.1041 -0.0422
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference -0.0586 -0.0305 0.0281
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Standard Errors in Parentheses. Difference-in-Differences value
in bold. ‘Others’ include that section of the population ineligible
for reservations (i.e. not SCs, STs, or OBCs)
Table 2.10: Relative Transition of OBCs between grades
Difference-in-Differences Coefficient
Level of Education Including College Excluding College
Illiterate -0.0862 -0.0661
(0.003) (0.003)
Below Primary Education -0.0132 -0.0083
(0.002) (0.003)
Primary Education -0.0149 -0.0065
(0.002) (0.002)
Middle School 0.0077 0.0217
(0.002) (0.002)
Secondary School 0.0281 0.0455
(0.002) (0.002)
Higher Secondary School 0.0047 0.0139
(0.002) (0.002)
College Graduate 0.0741
(0.002)
Standard Errors in Parentheses. Levels of education determined by NSS 1999-2000. Sample of ‘excluding
college’ drops all people with at least some college education.
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Table 2.11: Creamy Layer v Non Creamy Layer
VARIABLES Years of Education
OBC -2.360***
(0.297)
SC-ST -3.392***
(0.274)
Young -0.883***
(0.107)
Creamy Layer 5.328***
(0.155)
OBC*Young 1.253***
(0.0944)
SC-ST * Young 1.682***
(0.125)
OBC* Creamy layer 1.301***
(0.305)
SC-ST * Creamy Layer 1.647***
(0.364)
Young* Creamy Layer -3.140***
(0.170)
OBC*Young* Creamy Layer -0.641**
(0.274)
SC-ST*Young* Creamy Layer -0.943***
(0.297)
Constant 6.406***
(0.150)
Observations 521,063
R-squared 0.093
Dependent variable is years of education.
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Level of significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1
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Table 2.12: Discontinuity in Differences
Polynomial 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd
Cutoff 2.604* 2.342 4.105** 5.158** 18.07
SE (1.347) (1.387) (1.959) (2.031) (12.83)
Nonparametric bootstrap 0.0605 0.198 0.0505 0.0252 0.359
Wild-t p-value (0.0560) (0.148) (0.154) (0.0280) (0.196)
Flex Slope X X
R-sq 0.400 0.427 0.439 0.381 0.417
Dependent variable is years of education. Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Level of signifi-
cance : *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. Nonparameteric bootstrapped p-values, and Wild-t p-values
presented. Regressions consist of 27 sub-castes in the state of Haryana. Flex-slope specifica-
tions allow the slopes to vary across the cutoff.
Table 2.13: Discontinuity in Differences – No 24 to 30 year olds
Polynomial 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd
Cutoff 3.274** 2.908** 3.862* 5.716** 21.25
SE (1.256) (1.285) (1.947) (2.183) (12.57)
Nonparametric bootstrap 0.0203 0.0860 0.533 0.009 0.294
Wild-t p-value (0.0200) (0.0540) (0.140) (0.0220) (0.136)
Flex Slope X X
R-sq 0.400 0.427 0.439 0.381 0.417
Subsample of people no 24 to 30 year olds. Dependent variable is years of education. Stan-
dard Errors in Parenthesis. Level of significance : *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. Nonparameteric
bootstrapped p-values, and Wild-t p-values presented. Regressions consist of 27 sub-castes in
the state of Haryana. Flex-slope specifications allow the slopes to vary across the cutoff.
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Table 2.14: Young Sample
Polynomial β1 Clustered SE CGM pval Flex Slope Restricted Sample R-squared
3rd 2.640*** (0.747) (0.050) 0.108
3rd 2.900** (1.192) (0.108) X 0.120
4th 2.393*** (0.738) (0.022) 0.109
4th 1.727 (1.261) (0.266) X 0.121
5th 3.004*** (1.103) (0.078) 0.109
5th 2.728* (1.570) (0.206) X 0.122
1st 0.520 (0.593) (0.434) X 0.106
1st 6.952*** (2.578) (0.066) X X 0.119
2nd 17.66** (7.477) (0.194) X 0.109
2nd -30.52 (32.15) (0.438) X X 0.121
Dependent variable is years of education. Level of significance (based on clustered standard errors): *** 0.01; ** 0.05;
* 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of half the index span around the cutoff (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’
allows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the cut-off. Standard Errors clustered at the
Caste-level, and Cameron et al. (2008) Wild Bootstrap p-values also presented.
Table 2.15: Young Sample – No college
Polynomial β1 Clustered SE CGM pval Flex Slope Restricted Sample R-squared
3rd 3.113*** (0.743) (0.002) 0.108
3rd 3.113*** (0.743) (0.002) X 0.120
4th 2.882*** (0.840) (0.024) 0.109
4th 2.882*** (0.840) (0.024) X 0.121
5th 4.290*** (1.129) (0.004) 0.109
5th 4.290*** (1.129) (0.004) X 0.122
1st 1.365*** (0.301) (0.000) X 0.106
2nd 3.645*** (1.016) (0.034) X 0.109
Subsample of people never going college. Dependent variable is years of education. Level of significance (based on
clustered standard errors): *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of half the index span around the cut-
off (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’ allows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the
cut-off. Standard Errors clustered at the Caste-level, and Cameron et al. (2008) Wild Bootstrap p-values also presented.
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Table 2.16: Young Sample – No 24 to 30 year olds.
Polynomial β1 Clustered SE CGM pval Flex Slope Restricted Sample R-squared
3rd 3.105*** (0.746) (0.000) 0.108
3rd 3.513** (1.231) (0.050) X 0.120
4th 2.959*** (0.854) (0.014) 0.109
4th 2.378 (1.490) (0.126) X 0.121
5th 3.448*** (1.222) (0.034) 0.109
5th 3.951** (1.572) (0.038) X 0.122
1st 0.473 (0.650) (0.580) X 0.106
1st 5.985* (3.173) (0.106) X X 0.119
2nd 19.11** (8.051) (0.122) X 0.109
2nd -13.83 (46.45) (0.786) X X 0.121
Subsample of people no 24 to 30 year olds. Dependent variable is years of education. Level of significance (based on
clustered standard errors): *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of half the index span around the cut-
off (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’ allows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the
cut-off. Standard Errors clustered at the Caste-level, and Cameron et al. (2008) Wild Bootstrap p-values also presented.
Table 2.17: Education for the Older Population – Not eligible for reser-
vations
Polynomial Flex Slope Restricted β1 Std Err R-sq
3rd -0.165 (0.109) 0.189
3rd X -0.0615 (0.152) 0.175
4th -0.112 (0.106) 0.189
4th X -0.0361 (0.129) 0.175
5th -0.153 (0.109) 0.189
5th X -0.465* (0.240) 0.175
1st X 0.0545 (0.0641) 0.189
1st X X -0.648 (0.427) 0.175
2nd X -1.876** (0.869) 0.189
2nd X X 7.224 (5.678) 0.175
Dependent variable is years of education. Sample restricted to older population.
Level of significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of
half the index span around the cutoff (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’ al-
lows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the cut-off.
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Table 2.18: Difference in Discontinuities – No college
Polynomial β1 Clustered SE CGM pval Flex Slope Restricted Sample R-squared
3rd 2.424*** (0.623) (0.00) 0.104
3rd 2.424*** (0.623) (0.00) X 0.103
4th 2.194*** (0.572) (0.01) 0.105
4th 2.194*** (0.572) (0.01) X 0.108
5th 3.826*** (0.892) (0.00) 0.105
5th 3.826*** (0.892) (0.00) X 0.111
1st 2.354*** (0.623) (0.02) X 0.106
2nd 1.127*** (0.134) (0.00) X 0.105
Subsample of people never going college. Dependent variable is years of education. Level of significance (based on
clustered standard errors): *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of half the index span around the cut-
off (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’ allows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the
cut-off. Standard Errors clustered at the Caste-level, and Cameron et al. (2008) Wild Bootstrap p-values also presented.
Table 2.19: Difference in Discontinuities – No 24 to 30 year olds
Polynomial β1 Clustered SE CGM pval Flex Slope Restricted Sample R-squared
3rd 2.128*** (0.650) (0.022) 0.104
3rd 2.806** (1.020) (0.040) X 0.103
4th 1.923*** (0.607) (0.018) 0.105
4th 2.313* (1.317) (0.006) X 0.108
5th 2.890*** (0.929) (0.00) 0.105
5th 3.722** (1.623) (0.054) X 0.111
1st 2.020*** (0.652) (0.020) X 0.106
1st 1.509** (0.588) (0.064) X X 0.103
2nd 1.031*** (0.152) (0.00) X 0.105
2nd 1.797*** (0.378) (0.00) X X 0.113
Subsample of people no 24 to 30 year olds. Dependent variable is years of education. Level of significance (based on
clustered standard errors): *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’ consists of half the index span around the cut-
off (index values 15 to 44). ‘Flexible slope’ allows the slope of the regression specification to vary on either side of the
cut-off. Standard Errors clustered at the Caste-level, and Cameron et al. (2008) Wild Bootstrap p-values also presented.
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Table 2.20: Comparing Haryana to the Rest of India
Rest of India Haryana Difference
Sample Size 583422 10155
Mean Education Level 4.629 4.763 -0.134
Monthly per cap Expenditure (Rs.) 464.612 526.433 -61.821
Male (%) 0.515 0.529 -0.014
Age 26.133 25.551 0.582
Urban (%) 0.376 0.363 0.013
Agricultural sector (%) 0.516 0.503 0.013
OBC (%) 0.33 0.278 0.052
SC (%) 0.158 0.165 -0.007
ST (%) 0.114 0.007 0.107
Using NSS 1999-2000 data. ‘Mean Education Level’ covers 8 levels of education from illiterate
to college graduates. Nominal exchange rate: approx Rs. 50 to 1 dollar. Household Monthly
Expenditure deflated by rural-urban-region-wise CPI.
Figure 2.8.5: Enrollment Rates by Age
National Sample Survey 1999. The largest drop in enrollment occurs at the age of 18 - representing a 16% point fall.
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Table 2.21: RD: Robustness Checks: Other Discontinuities?
Polynomial Restricted Variable β1 Std Err R-sq
3rd Edu Expenditure -0.0587 (0.0502) 0.016
3rd X Edu Expenditure -0.0772 (0.0809) 0.013
4th Edu Expenditure -0.0834* (0.0471) 0.017
4th X Edu Expenditure 0.0315 (0.0798) 0.014
5th Edu Expenditure 0.0230 (0.0588) 0.019
5th X Edu Expenditure 0.0491 (0.116) 0.014
3rd Med Expenditure 0.0273* (0.0156) 0.008
3rd X Med Expenditure 0.00234 (0.0166) 0.005
4th Med Expenditure 0.0223 (0.0142) 0.008
4th X Med Expenditure -0.0309* (0.0172) 0.006
5th Med Expenditure 0.00726 (0.0187) 0.009
5th X Med Expenditure -0.0181 (0.0152) 0.006
3rd Total Expenditure 30.73 (30.97) 0.072
3rd X Total Expenditure -29.21 (25.01) 0.094
4th Total Expenditure 9.403 (20.71) 0.094
4th X Total Expenditure -59.37* (32.23) 0.097
5th Total Expenditure 10.06 (35.61) 0.094
5th X Total Expenditure -95.38*** (29.56) 0.100
3rd Casual Labor -0.686* (0.390) 0.151
3rd X Casual Labor 0.289 (0.226) 0.189
4th Casual Labor -0.381 (0.259) 0.194
4th X Casual Labor 0.253 (0.303) 0.189
5th Casual Labor -0.360 (0.372) 0.194
5th X Casual Labor 0.489 (0.287) 0.190
Variable ‘Edu Expenditure’ is expenditure on education-related goods. ‘Med Expenditure’ is
medical expenditure. ‘Total Expenditure’ is expenditure on all items. ‘Casual Labor’ is 1/0
indicator of occupation. Level of significance: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.1. ‘Restricted Sample’
consists of half the index span around the cutoff (index values 15 to 44).
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Figure 2.8.6: OBC Coefficients of Diff-in-Diff Regression across age cohorts (Controlling for SC-STs)
Unlike the figure in the main text, the omitted group in this picture is only upper-caste individuals. Whereas SC-ST indicators
are used as controls. Plot of coefficients from Difference-in-Differences regression on ‘levels of education’. Standard errors
clustered at state-level. People above the age of 24 should be unaffected by implementation of policy. Vertical lines indicate
year of implementation of policy.
Figure 2.8.7: Five years later - OBC Coefficients of Diff-in-Diff Regression across age cohorts (2005)
Source: 2004-5 NSS data. Standard errors clustered at state-level. Vertical lines indicate year of imple-
mentation.
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Figure 2.8.8: OBC Coefficients of Diff-in-Diff Regression across age cohorts (Years of Education)
Dependent variable is years of education. Standard errors clustered at state-level. Vertical lines indicate year of implementa-
tion.
Figure 2.8.9: Quantile Treatment Effects
Quantile Treatment Effects using the Difference-in-Differences method, across caste and age cohort.
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Figure 2.8.10: Pre-Collegiate Sub-sample
Standard errors clustered at state-level. Vertical line indicates year of implementation. Sub-sample of those without a college
education.
Figure 2.8.11: Operation Blackboard and District Primary Education Program (DPEP)
(a) Controlling for Operation
Blackboard
(b) No controls (c) Controlling for DPEP
Years of Education. Standard errors clustered at state-level. Persons above 24 unaffected by Reservations, persons above 30
unaffected by National Policy of Education. ‘Others’ defined as non-(OBC, SC or ST). Controls include a quadratic in the
‘intensity of the policy,’ an indicator for being above median intensity, and an indicator for whether the state received any
funds under the policy. Intensity of Operation Blackboard is taken from Chin (2005). Intensity of DPEP is defined as the
proportion of districts within a state that received funds under DPEP.
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Figure 2.8.12: Comparing Impacts on OBCs with Muslims and the Poorest 20% of Others
(a) Muslims (b) OBCs (c) Others - poorest 20%
Axes scaled for consistency across graphs. Dependent Variable: Level of Education. Standard errors clustered at state-level.
Persons above 24 unaffected by Reservations; Persons above 30 unaffected by National Policy of Education. ‘Others’ defined
as non-(OBC, SC or ST). In the regression with the Muslims, the omitted category is Hindus. In the regression with the
poorest 20% of upper-caste members, the omitted category is the richest 80% of the upper-caste population.
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Figure 2.8.13: Impacts on OBC: Control Group – only Muslims or Poorest Upper Caste
Standard errors clustered at state-level. Vertical line indicates year of implementation. Sub-sample of OBCs, Muslims, and
bottom two income deciles of non-OBC/SC/ST population.
Figure 2.8.14: State-wise Auxiliary Regression With Outliers
Auxiliary Regression of state-by-state relationship between the ATET and intensity of OBC reservations in each state.
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Figure 2.8.15: State-Wise Changes in Reservation Policy for OBCs
Vertical lines indicate year of implementation of significant changes in state-wise policies. Primary source data on reservation
policy changes collected via Right to Information (RTI) Act petitions.
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Figure 2.8.16: Looking for other Discontinuities at index values: 20, 25, 35 and 40
Placebo test: looking for discontinuities at other values of the index. True cutoff value is 30.
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CHAPTER 3
Road Oft Taken: The Route to Spatial
Development
Most estimates of the economics impacts of transit networks compare regions along such routes to neigh-
boring regions away from the route. In the presence of spatial spillovers in economic activity, such a
method will underestimate the true effect of roads and railways. I model and estimate the overall impacts
of transit networks in India by first measuring the extent of such spillovers. I use an empirical strategy
relying on the historical placement of major cities: by connecting nodal cities with straight-lines I instru-
ment for the endogenous placement of these networks. Using night-time luminosity data as a measure for
economic activity, I estimate the parameters of the model, which does a good job of fitting the data. I find
that being close to such transit networks led to greater economic activity in the 1990s, and such activity
spread to neighboring regions, substantially increasing the overall impacts of such routes. Ignoring the
spillovers produces income elasticities that are only 27% of the true overall effects of such routes, and
such geographic externalities led to a rapid rate of convergence in incomes across regions. Transit net-
works and spatial spillovers together, therefore, strongly determine the geographic spread and temporal
changes in the economic development of the region.
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One reason why some regions within a country are rich while others are poor is differences in access
to infrastructure. This is especially true in developing countries, where large regional disparities in in-
come levels can arise as a result of these infrastructure differences. This paper examines how access to
transit networks can affect the level of income and growth across regions in India. Importantly, unlike
cross-country convergence in incomes, intra-regional growth is often promoted by spillovers across re-
gions. I study the impact of road and rail routes connecting the four major Indian cities, the pattern of
regional development produced due to access to these networks, and the corresponding spatial spillovers
in economic activity.
Past work on transit networks that compares regions along the route to neighboring regions overlooks the
fact that these neighboring regions are also affected by these routes because of spillovers across regions.
If the spillovers are positive, then such an empirical strategy would understate the true impacts of these
routes. If the spillovers are large, then it may seem like there are no impacts of road and rail routes, when
in fact the overall effects are in fact, even larger. Therefore, to understand the full extent of the impacts
of a route, the amount of spillovers need to be quantified, and the entire pattern of spatial development
needs to be studied in a dynamic setting.
Within the Indian context, I focus on the two decades starting in 1992. This was a period of rapid growth,
economic liberalization, and a period of upgrading the existing highways that connected major cities.
Consistent with decreasing income-differentials for regions along the route, I find that while significant
spatial inequalities existed at the beginning of the period, there was a rapid convergence across regions
in the 1990s, as economic activity spreads from these routes to neighboring regions allowing them to
catch-up. I find that ignoring these externalities would lead to estimates of income elasticities that are
only 27% of the true overall impact of these routes. In 2012, a 1% decrease in distance from these routes
raises incomes by only 0.06% ignoring spillovers, but overall incomes rise by 0.23% once spillovers have
been incorporated. These spillovers also drive the rapid rate of convergence in incomes across regions –
I estimate a 4% rate of β-convergence which is twice as high as the rate estimated in the cross-country
literature.
Better infrastructure is generally thought to aid development by reducing the costs of trade and migration,
equalizing prices and facilitating the spread of ideas and technology. However, causal impacts of transit
networks are hard to find for two reasons. First, the true placement of these routes is endogenous. More
developed regions have funds to build better roads and upgrade their infrastructure. And routes may be
built to connect regions that were already developed, or expected to develop in the near future. It is easy to
see that richer regions have better roads, but this is not only because roads may lead to more development,
but also because these regions have the capability to build better roads, and many of the roads were built
in regions that were starting out on a path to prosperity. On the other hand, these routes may have been
built to help struggling regions recover, and are more likely to be built in regions with suitable terrain
and easier land acquisition policies. In order to obtain causal estimates, I use straight-line paths between
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nodal cities as instruments for the existence of transit networks. In the first half of the paper (Section
3.3 and 3.4), I discuss the empirical reduced form impacts of these routes on spatial development. I
combine this with a multi-period differences-in-differences specification to find that being connected to
transportation networks causes a region to be more developed than neighboring regions, but neighboring
regions catch up over time.
Secondly, there is the issue of finding an effective ‘control’ group. To reiterate, a neighboring region
will provide an underestimate of the true impacts due to the spillovers. So, in the latter half of the
paper (Section 3.5), I develop a model that captures these reduced form patterns, and then structurally
characterize income growth and regional convergence in the presence of economic externalities. The
model produces strong predictions for various parameters – namely, that the reduced form elasticity of
income with respect to distance is a specific function of the extent of spillovers in economic activity and
the direct impact of distance from these routes. I test these predictions and show that the model does
a good job of fitting the data. With the help of the model and the empirical estimates, I determine the
parameters of convergence and the extent of spatial spillovers across regions. I am able to use these
causally estimated parameters to quantify the overall impact of these transit networks. Ignoring these
spillovers would severely underestimate the true overall impacts of these routes.
Estimating such spillovers is essential for policy analysis, because positive externalities across regions
suggest that the benefits of infrastructure projects are larger than previously thought. I also find that while
the early construction of transit networks lead to regional development, there were diminishing returns
to continue investing in and upgrading these highways. It would then be a better policy to connect other
regions with road and rail routes, rather than upgrade already existing networks.
The road-map of this paper is as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the literature and the background motivat-
ing the identification strategy. One notable absence from the literature is a credible way to estimate and
quantify the extent of spillovers across regions that magnify the overall impacts of these routes. In Sec-
tion 3.2, I discuss the data I use, where I merge the night-time lights data with data on road and rail routes,
and other sub-district level indicators. Section 3.3 studies the reduced form effect of being along these
straight-line paths that connect major cities, and Section 3.4 describes what happens to this relationship
over time, including the effects of upgrading the highways. After which, I discuss a model in Section 3.5
that explains the patterns in the data described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The first part of the model focuses
on standard Neoclassical growth theory (Section 3.5.1) and the corresponding convergence in incomes
across regions (Section 3.5.2). In Section 3.5.3, I introduce the role played by spillovers, and estimate
the parameters of the model and rigorously test the predictions in Section 3.5.4. I use the estimated pa-
rameters of the model, including the extent of the spillovers, to determine the overall impact of theses
routes in Section 3.5.5, and discuss the importance of these results in the context of the long literature on
infrastructure projects in Section 3.6.
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3.1 Context and Literature
A number of papers follow the methodology first established by Chandra and Thompson (2000) and later
built upon by Michaels (2008) to estimate the impacts of US inter-state highways.1 These papers focus on
non-metropolitan areas that lie on highways, as these areas are more likely to be on routes only because
they happen to be lying in regions between the metros. This strategy, therefore, may help tackle many
endogeniety issues. In other contexts, like India, such a strategy may not be enough. There are many
possible routes between two metros, and the actual placement of the highway is therefore endogenous –
trying to connect growing rural areas, or areas that are particularly poor, or areas with suitable terrain,
land cover and easier land acquisition.
Two papers in the Chinese context help tackle these endogeniety issues. In a significant contribution,
Banerjee et al. (2012) use ‘straight-lines’ to connect historical cities in China, and use this to predict
the existence of transportation networks. They find that this can explain moderate differences in GDP
per-capita, but has no effect on income growth. A recent paper by Faber (2014) uses the construction of
the Chinese National Highway system and combines it with a spatial instrument based on the ‘least-cost’
path of connectivity, that depends on terrain, water bodies and land cover.2 Similarly, I connect historical
cities in India, which were selected as nodal cities for a large highway-upgrading project, and study the
impact on indicators that are closely related to economic activity, like the amount of night-time lights
emitted (luminosity) captured by satellites in this period.3 However, rather than just comparing regions
along these paths to neighboring regions (a ‘control’ group), I estimate the spillovers to the neighboring
regions so as to pin down the overall causal impact of the transit network and the dynamic nature of
convergence in incomes across regions.
Unlike other papers I, therefore, focus on spatial spillovers and how they cause poorer regions to catch
up. One crucial difference between the Chinese and Indian cases is the mobility of factors – while migra-
tion was highly regulated for many decades in the Chinese context,4 there is unrestricted labor mobility
in India, which would be especially useful in an analysis of spillovers across neighboring regions. In
so far as access to transportation will have large impacts via migration, the Indian context would allow
for studying these effects and be more relevant to contexts that do not have migration restrictions. While
labor mobility in India is low Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016), this may be due to the high costs of migra-
1See Redding and Turner (2015) for a discussion of models and identification methods in this literature.
2Two other recent papers in the Chinese context study the decentralization of Chinese cities Baum-Snow et al. (2014) and
market access Baum-Snow et al. (2015).
3I refrain from using the ‘least cost’ path since in the Indian context, since an instrument that relies on land cover, water
bodies and terrain may introduce other sources of endogeniety. A region that is flat may grow faster than a hilly region for
reasons unrelated to transit networks. A region that has less land cover may have been cleared for development purposes.
Furthermore, regions with less land cover and flatter terrain are also more likely to be near cities. In my context, therefore, a
simple ‘straight-line’ is arguably a cleaner instrument.
4From 1958 to 1978 it was restricted, and then some reforms were put into place to loosen but regulate mobility till the
late 1990s.
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tion for regions that are not well connected to transportation networks.5 The second big difference is the
data used – similar to the Chinese case, the Indian data on GDP at a sub-regional level is poor and prob-
lematic. Changes in data-collection methodology over time and across regions may well be correlated
with regional development and access. Banerjee et al. (2012) also highlight other issues with the Chinese
context – that a non-random sample of regions report GDP numbers, and which years those regions chose
to report is also endogenous. It may therefore be better to use data collected from an external source –
like the night-time lights data used by this paper. Lastly, unlike the Banerjee et al. (2012) paper, I conduct
a before-after analysis to look at the impact of a large upgradation under the National Highway Develop-
ment Project (NHDP) to test whether additional investments into already existing networks matter, and
find little to no benefits of these upgrades.
The highway system studied here connects the four nodal cities forming what is called the Golden Quadri-
lateral (GQ). Three of the four cities (Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai) were chosen to be capitals of the
British Presidencies because they were natural harbors and therefore could be used as ports for trade.
There was little economic activity in these three regions prior to the British, and were therefore not on
any pre-existing road network. The fourth (Delhi) was a major historical capital of various pre-Colonial
empires, and was a British cantonment during the Raj.6
I focus on the period between 1992 and 2012. While the decades leading up to this period was burdened
with sluggish growth, these two decades were a time of high and rapid development following the reforms
of 1991 that came under a proclamation of ‘Liberalization, Privatization, Globalization.’7 Starting in
1999, the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) project upgraded about 5,846km of already existing highways in
India. The NHDP invested about US $71 billion in order to widen the national highways, and strengthen
them for heavy traffic and truck transportation. While the proposal was approved in 1998, many projects
started only as late as 2001. Most of the delays had to do with issues of land acquisition, which makes
the placement of the final roads endogenous, prompting the use of the ‘straight-lines’ between the nodal
cities.8
Ghani et al. (2015) focus on the upgrades in the late 1990s and look at the behavior of manufacturing
firms. They find an increase in entry-rates for organized manufacturing firms within 10km of the high-
5Even though labor mobility is low, capital is relatively more mobile in India Ghani et al. (2015).
6Three cities were then chosen to be major British capitals for their natural harbors and strategic positioning of coastal forts
– all reasons unrelated to being near land-based routes. A member of the British East India Company arrived near modern
day Kolkata in 1690, and the British established Fort William in 1698, which gave rise to the modern Kolkata. A few decades
before that, in 1639, the British had set up Fort St. George which grew into modern day Chennai. While on the other side
of the peninsula, Francisco de Almeida, a Portuguese explorer, sailed into the deep natural harbor of the Mumbai islands in
1508, and the Portuguese acquired the islands in 1534. In 1661 the islands were given to the British as part of the dowry for
Catherine of Braganza’s wedding to Charles II. Delhi, on the other hand, only passed over to British hands in 1803.
7The reforms opened up major sectors of the economy to foreign trade and eventually some sectors to foreign investment,
privatized many industries and cut down what is well known as the ‘license-permit raj.’
8The junior Highways Minister told the Parliament that “Projects have been delayed mainly due to problems associated
with land acquisition, shifting of utilities, obtaining environment and forest clearance, approval for road over bridges, poor
performance of some contractors due to cash flow constraints and law and order problems in some states.” The bulk of the
projects were over by the end of 2006, but some alterations on additional phases of the project continue even as late as 2014.
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ways, and modest impacts on other indicators.9 They are careful to point out that their OLS results may
be affected by the fact that the route of the highway may have been chosen to connect regions that were
(a) expected to develop or attract businesses, or (b) were struggling and needed investments to turn them
around, or (c) had other systematic differences like lesser land acquisition issues, and therefore less agri-
cultural regions. My paper is, therefore, complementary to the Ghani et al. (2015) work. Firstly, while
their paper analyzes how manufacturing firms respond to upgrades, I estimate the effects of historical
connectivity on overall economic activity associated with night-time lights. Secondly, since the highway
project updated an already existing network of different forms of transportation, unlike the Ghani et al.
(2015) paper, my paper focuses on the long-run economic impacts of being connected to these historical
transportation networks, and the eventual dispersion and dissipation of these impacts. When I also look
at the upgrades, our results together suggest that organized manufacturing responded differently to any
new upgrades than other agents in the economy. Last, I study and quantify the extent of neighborhood
spillovers and show how they affect the rates of convergence in incomes across regions by formalizing
regional development in a growth-model framework.
Within the Indian context, there has also been work using other identification strategies, like using the his-
torical expansion of railroads (Donaldson, 2014) to look at price equalization and regional development,
or more recent rural road construction programs (Asher and Novosad, 2016) to look at village employ-
ment. Papers on highway infrastructure in the US context (Atack et al., 2008; Donaldson and Hornbeck,
2015; Michaels, 2008) look at market access, urbanization, population movements and the demand for
skill across different regions. Lastly, while the literature on neighborhood spillovers in economic activity
is scant, there is a growing literature on Solow-style convergence within countries (for an analysis of US
counties see Higgins et al. (2006)) which my paper addresses by estimating the rate of β-convergence
across regions driven by these regional externalities.
3.2 Data and Sample
The primary dependent variable of interest is night-time lights as measured by satellite imagery. This
has been used as an indicator for economic development, especially in developing countries that have
issues with disaggregated income data (Henderson et al., 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).
Researchers at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrations (NOAA) National Geophysical
Data Center (NGDC) process data from weather satellites that circle the Earth 14 times a day and take
pictures between 2030 and 2200 hours at night. They use algorithms to filter out other sources of natural
light using information about the lunar cycles, sunset times and the northern lights, and other occurrences
like forest fires and cloud cover. Given a lack of reliable sub-regional level GDP data in the India, this
9For other contemporaneous work related to the upgrades on market access within the context of a Ricardian trade model,
see Adler (2016); Asturias et al. (2015).
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measure is ideal to capture overall economic activity.
Figure 3.7.1a zooms in on the region connecting Delhi-Mumbai and Delhi-Kolkata where a stream of
lights is associated with the National Highway that connects the nodal cities, whereas Appendix Figure
3.8.1 shows the entire geographic distribution of night-time lights along with the straight-lines between
the four nodal cities. The Golden Quadrilateral Highways and the sub-districts used in the analysis are
shown in Figure 3.7.2. Distance to the nearest straight line is calculated using standard ArcGIS software,
and in some regressions I also use data on actual highways and roads that are obtained from the Digital
Chart of the World (DCW) database. DCW provides detailed information on road and rail routes based
on the content in the US Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).
The lights data is calculated at approximately every one square kilometer, but I aggregate the results to
the sub-district level in order to account for issues of spatial correlation.10 I regress this lights data on
distance to the nearest straight line connecting the nodal cities.11 Epanechnikov kernel density plots of
light density over time are presented in Figure 3.7.1b. As we can see, as the country grows between 1992
and 2002 there is an increase in mean light density and reduction in the variance, but this is not true of
the following decade.
In all calculations, I drop the nodal cities and 26 adjacent sub-districts so as to not capture the impact
of being a neighbor to a big city – doing so only slightly attenuates the results. It is also important to
include year fixed effects to capture the change in average light density due to changes in satellites across
years.12 In all specifications, I also flexibly control for other geographic features like distance to closest
nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude.
3.2.1 The Elasticity between Light Density and Domestic Product
In order to get at spatial development at a finer level, this paper studies the impacts at the administrative
level of the 2253 sub-districts. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not calculated at this level, but there
are GDP numbers available for about half the 594 districts in the country, and for all the 32 states. The
elasticity between State Domestic Product (SDP) and light-density will be an underestimate of the true
10Sub-districts are third largest administrative unit of aggregation with a population of about 460,000 people on average.
Results will be presented with standard errors clustered at even higher levels of aggregation. There are about 2253 sub districts
in 594 districts which are in 35 states and union territories. Results are statistically significant even at standard errors clustered
at the level of 35 states.
11Following the conventions established in the literature (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013), the lights data is trans-
formed to be of the form: Log(0.01 + Luminosity) to account for the fact that some areas have no luminosity. About 1.6%
of the total sample, and less than 1% of the last 3 years of the sample have sub-districts that had no luminosity. Further-
more, the results are robust and significant in using Poisson regression specifications of luminosity. I also present results of
Log(Luminosity) for the regions that never have 0 recorded lights - which can be interpreted as an impact on purely the
intensive margin.
12These include Delhi and surrounding areas like Ghaziabad and Gurgaon, Mumbai and greater-Mumbai, Kolkata and
Haora, and Chennai and its neighbors.
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elasticity between sub-district domestic product and light-density because of the measurement error in-
troduced in aggregating the 2253 sub-districts into 32 states. The relationship between District Domestic
Product (DDP) and light-density, while suffering from some measurement error as well, will however
bring us closer to the true parameter. Appendix Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show the state-level and district-
level elasticities between GDP and luminosity. While the state-level elasticities are a little below 0.2, the
district-level elasticities are a little above 0.3 in general, and there is no trend over time in the elasticities.
Due to measurement error in aggregating lights and domestic product to a higher administrative unit,
the true sub-district level elasticities should be higher. The cross-country literature (Henderson et al.,
2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) has elasticities of about 0.3 for sub-samples of low and
middle income countries, suggesting that 0.3 would be a reasonable lower bound for the sub-district level
elasticities.
3.3 Historical Connectivity to Transit Networks
In this section, I study the effect of being close to transit networks that have historically existed for
many decades, and In the following section, I see how this long-run relationship is changing over time.
These two sections characterize the reduced form impacts of roads. In Section 3.5, I parameterize these
relationships in order to estimate the overall impacts of these routes in the presence of regional external-
ities.
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
While the actual path of these routes is endogenous to regional characteristics, being on a straight-line
between two major cities should not be correlated with anything other than being close to the routes con-
necting them. In order to examine the long-term general impact of connectivity to historically determined
transportation networks, one can look at the impact on lights for cities closer to the straight-lines using
the following regression specification, for sub-district i:
LogLightsi = αi + γX + βDistancei + i (3.1)
Equation (3.1) is the reduced form specification where Distancei is the distance between the sub-district
and the nearest straight line, and X are geographic controls (distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, lati-
tude and longitude).13 Similarly the OLS formulation of this same equation would replace the Distancei
variable with distance to the nearest highway, or distance to the nearest rail-line. The OLS estimates,
13Some results are presented as distance in kms to be comparable to the Ghani et al. (2015) paper, and other results are
presented as Log(distance) to calculate the elasticity as in the Banerjee et al. (2012) paper.
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however, will be biased because the highways and rail-lines will be laid according to where cities and
economic centers are located, or lagging regions where the government wishes to induce economic activ-
ity. It is interesting, however, to study the direction of the OLS bias. If road and rail-lines are laid to be
closer to economic centers, then the OLS estimates will show large impacts of being close to a highway
or rail-line. If, however, land acquisition for construction of rail-lines and roads forces the government to
move away from economic centers, then the impact of distance to these lines would be attenuated.
Finally, one can derive the upper-bound of the effect of roads and rail lines by performing a two-staged
least squares exercise of the following form:
DistanceToRoadi = piDistancei + µi
LogLightsi = αi + δi + γX + β ̂DistanceToRoadi + i
(3.2)
For this to be a valid instrument, it must be that regions along these straight-lines do not systematically
have a different light-density for any reason unrelated to road or rail routes. Since the impact of the
distance to the straight-lines will work through both rail lines and roads, the coefficient β is not an
instrument for each separately, but rather an instrument for transit networks in general. It is, however,
possible to see the strength of the instrument for roads and railways separately. I find that the straight-lines
are strong predictors of highway placement, but not for rail lines, suggesting that the effects I capture are
more likely to be driven by these highways. Later, the paper will seek to isolate the impact of upgrading
the highway system by comparing districts close to and far away from the straight-lines, before and after
the highways were upgraded.
Table 3.1 shows the relationship between distance to the straight-lines and distance to transit networks.
While the distance to the straight-line is a good predictor of distance to the nearest GQ highway, it only
does moderately well in predicting distance to closest rail line. This is hardly surprising, since while the
GQ highways were built in order to connect the nodal cities, the rail lines were built to connect other
cities as well.14 Throughout the paper, the results will be clustered at higher-level administrative units
like districts or states in order to account for possibilities in spatial correlation and for other sources of
correlations in outcomes within administrative units.
3.3.2 Results: Distance to GQ Highway and Railways
The OLS, reduced form and IV-2SLS relationships between light-density and proximity to the nearest
GQ highway are shown in Table 3.2 for every decade – the years 1992, 2002 and 2012.
In 1992, the OLS relationship between light-density and distance had a coefficient of -0.391 (Table 3.2).
14Interestingly enough, the first set of railway lines laid in India (in the 1860s) were built by Lord Dalhousie to connect the
five major provincial capitals – four of which are the current nodal cities.
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Since the distance variables are in 100km, this means that a 100 km increase in distance from the highway
was associated with a fall in light-density of 0.391 log points. As discussed previously, a reasonable
lower-bound for the elasticity between sub-district domestic product and lights is 0.3; in the literature,
a 1 log point increase in light density is usually related to the a 0.3 log point increase in income for the
sample of low and middle income countries (Henderson et al., 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2013). Therefore, a 100 km increase in distance from the highway would be correlated with a 12% fall
in income. By the year 2012, this had halved to about a 6% difference in income.
The most commonly used metric for luminosity as a predictor of development is the light-density vari-
able (Henderson et al., 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). In Table 3.11, I present the OLS
relationship between distance and other measures of night-time lights, including the standard deviation
of lights within a sub-district. In order to look at the extensive margin, the last column in Table 3.11
is a linear probability model (LPM) of the probability of having the majority of recorded light-emission
pixels in a sub-district be greater than 0. This relationship is greater in 1992, again suggesting that over
the two decades the relationship between distance to the highway and development has weakened.
The OLS relationship, however, could be biased as the exact path of the highway will depend on the
government’s wish to connect some areas, and the ease with which land could be acquired for con-
struction. The second column of Table 3.2 shows the reduced-form relationship between lights and the
distance to the straight-lines that connect the nodal cities. Once again, the relationship is much larger
in magnitudes in 1992 than in 2012, and of similar size as the OLS relationship. Similarly, Table 3.12
shows the analogous reduced form relationship for other measures of night-time lights and distance to
the straight-line.
The two-staged least squares (2SLS) estimates are presented in the final column of Table 3.2 (and Table
3.13 shows the corresponding relationship for other measures of lights). In Table 3.1 we can see that
the excluded distance-to-line variable has an extremely high F-stat no matter what the level of clustering,
displaying a strong first-stage relationship. The 2SLS estimates are slightly more negative than the OLS
estimates in some cases – for example, in 1992, the 2SLS results say that a 100km increase in distance
from the highway leads to a 0.5 log point fall in light density. Assuming the same elasticity between lights
and income, this is a 0.15 log point or about a 16% fall in income. The 2012 light-density coefficient,
however, is identical to the OLS result.15
In Table 3.3, I estimate the elasticity between distance and economic activity over time. By using a
log-log specification in each year, I calculate how this elasticity between lights and distance to the near-
est straight line is changing between 1992 and 2012. Given that a lower bound for the elasticity between
15Tables 3.16 and 3.17 show the analogous OLS and 2SLS results for distance to the nearest railway line. Keeping in mind
that distance to the straight line is only a moderately good predictor of distance to the rail line, the bulk of the reduced-form
impact is coming via roads. For the railway lines, we can see that the 2SLS results are much larger than the OLS results. The
reduced form is in Table 3.12, and the 2SLS results are magnified by the fact that the excluded distance-to-line variable is not
a very good predictor of the distance to nearest railway line.
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lights and GDP per capita is constant at 0.3, the results indicate that the elasticity between GDP per capita
and distance is falling over this period from about 0.15 to 0.06. The range subsumes the Banerjee et al.
(2012) elasticity of 0.07, but for much of the period is higher. The results therefore indicate that in 1992
this elasticity was high, and that historical connectivity played a large role in regional and spatial devel-
opment. However, this elasticity more than halves to fall to an economically insignificant relationship by
the end of the period. If we merely estimated the impact in 2012 we would say that transit networks do
not significantly affect incomes.
This dissipation of the impacts hasn’t been investigated much in the literature, and is studied below in
Section 3.4 in more detail, where large spatial spillovers can lead to a dissipation in the differential
increases in income for the regions along these routes.
3.4 Dynamics and Changes Over Time
In this section, I examine the dynamics of this dissipation in more detail. I focus on how the economic
impacts of these routes change over time, and the effect of the major highway upgrading program which
took place between 1998 and 2006. First, I estimate the following regression for sub-district i in year
t:
LogLightsit = α + δi + τt + γX + βtDistancei ∗ τt + it (3.3)
The regression includes year fixed-effects τt, region fixed effects δi and the usual geographic controls
X, similar to a multi-period difference-in-differences specification. The coefficient of interest βt is on
the interaction term between Distancei and τt. In the regressions, the omitted year is the first year of
the sample – 1992. One can plot this coefficient βt to look at how the impact of distance to the line is
changing over this period, relative to the year 1992.
Figures 3.7.4b shows how the effect of distance on light-density changes relative to 1992. Positive values
of βt indicate that the impact of distance on lights is falling relative to 1992. In the figures it is clear
that this differential impact is indeed falling over time, and especially after the upgrades to the highways
system begins in 1998. It is however, not possible to reject the possibility that the dissipation of the rela-
tionship between distance and development would not have happened if the highways were not upgraded.
The panel on the standard-deviation of lights shows that even though inequality within a sub-district was
higher for regions closer to these routes, this difference has been shrinking over time.
Appendix Figure 3.8.4 shows this relationship for different measures of night-time lights and finds similar
trends over time – the impact of being far away from these routes decreases over time. Robustness to
different specifications is shown in Appendix Figures 3.8.6. The figure has four panels allowing for
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two-different levels of clustering errors and doing robustness checks with dropping any sub-district that
ever had 0 recorded luminosity, and dropping any subdistrict that ever had any pixel with the maximum
possible luminosity value. Appendix Figures 3.8.5 reproduces the main results after excluding regions
that are a significant distance away from these routes.16
While Table 3.3 shows the ‘reduced form’ elasticities between light and distance to the straight-line, in
Figure 3.8.2 I show the OLS and 2SLS elasticities over time. While the elasticities are similar towards
the end of the period, there are stark differences in the beginning of the period. One explanation for this
convergence, that is worth exploring, is that in the early 1990s, the ‘distance to line’ could be picking up
other transit networks as well in the 2SLS regression, but by the 2000s the highways seem to become the
dominant channel. And this shift in importance of which transportation networks are used may be due to
the highway upgrades.
3.4.1 Upgrading the Highways
The literature on the golden quadrilateral, has so far concentrated on the upgrades that were started in
the late 1990s. The NHDP upgrading projects were first finalized in 1998, and the foundation stone was
laid by the Prime Minister on January 6, 1999. The first couple of years, however, were plagued with
delays in certain areas because of contractual issues and problems with land acquisition. About 20% of
the projects started between 1998 and 2000, whereas almost 50% of projects started in 2001.17 While
Phase I of this project officially ended in 2006, about 8% of the projects ended a few years later. Later
phases added some additional upgrades, and work continued on the GQ till the end of 2011. This timing
allows for a before-after analysis of this highway construction, since the lights data spans from 1992 to
2012. The period 1999 to 2006 in the sample will be considered to be the ‘construction’ phase, while the
years after that will be the post-project phase.
In order to see how the impact of distance changes with time, one can run the following regression:
LogLightsit = α+τt+βX+δ1iDistancei+δ2iDistancei∗Constructiont+δ3iDistancei∗Postt+it
(3.4)
where δ1i is the impact of distance on lights in the pre- construction period, δ1i + δ2i is the impact in the
construction period, and δ1i + δ3i is the effect in the post-construction period:
Table 3.6 shows the impact of distance over these three periods. In the pre-construction period, light
density would fall by 3.389 log points for every increase in 1000km from the straight line, but once
construction starts, this falls by 0.955 log points to about 2.434 log points, and in the post-construction
16The excluded regions include the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizo-
ram, Tripura, Nagaland, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshwadeep.
17Source: National Highways Authority of India http://www.nhai.org/completed.asp
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period it’s even lower at about 2 log points. All measures are statistically significant, and show that the
impact of distance on development falls around the turn of the century, after the highway construction
begins. If the upgrades made the highways more important, then we should expect the opposite result –
that they should matter more for economic activity. This does not necessarily indicate that the highway
construction caused the relationship to dissipate, as the relationship was already weakening over time. If
anything, upgrading the highways did not change the rate at which this relationship was weakening over
time.
To see at what distances the change in impact appears, I split up all positive distances into 8 equal quan-
tiles Ψi, and interact them with indicators for being in the ‘construction’ phase or the ‘post-project’ phase.
In the regression equation below τt are year fixed effects and X is a vector of geographic controls:
LogLightsit = α + τt + βX + ψ1iΨi + ψ2iΨi ∗ Constructiont + ψ3iΨi ∗ Postt + it (3.5)
The omitted category in this regression are the sub-districts that are on the straight-line (a little more
than 5% of all sub-districts). ψ1i traces out the impact of distance from these sub-districts in the pre-
construction period, whereas ψ1i + ψ2i is the impact during the construction phase. These coefficients
can be plotted for each distance quantile to look at the the semi-parametric impact of distance, and how
that changes in the three time periods.
The lines in Figure 3.7.4a show the impact on light-density by distance quantiles, relative to sub-districts
that touch the straight-lines. The blue lines are for the pre-construction period, the orange for the con-
struction period, and the green lines are for when the project is over. Looking at the pre-construction
period in panel (b) we can see that a district in the eighth distance quantile has about 2 log points less
light density than a district that is on the line. But once construction begins, these lines start flattening
out. Together these results seem to suggest that while an increase in distance from the straight line leads
to less development, this relationship weakens in the later period, and especially after the construction of
the highway.
Figure 3.8.5 reproduces this result for other measures of light-density. The panel on the standard-
deviation of lights in Figure 3.8.5 shows that there is a larger dispersion of lights within a region that
is closer to the route. This gives us some indication towards the pattern of development in these regions
– that in sub-districts near the route there are a few large towns with a lot of activity, and then areas with
very little activity. In regions away from the route however, there is an equal amount of low economic
activity. This pattern is consistent with developed regions reflecting agglomeration economies, where
activity is concentrated in certain areas but is sparse in other regions Krugman (1991).
Ghani et al. (2015), show that upgrading the highways induced new manufacturing firms to enter in re-
gions close to the highway. The difference in results are not due to the methodology, and must therefore
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be because of different outcome variables under analysis.18 Their paper looks at the organized manu-
facturing sector, for about half the districts in the country and shows that there was an increase in entry
for such firms in regions within 10kms of the highway.19 Together our papers, therefore show that while
there was an increase in the entry of organized manufacturing enterprises, overall economic activity was
still shifting away from the highways.20
This spread in economic activity may have been stemmed if upgrading the highways induced enterprises
to stay or enter in regions on the highway at a higher rate than other regions, like it happened for firms
in the organized manufacturing sector. There is, however, little evidence in this paper to show that
upgrading the highway system actually turned around the trends that were already visible in the data for
overall economic activity.
One way to finally determine whether the GQ upgrades caused these trends is to look at another route that
did not have heavy investments in the highway system: the diagonal of the quadrilateral between Mumbai
and Kolkata. Table 3.5 shows that the elasticity between economic activity and distance to a straight line
connecting these two cities has been dissipating over time, despite the fact that there was no projects
under the National Highway Authority of India to upgrade the routes between these two cities. If this is
an indication of the trends seen along routes connecting the other nodal cities, then the construction of the
highway may not have had much of an impact on the pre-existing trends under which economic activity
was already spreading geographically away from the well developed regions connected to the highway.
These mechanisms are explored further when studying the geographic spillovers within the confines of a
modified Neoclassical growth model that I set-up in Section 3.5.
3.4.2 The Nature of Development
While light-density may be a good proxy for overall economic activity, it tells us little about what the
nature of this economic activity is. Unfortunately, the only source of data that provides counts at the
sub-district level is the Census of India which has a limited number of outcome variables and is only
compiled once every 10 years. Table 3.8 shows results from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses. While regions
away further away from the route have less population overall, they are more likely to have a higher
concentration of Scheduled Tribe (ST) persons. Along with the Scheduled Castes (SCs) these are among
the most socio-economically disadvantaged groups in the country. Furthermore, regions further away
18While Ghani et al. (2015) use an OLS specification for their main results, they show that their main specification is robust
to using an instrumental variables approach. Unlike this paper, instead of using a continuous “distance” measure, they use
two discrete categories – compare districts between 0 and 10km near the road to districts further away with a 1/0 indicator
for whether you are within 10kms of the highway. When I use their methodology, I still find that the relationship between
night-lights and distance to the road dissipates over time.
19Their sample is only for states that had enough manufacturing activity, and in districts that were observed over their entire
panel.
20One possibility that Ghani et al. (2015) mention in relation to our papers is the change in the composition of economic
activity – for example, organized manufacturing firms may move closer to the highway, but other firms may not.
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also have a higher concentration of cultivators, but lower concentration of persons engaged in household
industry. While distant regions also have lower literacy rates, they seem to have a more equitable distribu-
tion of literacy across genders – the gender-gap defined as the difference in the male and female literacy
rates is lower. Unfortunately, without more detailed data at the sub-district level, it is hard to discern any
intricate patterns in the nature of economic activity, but it is clear that regions farther away from the route
have a higher concentration of marginalized populations, lower literacy, and have more cultivators but
less persons engaged in household enterprises.
The question of what kind of economic activity the night-lights are picking up over the long-run will
provide more information on the kind of development. If the regions further away from the routes were
previously uninhabited and the routes allowed people to locate there, then we should see a rise in pop-
ulation for those regions. If, however, it is merely the composition of the population and the kind of
economic activity undertaken by them, then for a given population, the increase in night-lights will rep-
resent more wealth per capita being generated.
To get at the question of whether there are population changes to less inhabited regions or whether the
changes over time are picking up increases in economic activity per capita, I use the LandScan data
on population estimates. The data compiled by the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, uses sub-national Census counts and primary geospatial ancillary datasets, including land
cover, roads, slope, urban areas, village locations, and high resolution imagery analysis of settlements, to
predict the populations at a finer geographic level than available elsewhere.
Table 3.4 presents the elasticity between population and distance to the nearest straight-line connecting
the nodal cities over time (starting with the data in 2002). While the elasticity is high (between 0.18
and 0.2) for this period, there is no change in the elasticity over time. This shows that the change in
the night-lights elasticity over time is driven by something other than the number of people migrating to
newer areas, and instead be due to changes in per-capita economic activity.
3.5 A Simple Model of Spatial Development
Better access to transportation networks can induce development in connected regions by facilitating
trade and migration, the spread of technology and ideas, and reducing price volatility. So far from the
results it is clear that till the early 1990s, being near the transit network that connects the four major cities
had significant impacts on regional development. However, the impact of being close to the straight
lines dissipates over time, even after the highway system is upgraded. Why, then, does the effect of the
transit network dissipate? One possibility is that these routes affect the initial level of development more
than the steady state level – in such a situation, a simple Neoclassical growth model would predict that
underdeveloped regions would grow faster and there would be convergence in incomes across regions.
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In such a model, the dissipation has nothing to do with spillovers. If we build in the possibility of
spillovers in economic activity across regions, this not only spurs the growth in underdeveloped regions
but also increases the overall impact of these routes. As I will show with my structural estimates, the
evidence strongly supports a model in which there are economic spillovers in activity across neighboring
regions.
3.5.1 Distance to the Network and Neoclassical Growth
First, let us consider the model that is not driven by spillovers. While transit networks may be important
for regional development, these impacts may dissipate over time on their own. After the four nodal cities
were established, the regions that had the least-cost connections to these cities started developing. This
helped build up a network structure whereby regions connected to these growing regions started growing.
Since regions connected to the routes started growing earlier, they are at any point of time closer to their
steady-state level of development than regions further away which will hence be growing faster. If we
then look at long-term development, the first set of regions would have more economic activity, but their
neighbors and their neighbors’ neighbors would be catching up over time. This would then produce the
dynamic trends seen in the data, and is consistent with the results found in Banerjee et al. (2012) where
they find that Chinese regions near the straight-lines had reached a higher level of GDP per capita but
were not necessarily growing faster than other regions.
There are a few ways to encapsulate transit networks into a Solow-style growth model. One possibil-
ity is that distance to networks affects the steady-state level of development, which would then predict
regions closer to the highways would grow to a higher level of income than regions further away. An-
other possibility is that the distance to transit networks only affects the initial level of income, and all
regions converge to a similar steady-state level of economic activity. This would then be consistent with
a result that shows that regions further away from the route have higher growth rates. To formalize this
framework, we can modify the empirical predictions of the Neoclassical growth model in the following
way:
Let ytd be income per effective worker in sub-district d and time t. A region on the route is a simple
Solow-style economy with income y¯t. A region that is distance D from the route can be characterized in
relation to the region on the network:
ytd = D
αt y¯t (3.6)
Here −1 < αt < 0 captures the elasticity of income with respect to distance from the route. This
framework is similar to gravity-models in trade theory, where the distance would be picking up trade-
costs and other frictions. Given that the evidence so far shows that this elasticity is higher in earlier years,
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αt can be simply represented by:
αt = λ+
ψ
(1 + t)
(3.7)
Here −1 < λ < 0 captures how distance to the transit network affects the steady-state level of income,
and λ + ψ the initial level of income. One test is to see whether these routes have a larger effect on the
initial level of income or the steady state level. If, and only if, the routes affect the initial levels of income
more than the steady state levels, then ψ < 0 as well, and we should see that regions further away from
the route grow faster. From the results in Table 3.3 it is clear that λ + ψ < −0.497 and λ > −0.212.
Together, this implies that ψ < −0.285.21
3.5.2 Convergence
In the results so far, we see that while regions along the route are richer, there is a catching-up of regions
further away. The Solow (1956) model’s predictions of a conditional (on parameters) convergence of
per-capita incomes may be used as a framework to study these patterns in the data. Barro and Sala-i
Martin (1992) are careful to distinguish between the different notions of convergence. If β−convergence
holds then poorer sub-districts would be growing faster than their richer counterparts. The Neoclassical
growth framework has certain predictions for the rate of convergence to steady state β. As discussed in
Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992, 2004); Mankiw et al. (1992), the solution to the income dynamics can be
characterized by:
log ytd = (1− e−βt)log y∗d + e−βtlog yd0 (3.8)
Given this setup, there are a few ways to then estimate the rate of convergence. One possible approach is
to use a cross-sectional regression based on the long difference between the first and last year in the data,
as explained by Mankiw et al. (1992):
log ytd − log yd0 = γ0 + (1− e−βt)log yd0 + γxX + udt (3.9)
β can be estimated from the coefficient on initial income. Another approach was used by Evans (1997);
Higgins et al. (2006) amongst others. Here, instead of using the cross-section, they use all the years and
back out the rate of the convergence:
growthd = δ0 + δylog yd0 + δxX + udt (3.10)
Here, growthd is the average growth rate across all the years for a region d. The rate of convergence over
T periods is then βˆ = 1− (1 + δˆyT ) 1T .
21These estimates are bounds, rather than precise estimates since we neither observe year 0 nor the steady-state, which lies
in the distant future. If we assume that 1992 is the ‘initial’ period, or that the steady state has been reached by 2012, then
λ = −0.212 and ψ = −0.285.
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In Table 3.7, I present the results using both methods. The Mankiw et al. (1992) cross-sectional method
shows a convergence rate of 4% a year, whereas the Evans (1997); Higgins et al. (2006) method displays
a rate of 3.9% a year. These are both double the 2% rate that we see in cross-country convergence rates
(Sala-i Martin, 1996). While capital mobility within the country can aid rapid convergence, mobility in
labor across regions in India are low (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). Rates of convergence could be
higher within countries due to the presence of spillovers in economic activity across regions.
Lastly, β−convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a decrease in the variance of
incomes across regions – also known as σ−convergence (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992). Figure 3.7.1b
shows that between 1992 and 2002 the variance in light density had shrunk a lot, but this did not continue
for the next decade.
3.5.3 Spillovers and the Direction of the Spread of Development
While a Solow-style model discussed in Section 3.5.1 is consistent with the dynamic trends, it says
nothing about spillovers in economic activity across regions. It does not necessarily predict that as one
region gets richer that will lead to its neighboring region getting wealthier as well over time. In this
section I explicitly show strong evidence of such spillovers, and estimate the parameters of a simple
model that will help quantify the extent of these spillovers and the overall benefits of these routes. In
such a model, distance to the highway not only directly affects the income levels (as in the Neoclassical
growth framework) but also sets into motion certain dynamics that affect the spatial development of
neighboring regions as well.
As a descriptive motivation, in Figure 3.7.3 we can follow the regions around the Mumbai-Chennai over
time. The pictures show the regions along the highway (depicted by a blue line) and along the straight-line
path (red line) every 5 years, in a Green to Red spectrum (where deeper green reflects lesser economic
activity, and red indicates more activity). It is clear that the regions to develop first are the ones along
the route, after which economic activity seems to fan out to neighboring areas, and then the neighbors’
neighbors and eventually reaching areas farther away.
If economic activity spreads from regions close to highways to regions away from the highway, then a
given region (d) should be affected more by economic activity in neighboring regions that are closer to
the highway (d−1) than neighboring regions that are further away from the highway (d+1). Let Log ytd
be income in region d at time t, Log yt,d−1 be the mean of the lights for all it’s neighboring regions that
are closer to the highway, and Log yt,d+1 be the mean of lights for neighboring regions farther away from
the highway. In the regression below, we should then expect δ > γ > 0 if economic activity is spreading
from regions closer to the highway to regions away:
Log ytd = αd + δLog yt,d−1 + γLog yt,d+1 + td (3.11)
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While this regression formulation shows a contemporaneous impact, the effect could also have a period
lag, when activity in a region today can affect economic activity in a neighboring region tomorrow.
Furthermore, the true relationship could be one of changes, where changes in a region’s economic activity
affect changes in it’s neighbor’s activity. It is important to stress however, that the true test of the model
is one where δ > γ, and not merely if δ > 0 since δ > 0 can also be consistent with a model of spatial
correlation in income shocks. The regressions for contemporaneous spillover effects, as well as the one-
period lagged effect and the changes over time specification are shown in Table 3.9, where it can be seen
that δ is always statistically and economically significantly greater than γ.
Studying the pattern of lights in regions along the route, and their neighbors would help answer the
question of how spillovers are leading to convergence. In order to study this, let us define a ‘degree-
of-separation’ (s) as how many regions lie between your region and the route. For example, s = 1
means the region neighbors a sub-district that lies on the route, and s = 3 means that the region is a
neighbor of a neighbor of a neighbor of a region that lies on the route. Plotting the coefficients (βst) of
the regression below for each s and over time t allows us to study whether convergence takes place across
neighboring regions. In the specification below, 1s=S is an indicator function that depends on the ‘degree
of separation’ of the given region, and Y eart is an indicator variable for the year:
Log(lightdensity)dst = α + βst1s=S ∗ Y eart + dt (3.12)
In Figure 3.7.5 each point is the differential impact of light density on that region compared to other
regions in a given year. It can be seen that regions on the straight-line connecting two major cities have
the highest light-density compared to other regions, and the regions that are one-degree of separation
away are only slightly worse off. Figure 3.7.5, therefore, indicates a few things. First, the ordering
in term of ‘degrees of separation’ is maintained, whereby regions closer to the route have higher light-
density, and even though there is convergence over time, we don’t see an ‘over-taking’ by the regions
further away. Second, while it seems like the 1990s were a period where convergence was rapid, this
has slowed down in the later half of the 2000s. At the end of the period, regions still maintain their
initial ordering in concentration of light-density, an ordering which directly depends on their ‘degree-
of-separation’ from the route. Third, it is clear that distance to the route strongly affects initial income
levels, as seen by the dispersion in incomes in the first year of the data. Last, distance to the route also
affects the steady state level of incomes, as the same ordering remains in the last year of the data despite
a slow down in the rate of convergence in the last few years.
3.5.4 Testing the Model and Estimating Spillover Parameters
A strong test for the magnitudes of these spillovers is to see how a structural model of the spillovers
correctly predicts the reduced form impacts of the routes in each year. To formalize this, let ytk represent
161
income in region d and yt,d−1 be the mean income for all it’s neighbors that are closer to the route than
region d. For a given distance from the route Dd, let the true relationship between income and distance
be a modification of equation (3.6):
ytd = (D
µt y¯t) y
χ
t,d−1 (3.13)
In this relationship, 0 < χ < 1 represents the neighborhood spillover effect of economic activity from
bordering regions closer to the highways than the given region, and −1 < µt < 0 represents the direct
effect of being further away from these routes. This equation can be solved forward recursively to:
Log ytd = (
d∑
j=0
χj)µtLog Dd + Log y¯t (3.14)
= αtLog Dd + Log y¯t (3.15)
We therefore recover equation (3.6), showing that the model with spillovers is a general form of the
model without. Equations (3.14) and (3.15) can be used to estimate parameters χ,µt and αt, and we can
test the following model prediction:
αt = (
d∑
j=0
χjt)µ (3.16)
Table 3.10 shows results for both Equations (3.14) and (3.15).22 The distance-spillover parameter (
∑d
j=0 χ
j
d)µ
according to equation (3.13) is also presented, and is almost identical to αt as seen in equation (3.14).
This is a strong test of the model that substantial neighborhood spillovers across regions exist in this con-
text. The spillover parameter χ is relatively stable over time and lies within the range of 0.77 and 0.868,
whereas the direct-distance effect µt is initially -0.104 and falls to about -0.064. The distance-spillover
parameter αt = (
∑d
j=0 χ
j
t)µ is initially 0.5 and halves to about 0.25 by 2012. All these parameter esti-
mates are statistically indistinguishable from 0 in all years.
Figure 3.7.6 shows how well the model fits the data by plotting both the reduced form elasticity of
light-density with respect to distance, and the corresponding structural parameter based prediction of this
elasticity from a model that incorporates these spillovers. The model fit is good throughout this period,
lending strong credibility to the structural assumptions here.
Finally, how this relationship changes over time tells us about how these spillovers can actually lead to
convergence across regions. In the cross-country version of the Solow model, the convergence across
regions could be generated without any spillovers, and often leads to rates of β−convergence of about
2% (Sala-i Martin, 1996). Within a country, however, spillovers across regions can speed up convergence,
and generate rates like 6% for US counties (Higgins et al., 2006), or 4% as in the case of this paper.
22For this test, we need to use the fact that on average regions have about five to six degrees of separation between the route
and themselves (i.e. d is approximately six).
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3.5.5 Income Elasticities with Spillovers
These results together then allow us to back out the income elasticities with respect to distance from
these routes, after accounting for the presence of these spillovers. To reiterate, ignoring the presence
of spillovers underestimates the true effect of these routes. As economic activity spills over to regions
further away, the difference in incomes for a region on a route to the region further away falls. Measuring
the difference between the two regions may then produce a small number. The issue here is that by
ignoring the spillover we are subtracting it from the overall effect of the route, when in fact we should be
adding these spillovers to the total impact.
At the bottom of Table 3.10, I present the income elasticity ignoring the spillovers and the elasticities
taking them into account. In 2012, if we ignore the spillovers in our calculations, we would have esti-
mated an elasticity of 0.06 – a small number, suggesting that investments in transit networks may have
low returns. Taking the spillovers into account raises the income effects of routes by more than three
times to 0.21. This suggests, if we ignored spillovers we would say that a 10% decrease in distance from
the route, raises incomes by only 0.6%, but incorporating spillovers, we can see that overall incomes rise
by 2.1% – a substantial amount by many measures.
In Appendix 3.9, I explore the mobility of capital and labor to see whether standard models and evidence
can pin down how they contribute to this spread of economic activity over time.
3.6 Conclusion
The impact of transportation infrastructure on regional development has been a long debated discussion.
In general, better transit networks have been thought to facilitate trade, migration, the spread of ideas and
technology, credit and other financial opportunities, and decrease price differentials and volatility. Study-
ing infrastructure projects in different contexts have however provided contradictory evidence. Fogel’s
(1964) study of US historical development argues that there were limited impacts of railways on growth
relative to the transportation networks that used waterways, whereas Hirschman’s (1969) treatise posits
that social overhead capital, like railways, have significant linkages that promote growth in industries.
For Hirschman, infrastructure projects would have forward linkages (promote industries that need roads
and railways), backward linkages (promote industries that supply materials for road and rail construction)
and lateral linkages (connect industries together). The Fogelian view, on the other hand, supports the idea
that much of US historical investment in railways was misguided and therefore did not have impacts on
development because of governmental policies that subsidized railway construction. The natural exper-
iment under analysis in the Indian context, however, is that some regions happened to be on the path
of shortest distance connecting major centers of economic activity, and we are hence less likely to find
‘misguided’ investments in this context.
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The results in this paper indicate that while distance to the straight line may have significant impacts on
regional development till the early 1990s, the strength of this relationship dies out slowly over the next
two decades. If one was to analyze the relationship at the end of this period, they would come to the
conclusion that there is little economically significant impacts of being near a transportation network,
which would support the Fogelian view. However, the relationship in the early 1990s shows how this
is not the case. The question then arises, as to what happened in the two decades that weakened this
relationship.
The period of study was one of rapid economic growth and development after reforms that liberalized the
market structure, cut down on the license-permit bureaucracy and integrated various industries with world
markets. It was also a period of upgrading the existing transportation network by strengthening the high-
way system. While the first set of regions were to benefit from being directly connected to the cities by
being on the least-cost path of connectivity, over time other regions would establish indirect connections
via these already connected regions. This would then lead to a protruding network structure that would
link regions and spread development by lowering the costs of trade and exchange. This explanations
can be ensconced in a growth-model framework by formalizing and estimating the extent of the spatial
spillovers. The results in the paper indicate that a substantial amount of the high-rates of β−convergence
can be explained by spatial spillovers in economic activity across neighboring regions.
As I show, ignoring these spillovers would have produced estimates of the impacts of these routes that
are only 27% the size of the true overall effect – a gross underestimate. Furthermore, the implications for
policy in the light of such spillovers can be crucial. While the initial transit networks did a lot to encourage
economic activity in connected regions, future investments in upgrading these highways did little to help
these regions indicating that investments in these highways had reached a portion of diminishing returns.
However, the initial investments in the highways not only helped develop connected regions, but also led
to spillovers in activity to neighboring regions. Together, these results indicate that policy-makers should
try to connect more regions rather than upgrade routes on already connected regions.
Last, the existence of large spillovers can explain why past research on roads have found little impacts. An
empirical strategy that compares regions along a route to neighboring regions will provide underestimates
of the true impacts because economic activity may have spread to these neighboring regions by then. The
existence of the spillovers indicate that the overall impacts of routes can be larger than previously thought,
since roads can affect development not only on regions along the route, but regions farther away as well.
In order to capture this spread of activity, therefore, it is important to study the impacts over time and pin
down the entire pattern of spatial development, as I do in this paper.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
(a) Night-time lights, highways and straight-lines between Mumbai-Delhi and Delhi-
Kolkata (The blue-line traces the actual route of the highway, and the red-line indicates
the straight-line path between the major cities.
(b) Distribution of Log Light Density Over Time
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Figure 3.7.2: Golden Quadrilateral Highways and boundaries of the sub-districts used in the analysis
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Figure 3.7.3: Spread of Lights From the Mumbai-Chennai Highway
(a) 1992 (b) 1997
(c) 2003 (d) 2008
(e) 2012 (f)
Displaying the spread of night-time light density every five years. The Blue Line indicates the actual path of the Highway, and
the Red Line indicates the straight line connecting 2 major cities. The legend of light-densities is on a green to red spectrum,
where green is relatively less light-density and red is a higher level of light-density
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(a) Light Density (per sq miles)
The graphs show the impact of distance on night-time lights relative to sub-districts that have any portion of the sub-district
touching the straight-lines. The blue lines are for the pre-construction period, the orange lines for the construction period
and the green lines for the post-construction period. The standard error bands are for the pre-construction (blue) lines and
clustered at the district level. The ‘Distance’ axis consists of 8 quantiles of equal size. The distance quantile cutoffs are
roughly as follows: 0 to 40kms, 40 to 90 kms, 90 to 135 kms, 135 to 200kms, 200 to 260kms, 260 to 340 kms, 340 to
440 kms, and above 440kms. Different measures of night-time lights are presented in Figure 3.8.5. Robustness checks are
presented in Figure 3.8.5
(b) Light-Density:1992 coefficient -0.00406
Coefficients of change in impact relative to 1992. Standard errors calculated at the district level. Vertical lines represent the
phases of construction - 1999 is when the highways started being built. There were delays till 2001 when most work started,
and 2006 is when most work was completed. To interpret the graph: the mean impact of a 1km increase in distance from the
highway was a 0.00406 fall in light-density, and this impact has been dissipating over time. By 2012 the impact of a 1km
increase in distance from the highway had become -0.00406+0.00205, or about -0.00201. Different measures of night-time
lights are presented in Figure 3.8.4. Robustness checks are presented in Figure 3.8.6.
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Figure 3.7.5: Relative light density for regions on the line, and their neighbors
Relative light density calculated as Log(light density) for that region relative to all other regions. “On Line” represents regions
on the straight-line path between two major cities. “Neighbor” represents sub-districts that are neighbors of “On Line” sub-
districts. “Neighbor’s Neighbor” represents neighbors of neighbors of “On Line” regions, and so on. “Neighbor 6 degrees”
represents regions that are removed from “On Line” regions by more six-degrees of separation.
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Figure 3.7.6: Spillovers & The Elasticity of Light Density with Respect to Distance
Elasticity of Light Density with respect to Distance to straight-line paths connecting historical major cities. The ‘Re-
duced Form’ line and corresponding confidence intervals plot the coefficient from the regression Log LightDensityit =
αtLog Distanceit + βX + it. The ‘Spillovers - Structural Estimate’ line plots the corresponding model-based elasticity as
discussed in Section 3.5.4. As can be seen, the model fit is good as the structural estimates closely correspond to the reduced
form estimates throughout this period.
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Table 3.1: Predicting Distance to Routes with Distance to Straight-Lines
Distance to GQ Highway Distance to Railroad
Coefficient First Stage Coefficient First Stage
SE F Stat SE F Stat
Distance to Line 0.81 0.055
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.00983) 6796 (0.0215) 6.570
District (0.0205) 1569 (0.0238) 5.348
State (0.0372) 474.7 (0.0334) 2.707
R-squared 0.791 0.738 0.071 0.0516
Observations 2253 2253 2253 2253
Controls Y Y Y Y
Level of observation - sub-district
Dependent variable ‘Distance to GQ Highway’ is the nearest geo-distance between
the the sub-district and the closest Golden Quadrilateral highway
Dependent variable ‘Distance to Railroad’ is the nearest geo-distance between the
sub-district and the closest railway line
Independent variable ‘Distance to Line’ is the nearest geo-distance between the sub-
district and closest straight-line connecting nodal cities
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Re-
sults are robust to excluding controls.
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Table 3.2: Relationship Between Night-Time Light Density and Distance to Transit
Networks
Log Light Density
Year: 1992 OLS Reduced Form IV 2SLS
Distance (100km) -0.391 -0.406 -0.501
SE Cluster:
Sub-district (0.0492) (0.0479) (0.0593)
District (0.0784) (0.0749) (0.0933)
State (0.177) (0.159) (0.194)
R-squared 0.144 0.152 0.141
Year: 2002 OLS Reduced Form IV 2SLS
Distance (100km) -0.224 -0.233 -0.287
SE Cluster:
Sub-district (0.0332) (0.0326) (0.0404)
District (0.0476) (0.0442) (0.0551)
State (0.102) (0.0884) (0.109)
R-squared 0.188 0.193 0.185
Year: 2012 OLS Reduced Form IV 2SLS
Distance (100km) -0.193 -0.188 -0.232
SE Cluster:
Sub-district (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0391)
District (0.0457) (0.0432) (0.0535)
State (0.0849) (0.0782) (0.0965)
R-squared 0.156 0.157 0.155
Controls Y Y Y
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253
Level of observation - sub-district
Independent variable ‘Distance’ in OLS specification is ‘Distance to GQ Highway’ – the near-
est geo-distance between the the sub-district and the closest Golden Quadrilateral highway
Independent variable ‘Distance’ in Reduced Form specification is ‘Distance to Line’ – the
nearest geo-distance between the sub-district and closest straight-line connecting nodal cities
First stage of IV 2SLS specification is shown in Table 3.1 – Distance to GQ Highway is instru-
mented with Distance to nearest straight-line connecting nodal cities
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are
robust to excluding controls.
Dependent variable is Log(0.01+lights/area)
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Table 3.3: Reduced Form and 2SLS: Elasticity of Lights, Distance and GDP
Reduced Form Log Light Density
Year 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Log(Distance) -0.497 -0.362 -0.3 -0.254 -0.217 -0.212
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.0591) (0.0462) (0.0379) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0364)
District (0.106) (0.0747) (0.0571) (0.0567) (0.0543) (0.0545)
State (0.226) (0.151) (0.116) (0.109) (0.0944) (0.0921)
R-Squared 0.135 0.160 0.170 0.196 0.154 0.147
GDP-distance elasticity 0.1491 0.1086 0.09 0.0762 0.0651 0.0636
Bootstrapped SE (0.0164) (0.0126) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0105)
IV - 2SLS Log Light Density
Year 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Log(Distance) -0.735 -0.534 -0.444 -0.375 -0.321 -0.313
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.0852) (0.0670) (0.0546) (0.0519) (0.0524) (0.0523)
District (0.155) (0.109) (0.0819) (0.0795) (0.0772) (0.0776)
State (0.338) (0.226) (0.175) (0.162) (0.141) (0.137)
R-Squared 0.124 0.148 0.164 0.202 0.159 0.155
GDP-distance elasticity 0.2205 0.1602 0.1332 0.1125 0.0963 0.0939
Bootstrapped SE (0.0237) (0.0207) (0.0174) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0140)
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
*Estimates of GDP-distance elasticity rely on elasticity of GDP-lights being 0.3 for low-
middle income countries. Therefore to find elasticity of GDP-distance, multiply the coeffi-
cient with 0.3.
Level of observation - sub-district.
Independent variable ‘Log (0.01+Distance to Line)’ is the nearest geo-distance between the
sub-district and the closest straight-line connecting Mumbai and Kolkata - two historical
cities that have not had direct transit networks connecting them.
Dependent variables is Log(0.01 + Light density). ‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by
the surface area of the district.
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results
are robust to excluding controls.
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Table 3.4: Elasticity between Population and Distance to Line
Log (Population)
Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Log(Distance) -0.226 -0.182 -0.178 -0.179 -0.176 -0.191
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.0221) (0.0293) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0305) (0.0305)
District (0.0404) (0.0560) (0.0543) (0.0545) (0.0562) (0.0559)
State (0.0838) (0.0991) (0.0968) (0.0969) (0.0977) (0.0970)
R-Squared 0.091 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.044 0.046
Observations 2,246 2,246 2,246 2,246 2,246 2,246
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population Data from LandScan, US Department of Energy
Independent variable ‘Log (0.01+Distance to Line)’ is the nearest geo-distance between the sub-district and the
closest straight-line connecting Mumbai and Kolkata - two historical cities that have not had direct transit networks
connecting them.
Dependent variables is Log(Population Density)
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to excluding
controls.
Table 3.5: Elasticity For non-GQ Route: Mumbai to Kolkata
Log (Light Density)
Year 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Log(Distance) -0.248 -0.147 -0.0735 -0.0822 -0.0273 -0.0520
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.0463) (0.0351) (0.0307) (0.0300) (0.0293) (0.0294)
District (0.0805) (0.0520) (0.0436) (0.0425) (0.0405) (0.0404)
State (0.179) (0.118) (0.0964) (0.0845) (0.0780) (0.0743)
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP-distance elasticity 0.0744 0.0441 0.02205 0.02466 0.00819 0.0156
*Estimates of GDP-distance elasticity rely on elasticity of GDP-lights being 0.3 for low-middle income
countries. Therefore to find elasticity of GDP-distance, multiply the coefficient with 0.3.
Level of observation - sub-district.
Independent variable ‘Log (0.01+Distance to Line)’ is the nearest geo-distance between the sub-district
and the closest straight-line connecting Mumbai and Kolkata - two historical cities that have not had direct
transit networks connecting them.
Dependent variables is Log(0.01 + Light density). ‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area
of the district.
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to
excluding controls.
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Table 3.6: The impact of distance changing over time
Sum of Lights Mean Lights Light Density P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Line -3.257 -1.796 -3.389 -0.275
SE Level of Clusters:
Sub-district (0.357) (0.184) (0.386) (0.0497)
District (0.539) (0.302) (0.561) (0.0893)
State (1.088) (0.643) (1.187) (0.155)
Distance*Construction Period 0.867 0.35 0.955 -0.0117
SE Level of Clusters:
Sub-district (0.136) (0.0521) (0.162) (0.0259)
District (0.161) (0.0872) (0.202) (0.0445)
State (0.351) (0.232) (0.397) (0.117)
Distance*Post Period 1.232 0.526 1.388 0.0938
SE Level of Clusters:
Sub-district (0.173) (0.0733) (0.205) (0.0306)
District (0.206) (0.120) (0.247) (0.0512)
State (0.437) (0.267) (0.487) (0.127)
R-Squared 0.144 0.285 0.203 0.208
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 47,313 47,313 47,313 47,313
Level of observation - sub-district. Distances in 1000 kms.
Independent variable ‘Distance to Line’ is the nearest predicted geo-distance between the sub-district and the closest
straight-line connecting nodal cities
Dependent variables ‘Sum of Lights’, ‘Mean Lights’ and ’Lights per area’ are of the form Log(0.01 + Lights). ‘Sum of
Lights’ is the sum of pixels in a sub-district. ‘Mean Lights’ is the mean light intensity for pixels in a sub-district. ‘Lights
per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area of the district. Dependent variable P(Majority Lights>0) is a 1/0 indicator
variable for if the the majority of recorded lights was greater than 0 in that year
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude, and year fixed effects. Results are robust
to excluding controls.
Pre-construction period is 1992 to 1999, construction period is 1999 to 2006, and post-construction period is 2007 onwards.
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Table 3.7: Beta-convergence and the Solow model
Log Lights(t)
Lights(t−1) Log
Lights(t=T )
Lights(t=0)
Growth rate (Lights)
Log Lights (t-1) -0.108
(0.0143)
Log Lights (t=0) -0.551 -0.0275
(0.00998) (0.00155)
R-squared 0.071 0.583 0.007
Controls N Y Y
Estimated Rate of Convergence
β 0.04 0.0392
Bootstrapped SE (0.00421) (0.0128)
Standard errors calculated at the district level (587 districts)
Column 1 tests if unconditional convergence holds in this case using the specification discussed in Sala-i Martin
(1996) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004)
Column 2 estimates the rate of β-convergence using the methodology discussed in Mankiw et al. (1992)
Column 3 estimates the rate of β-convergence using the OLS methodology discussed in Evans (1997); Higgins
et al. (2006)
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Table 3.8: 2001 and 2011 Census: population, workers, and literacy
Log Population Rural Total Female Male SC ST
(2011 Census)
Log(Distance) -0.239 -0.218 -0.216 -0.220 -0.226 0.285
(0.0394) (0.0402) (0.0401) (0.0403) (0.0474) (0.0737)
Constant 16.85 17.86 17.16 17.17 13.91 7.284
(0.802) (0.798) (0.799) (0.797) (0.966) (1.153)
Observations 5,259 5,290 5,290 5,290 5,032 5,149
R-squared 0.211 0.205 0.203 0.207 0.064 0.025
Log Population Rural Total Female Male SC ST
(2001 Census)
Log(Distance) -0.213 -0.201 -0.200 -0.203 -0.351 0.300
(0.0390) (0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0619) (0.0763)
Constant 16.65 17.56 16.88 16.86 17.76 6.358
(0.800) (0.799) (0.802) (0.797) (1.433) (1.232)
Observations 5,269 5,293 5,293 5,293 5,112 5,050
R-squared 0.195 0.197 0.196 0.198 0.134 0.027
Census Year 2001 2011 2001 2001 2001 2001
Log(cultivators) Log(cultivators) Log(Ag Laborers) Log(workers in HH Literacy Rate Gender Gap
per capita per capita per capita ind. per capita) in literacy
Log(Distance) 0.0612 0.0868 -0.149 -0.0698 -0.111 -1.478
(0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0336) (0.0228) (0.700) (0.283)
Constant 3.326 2.323 1.207* -3.391 125.3 18.93
(0.455) (0.544) (0.632) (0.360) (8.507) (4.073)
Observations 5,264 5,286 5,278 5,284 4,809 4,809
R-squared 0.073 0.035 0.268 0.081 0.090 0.119
Level of observation - Census Teshils (also called Taluks, Mandals and Wards depending on the region)
Standard errors calculated at the district level (587 districts)
SC are known as Scheduled Castes, and STs are Scheduled Tribes - which the two most economically and socially disadvantaged
sections.
Gender Gap is defined as the male-literacy rate minus the female-literacy rate.
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Table 3.9: Neighbors closer to the road vs. farther away from the road
Contemporaneous effect Lagged effect Changes*
Log(light density) of 0.490
neighbors closer to road (0.0302)
Lagged 0.370
(0.0269)
Changes 0.332
(0.0427)
Log(light density) of 0.351
neighbors further from road (0.0356)
Lagged 0.237
(0.0333)
Changes 0.265
(0.0287)
Constant 1.648 4.138 0.0280
(0.304) (0.387) (0.00290)
Observations 45,045 42,900 42,900
R-squared 0.341 0.194 0.106
Fixed Effect Units 2,145 2,145 2,145
Fized effects regressions - Level of observation - Sub-district-year
Standard errors calculated at the district level (587 districts)
This table tests whether neighbors closer to the highway have larger impacts than regions away from
the highway.
* The ‘Changes’ version of the equation estimates ∆Log(lights)t,k = β∆Log(lights)t,k−1 +
γ∆Log(lights)t,k+1
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Table 3.10: Spillovers from Neighbors and the effect of distance
Panel A 1992 1997 2003 2007 2012
Log(Light density)
Log(light density) of neighbors 0.868 0.827 0.773 0.843 0.802
closer to road χ (0.0491) (0.0656) (0.0637) (0.0560) (0.0762)
Log(distance) µt -0.104 -0.101 -0.0853 -0.0652 -0.064
(0.0376) (0.0312) (0.0254) (0.0235) (0.0225)
Observations 2,219 2,219 2,219 2,219 2,219
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.493 0.470 0.462 0.502 0.440
Distance-spillover parameter αt -0.495 -0.429 -0.314 -0.290 -0.254
Bootstrapped SE (0.166) (0.156) (0.0999) (0.117) (0.112)
Panel B 1992 1997 2003 2007 2012
Log(Light density)
Log(distance) αt -0.497 -0.404 -0.294 -0.227 -0.212
(0.0591) (0.0488) (0.0388) (0.0382) (0.0364)
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.135 0.174 0.203 0.180 0.147
Panel C
Reduced Form 1992 1997 2003 2007 2012
GDP-Distance Elasticity ignoring spillovers -0.149 -0.121 -0.0789 -0.0681 -0.0635
Bootstrapped SE (0.0164) (0.0132) (0.0123) (0.0114) (0.0105)
Overall Income Effects -0.149 -0.177 -0.2191 -0.2299 -0.2345
Incorporating Spillovers
IV 2SLS 1992 1997 2003 2007 2012
GDP-Distance Elasticity ignoring spillovers -0.22 -0.179 -0.117 -0.101 -0.0938
Bootstrapped SE (0.0237) (0.0229) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0140)
Overall Income Effects -0.22 -0.261 -0.323 -0.339 -0.3462
Incorporating Spillovers
Level of observation - Sub-district
Standard errors calculated at the district level (587 districts)
This table tests the model where light density ytd depends on light-density of the neighbors closer to the highway
yt,d−1 and distance to the highway D, in the following way: Log ytd = χLog yt,d−1 + µtLog D. This relationship
is estimated in Panel A. Furthermore, we can recursively solve, to show that Log ytd = (
∑d
j=0 χ
j)µtLog D, which
is the parameter evaluated as the “Distance-spillover parameter” between the two panels for the average number of
degrees-of-separation (i.e. d = 6). Panel B then tests if this parameter is equal to the parameter obtained by regressing
Log ytd = αtLog D.
Panel C re-estimates the GDP-distance elasticities incorporating these spillovers and compares them to the elasticities
where the spillovers were ignored.
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3.8 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 3.11: OLS relationship between night-time lights and distance to GQ highway: Different Mea-
sures of Lights
Year: 2012 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to GQ Highway -2.016 -1.287 -1.929 -0.0536
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.302) (0.176) (0.316) (0.0614)
District (0.469) (0.289) (0.457) (0.107)
State (0.858) (0.577) (0.849) (0.190)
R-squared 0.084 0.220 0.156 0.201
Year: 1992 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to GQ Highway -3.680 -1.654 -3.913 -0.217
Standard Errors
Level of Clustering:
Sub-district (0.434) (0.398) (0.492) (0.0582)
District (0.701) (0.731) (0.784) (0.0958)
State (1.592) (1.213) (1.773) (0.178)
R-squared 0.108 0.163 0.144 0.051
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Level of observation - sub-district. Distances in 1000 kms.
Independent variable ‘Distance to GQ Highway’ is the nearest geo-distance between the sub-district and the closest
Golden Quadrilateral highway
Dependent variables ‘Sum of Lights’, ‘Mean Lights’ and ’Lights per area’ are of the form Log(0.01 + Lights). ‘Sum
of Lights’ is the sum of pixels in a sub-district. ‘Mean Lights’ is the mean light intensity for pixels in a sub-district.
‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area of the district. Dependent variable P(Majority Lights>0) is a
1/0 indicator variable for if the sub-district has any visible lights emitted in that year
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to excluding
controls.
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Table 3.12: Reduced-form relationship between Lights and straight-lines: Different Measures
of Lights
Year: 2012 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Line -1.919 -1.210 -1.876 -0.133
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.305) (0.171) (0.316) (0.0568)
District (0.464) (0.268) (0.432) (0.0942)
State (0.778) (0.517) (0.782) (0.136)
R-squared 0.085 0.220 0.157 0.202
Year: 1992 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Line -3.805 -1.861 -4.060 -0.224
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.420) (0.216) (0.479) (0.0548)
District (0.668) (0.377) (0.749) (0.0923)
State (1.402) (0.794) (1.588) (0.167)
R-squared 0.117 0.173 0.152 0.052
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Level of observation - sub-district. Distances in 1000 kms.
Independent variable ‘Distance to Line’ is the nearest geo-distance between the sub-district and the closest
straight-line connecting nodal cities
Dependent variables ‘Sum of Lights’, ‘Mean Lights’ and ’Lights per area’ are of the form Log(0.01 +
Lights). ‘Sum of Lights’ is the sum of pixels in a sub-district. ‘Mean Lights’ is the mean light intensity for
pixels in a sub-district. ‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area of the district. Dependent
variable P(Majority Lights>0) is a 1/0 indicator variable for if the sub-district has any visible lights emitted
in that year
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to
excluding controls.
181
Table 3.13: Two-staged least squares relationship between lights and distance to GQ highways: Dif-
ferent Measures of Lights
Year: 2012 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to GQ Highway -2.368 -1.494 -1.929 -0.164
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.377) (0.211) (0.391) (0.0699)
District (0.572) (0.331) (0.535) (0.117)
State (0.951) (0.638) (0.965) (0.167)
Pagan-Hall Het Test 72.25 129.2 68.56 183.6
p-value of Pagan-Hall 0 0 0 0
Year: 1992 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to GQ Highway -4.697 -2.297 -5.011 -0.277
SE clusters:
Sub-district (0.521) (0.266) (0.593) (0.0675)
District (0.830) (0.468) (0.933) (0.114)
State (1.702) (0.969) (1.940) (0.202)
Pagan-Hall Het Test 215.6 164.4 200.0 161.9
p-value of Pagan-Hall 0 0 0 0
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Level of Clustering: F-Stat Prob>F Hansen J Partial R-sq
Sub-district 6796 0 0 0.738
District 1569 0 0 0.738
State 474.7 0 0 0.738
Level of observation - sub-district. Distances in 1000 kms.
Independent variable ‘Distance to GQ Highway’ is the nearest predicted geo-distance between the sub-district and the
closest GQ highway, predicted by the distance to the closest straight-line connecting nodal cities
Dependent variables ‘Sum of Lights’, ‘Mean Lights’ and ’Lights per area’ are of the form Log(0.01 + Lights). ‘Sum
of Lights’ is the sum of pixels in a sub-district. ‘Mean Lights’ is the mean light intensity for pixels in a sub-district.
‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area of the district. Dependent variable P(Majority Lights>0) is a
1/0 indicator variable for if the sub-district has any visible lights emitted in that year
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to excluding
controls.
182
Table 3.14: Elasticity between Light-Density and State Domestic Product for 32 States
Per capita GDP at 2005 prices
Log(per cap GDP) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Log(light density) 0.19 0.198 0.19 0.191 0.183 0.198 0.192 0.186
(0.0508) (0.0503) (0.0510) (0.0545) (0.0557) (0.0617) (0.0600) (0.0589)
Constant 8.422 8.409 8.563 8.541 8.72 8.548 8.695 8.798
(0.526) (0.523) (0.529) (0.584) (0.594) (0.684) (0.655) (0.648)
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
R-squared 0.318 0.340 0.316 0.291 0.265 0.255 0.254 0.249
Per capita NDP at 2005 prices
Log(per cap NDP) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Log(light density) 0.191 0.199 0.191 0.192 0.186 0.202 0.196 0.191
(0.0514) (0.0508) (0.0517) (0.0549) (0.0560) (0.0626) (0.0613) (0.0606)
Constant 8.294 8.275 8.428 8.406 8.558 8.375 8.519 8.612
(0.533) (0.528) (0.536) (0.589) (0.597) (0.694) (0.670) (0.667)
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
R-squared 0.315 0.339 0.313 0.290 0.269 0.257 0.255 0.250
Regressions of Log(0.01+light density) on Log(per capita domestic product) at the state level.
State Domestic Product Sources: Reserve Bank of India
GDP indicates Gross Domestic Product of the State; and NDP is the Net Domestic Product
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Table 3.15: Elasticity between Light Density and Per Capita District Domestic Product
Per capita NDP at current prices
Log(per cap NDP) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Log(light density) 0.332 0.357 0.347 0.371 0.354 0.371 0.394 0.388
(0.0236) (0.0259) (0.0264) (0.0291) (0.0249) (0.0324) (0.0296) (0.0462)
Constant 6.213 5.988 6.16 5.82 6.103 5.762 5.661 5.75
(0.241) (0.268) (0.274) (0.312) (0.264) (0.361) (0.323) (0.518)
Observations 209 222 222 222 222 222 190 96
R-squared 0.488 0.463 0.439 0.426 0.479 0.373 0.485 0.428
Per capita NDP at 2004-5 prices
Log(per cap NDP) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Log(light density) 0.363 0.354 0.344 0.365 0.344 0.362 0.385 0.357
(0.0230) (0.0243) (0.0261) (0.0290) (0.0244) (0.0310) (0.0287) (0.0457)
Constant 5.915 6.071 6.302 6.113 6.516 6.238 6.223 6.591
(0.238) (0.252) (0.271) (0.312) (0.260) (0.347) (0.315) (0.511)
Observations 249 249 222 249 249 249 217 97
R-squared 0.502 0.463 0.440 0.391 0.446 0.356 0.456 0.391
Regressions of Log(0.01+light density) on Log(per capita domestic product) at the district level.
District Domestic Product Sources: Department of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of West
Bengal; Planning Commission; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Uttar Pradesh; Department of
Economics and Statistics Government of Tamil Nadu; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Rajasthan;
Department of Planning Government of Punjab; Planning and Coordination Government of Odisha; Directorate of
Economics and Statistics Government of Maharashtra; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Kerala;
Planning Programme Monitoring and Statistics Department Government of Karnataka; Directorate of Economics and
Statistics Government of Bihar; Directorate of Economics and Statistics Government of Assam; Andhra Pradesh State
Portal
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Table 3.16: OLS relationship between lights and rail-lines: Different Measures of Lights
Year: 2012 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Railways -9.321 -6.253 -8.82 -1.069
SE clusters:
Sub-district (5.341) (2.885) (4.656) (0.400)
District (5.536) (2.954) (4.816) (0.403)
State (7.584) (3.997) (6.552) (0.530)
R-squared 0.096 0.232 0.164 0.207
Year: 1992 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Railways -14.32 -7.884 -15.37 -0.862
SE clusters:
Sub-district (8.247) (3.813) (8.535) (0.404)
District (8.569) (3.882) (8.827) (0.416)
State (11.86) (5.328) (12.20) (0.542)
R-squared 0.108 0.175 0.145 0.051
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Level of observation - sub-district. Distances in 1000 kms.
Independent variable ‘Distance to Railroad’ is the nearest geo-distance between the sub-district and the closest
Railway line
Dependent variables ‘Sum of Lights’, ‘Mean Lights’ and ’Lights per area’ are of the form Log(0.01 + Lights).
‘Sum of Lights’ is the sum of pixels in a sub-district. ‘Mean Lights’ is the mean light intensity for pixels in a sub-
district. ‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area of the district. Dependent variable P(Majority
Lights>0) is a 1/0 indicator variable for if the sub-district has any visible lights emitted in that year
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to excluding
controls.
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Table 3.17: Two staged least squares relationship between lights and distance to railways: Different
Measures of Lights
Year: 2012 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Railways -34.86 -21.99 -34.09 -2.412
SE clusters:
Sub-district (14.51) (8.781) (14.32) (1.271)
District (15.63) (9.903) (15.91) (1.856)
State (22.23) (14.34) (22.31) (2.669)
Pagan-Hall Het Test 24.15 18.87 23.54 52.75
p-value of Pagan-Hall 0.000203 0.00203 0.000266 0
Year: 1992 Sum of Lights Mean Lights Lights per area P(Majority Lights>0)
Distance to Railways -69.14 -33.82 -73.77 -4.076
SE clusters:
Sub-district (28.20) (13.48) (30.25) (1.831)
District (30.19) (15.06) (33.09) (2.293)
State (42.09) (21.36) (45.97) (3.562)
Pagan-Hall Het Test 42.88 25.49 38.05 12.99
p-value of Pagan-Hall 0 0.000112 0 0.0235
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,253
Level of Clustering: F-Stat Prob > F Hansen J Partial R-sq
Sub-district 6.570 0.0104 0 0.0516
District 5.348 0.0211 0 0.0516
State 2.707 0.109 0 0.0516
Level of observation - sub-district. Distances in 1000 kms.
Independent variable ‘Distance to Railroad’ is the nearest predicted geo-distance between the sub-district and the
closest rail-line, predicted by the distance to the closest straight-line connecting nodal cities
Dependent variables ‘Sum of Lights’, ‘Mean Lights’ and ’Lights per area’ are of the form Log(0.01 + Lights).
‘Sum of Lights’ is the sum of pixels in a sub-district. ‘Mean Lights’ is the mean light intensity for pixels in a sub-
district. ‘Lights per area’ normalizes the sum by the surface area of the district. Dependent variable P(Majority
Lights>0) is a 1/0 indicator variable for if the the majority of recorded lights was greater than 0 in that year
Controls include distance to nearest nodal city, coastline, latitude and longitude. Results are robust to excluding
controls.
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Figure 3.8.1: Night-time lights and straight-lines between four nodes
Figure 3.8.2: Change in Elasticities Over Time
Elasticities calculated by running a log-log relationship between lights and distance. Vertical lines represent the phases of
construction - 1999 is when the highways started being built. There were delays till 2001 when most work started, and 2006
is when most work was completed.
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Figure 3.8.3: Impact of distance on lights: Different Measures of Light Density
(a) Light Density (per sq miles) (b) Standard Deviation of Lights
(c) Mean Lights (d) Sum of lights
The graphs show the impact of distance on night-time lights relative to sub-districts that have any portion of the sub-district
touching the straight-lines. The blue lines are for the pre-construction period, the orange lines for the construction period
and the green lines for the post-construction period. The standard error bands are for the pre-construction (blue) lines and
clustered at the district level. The ‘Distance’ axis consists of 8 quantiles of equal size. The distance quantile cutoffs are
roughly as follows: 0 to 40kms, 40 to 90 kms, 90 to 135 kms, 135 to 200kms, 200 to 260kms, 260 to 340 kms, 340 to 440
kms, and above 440kms.
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Figure 3.8.4: How the Impact of Distance on Light-Density changes over time (relative to 1992): Differ-
ent Measures of Light Density
(a) Light-Density:1992 coefficient -0.00406 (b) Mean-lights. 1992 cofficient is -0.00186
(c) Sum of lights: 1992 coefficient is -0.0038 (d) Standard Deviation of Lights -0.00174
Coefficients of change in impact relative to 1992. Standard errors calculated at the district level. Vertical lines represent the
phases of construction - 1999 is when the highways started being built. There were delays till 2001 when most work started,
and 2006 is when most work was completed. To interpret the graph: the mean impact of a 1km increase in distance from the
highway was a 0.00406 fall in light-density, and this impact has been dissipating over time. By 2012 the impact of a 1km
increase in distance from the highway had become -0.00406+0.00205, or about -0.00201.
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Figure 3.8.5: Robustness Checks: Impact of distance on lights excluding outlying states
(a) Standard Deviation of Lights (b) Light Density (per sq miles)
(c) Mean Lights (d) Sum of lights
The excluded states in this robustness check include: Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Sikkim,
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshwadeep. The graphs show the impact of
distance on night-time lights relative to sub-districts that have any portion of the sub-district touching the straight-lines. The
blue lines are for the pre-construction period, the orange lines for the construction period and the green lines for the post-
construction period. The standard error bands are for the pre-construction (blue) lines and clustered at the district level. The
‘Distance’ axis consists of 8 quantiles of equal size. The distance quantile cutoffs are roughly as follows: 0 to 40kms, 40 to
90 kms, 90 to 135 kms, 135 to 200kms, 200 to 260kms, 260 to 340 kms, 340 to 440 kms, and above 440kms.
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Figure 3.8.6: Robustness Checks: Different samples and specifications for: How the Impact of Distance
on Light-Density changes over time
(a) District-level clusters (b) Sub-district clusters
(c) Dropping 0s - Log(lights/area) (d) Dropping extremely high light-density
Coefficients of change in impact relative to 1992. The impact of a 1km increase in distance in 1992 was a 0.00406. Vertical
lines represent the phases of construction - 1999 is when the highways started being built. There were delays till 2001 when
most work started, and 2006 is when most work was completed. The ‘Dropping extremely high light-density’ panel drops all
sub-districts if they ever recorded a light pixel equal to the maximum possible value (63). This is 12% of the sample.
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3.9 Mobility and Convergence
One factor that may contribute to the dissipation of the effects of these routes may lie with the mobility
of firms and people. However, such a model of mobility patterns would have to explain why capital or
workers move away from the road over time. If the upgradation of highways actually allowed firms and
workers to move away from the highway, then that may explain the spread in economic activity to regions
further away.
3.9.1 Movement of Capital and Firms
The first is a location choice model for firms and capital. While the long-run positive impacts of the road
suggest that firms locate to regions along these routes, somewhat more complex models are needed to
explain why firms may move away over time. In such a model, upgrading the highway and therefore
better connectivity on the highway system allows firms and households to locate further away from the
highway. A firm or household enterprise wishes to be connected to the four nodal cities for purposes of
trade and exchange. For locations that are not near the nodal cities, the cost of being connected to the
city is the sum of the cost of being connected to the highway c1(d) and the cost of using the highway
to get to the city c2, where c1(d) is an increasing function of the distance between the region and the
closest highway d.23 Firms have returns to investment that is drawn from a distribution R ∼ F (.) and
choose to locate in region d if R ≥ c1(d) + c2. The fraction of firms that locate there are therefore
1− F (c1(d) + c2). Since the cost functions are increasing in the distance, this would indicate that more
firms will locate closer to the highways. Once the highway is upgraded, this reduces c2, thereby allowing
the same firm to locate at a distance d′ further away from the highway. After the NHDP upgrades, firms
and households can therefore move into regions that would earlier have been too costly for them to locate
in. Note that in such a model, firms are no longer profit maximizing – lowering the credibility of such a
model.
The strongest evidence against this model is the result shown in Ghani et al. (2015) who find that when the
highways are upgraded, organized manufacturing firms actually move closer to the highway. Similarly,
Redding and Turner (2015) discuss how it is likely that firms would move from ‘untreated’ to ‘treated’
regions when highways are built.
3.9.2 Movement of People
Another model is that of lowering costs of seasonal migration. Once the highways are upgraded, this
allows people from near the highways to migrate to the city at lower costs. If the migration is permanent,
23c2 can also be made to depend on the distance on the highway from the city, but is irrelevant for this analysis
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there will be a fall in population and economic activity in the region close to the highway. In the Indian
context, migration for work is low Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016), and Table 3.4 shows that at least
long-run migration cannot drive the dynamic results. However, a lot of the migration in the Indian
context is seasonal in nature, where people work in the cities during the agricultural slack season but on
the farms in the peak season. For a city wage Wc that lies between the peak season wp and slack season
ws wages, after taking into account the cost of migrating cm, a laborer word work in the city during the
agricultural slack season and return to his fields in the peak season. If a worker doesn’t migrate in the
slack season (he lives in a region where cm is high), then he would engage in non-agricultural economic
activity instead, but if he does migrate (cm is low) then there is no need for non-agricultural enterprises
to exist in these regions since in the slack season workers would easily migrate to the city. A lowering of
migration costs by upgrading the highways would then facilitate seasonal migration and thereby reduce
any non-agricultural enterprises from setting up in rural areas near the highways.
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